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This thesis examines Britain and the United States’ use of cultural diplomacy and 
propaganda in Iran between 1953 and 1960. It identifies why British and American 
policymakers placed so much importance on cultural ties with Iran, how officials from both 
countries used these initiatives to attract Iranians to their respective ways of life and the 
extent to which they perceived these policies to be successful. This PhD considers how 
Britain and the United States sought to strengthen ties with Iran at an elite and popular level. 
It explores how the UK Foreign Office and the US State Department forged links with their 
Iranian counterparts to instruct them on the production and dissemination of propaganda. 
The project proceeds to explore the role played by government-affiliated institutions at a 
non-state level to promote British and American cultures, norms, values and ways of life in 
Iran. These include the British Council, the Iran-America Society and the United States 
Information Agency (USIA).  
The analysis of British and American soft power in Iran between 1953 and 1960 
makes three key contributions to the literature on this topic. First, it views Anglo-American 
relations with Iran through the prism of soft power. This is an original take on the topic. 
Previous research has emphasised economic and military interactions between the UK, US 
and Iran. Second, the thesis explores how Britain and the United States responded to the 
changes in their respective global positions. During this period, the UK was a declining 
power, crippled by the financial cost of the Second World War and was in the process of 
relinquishing most of overseas colonies. The US, in comparison, was a booming 
superpower, talking a greater interest in the struggle against Communism in regions such as 
the Middle East. Finally, it highlights the tensions and competitive element of Anglo-
American relations in the Middle East. Both countries, while collaborating in many fields, had 
similar aims but different regional priorities. The project points out the ways in which they co-
operated and competed with one another for regional supremacy
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Introduction 
 
‘At the heart of the Iran deal was a giant fiction that a murderous regime desired only a 
peaceful nuclear energy program.’1 
 
In May 2018, the US President, Donald Trump, withdrew the United States from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action. Dubbed the ‘Iran deal’, the agreement pledged that the 
country would halt its nuclear programme in return for the lifting of economic sanctions.2 The 
incumbent President claimed that the Iranian government had flouted the agreement by 
cultivating plutonium, something its leadership in Tehran vehemently denies. The treaty had 
been a key foreign policy achievement of Trump’s predecessor in the White House, Barack 
Obama. Presuming that both countries shared mutual regional goals, he had adopted a 
more conciliatory approach towards Iran, working with moderate Iranian government elites to 
achieve these goals. Between 2013 and 2015, Obama and his then Secretary of State, John 
Kerry, worked with the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, and his Foreign Minister, Javad 
Zarif, to construct the ‘Iran deal’ and create an international consensus around this 
agreement.3 The juxtaposing approaches taken by Trump and Obama towards the Iranian 
regime here are nothing new. Echoing the stance adopted by the incumbent in the White 
House, George W. Bush used his 2002 State of the Union Address to place Iran, among 
                                               
1 ‘Remarks by Donald Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’, The White House, 8 May 
2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-
comprehensive-plan-action/ (accessed 31 May 2019). 
2 Peter Baker, ‘President Obama Calls Preliminary Iran Nuclear Deal “Our Best Bet”’, New York 
Times, 5 April 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/world/middleeast/obama-strongly-defends-
iran-nuclear-deal.html (accessed 2 April 2019).  
3 Steve Hurst, The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme: A Critical History (Edinburgh, 
2018). 
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others, in his ‘axis of evil.’ He proceeded to accuse the country of supporting terrorist groups 
and of working to manufacture a nuclear weapon. In his first term, likewise, William J. 
Clinton implemented the policy of ‘dual containment.’ Grouping the country with its 
neighbour, Iraq, he strove to starve Iran’s economy and deprive it of its regional influence.4 
From the 1997 election of reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, though, Clinton 
abandoned this policy, working with his Iranian counterpart to improve US-Iran relations.5 
Britain’s relationship with Iran in this period has been similarly fractured. An advocate 
of the ‘Iran deal’, the British government have led European efforts to resurrect the 
agreement in light of Trump’s refusal to comply with it. Despite this willingness to engage 
with the country, Anglo-Iranian relations have, at times, been difficult. Since 2012, the 
Iranian authorities have tried to jam the BBC Persian Service’s televisual transmissions, 
threatened its staff, and detained relatives of those working for the broadcaster. The 
continuance of such aggressive tactics compelled the BBC in March 2018 to appeal to the 
UN’s Human Rights Council in Geneva to get the Iranians to halt these practices.6 In 2009, 
moreover, the British Council was forced to depart Iran after its office in Tehran was 
vandalised, with the British Embassy following suit in 2011 after its site was attacked by 
protestors.7 
                                               
4 Anthony Lake, ‘Confronting Backlash States’, Foreign Affairs, 73/2 (1994), 44-55.  
5 Donette Murray, US Foreign Policy and Iran: American-Iranian Relations Since the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution (London, 2010), 90-115. 
6 Kasra Naji, ‘BBC UN Appeal: Stop Harassing Persian Service Staff’, BBC News, 12 March 2018, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-43334401 (accessed 26 March 2018).  
7 Saeed Kamali Deghan, ‘Hague Says Iran Will Face “Serious Consequences” over Embassy Attack’, 
The Guardian, 29 November 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/29/iranian-students-
storm-british-embassy (accessed 2 April 2019); Matthew Moore, ‘Iran: British Council Suspends Work 
in Tehran’, The Telegraph, 5 February 2009, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews 
/middleeast/iran/4518269/Iran-British-Council-suspends-work-in-Tehran.html (accessed 2 April 2019).  
  5 
The United States and Britain’s tense relationship with Iran was the consequence of 
proceedings during the middle and latter stages of the Cold War. In 1979, the Shah of Iran, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was overthrown, replaced by an oligarchy of Islamic clerics 
opposed to the UK and US. Popular discontent had arisen in Iran due to the Iranian 
monarch’s authoritarian rule, endemic corruption within the government and vast disparities 
in wealth and income among the country’s people. In response to America permitting the 
deposed Shah to reside in New York for hospital treatment, supporters of the new regime 
stormed the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and took 52 hostages. Lasting for 
444 days, America and Britain led international efforts to impose political and economic 
sanctions on Iran to halt the ensuing stand-off.8 Although the US and UK’s relationship with 
Iran has been difficult since this flouting of hitherto sacrosanct diplomatic conventions, this 
was not always the case. In the 1950s, American and British policymakers relied on close 
ties with the Shah to fight the Cold War in the Middle East. Vehemently opposed to 
Communism, the Iranian monarch had led efforts to restrict and quash the activities of the 
Soviet-backed Tudeh Party in the country. US State Department and UK Foreign Office 
officials, equally, feared that the USSR, which neighboured Iran, sought to meddle and 
exercise considerable influence over Iranian affairs. In so doing, they could use the country 
as a platform to expand their presence across Asia, the Arab world and the Persian Gulf.9 
                                               
8 Ivor Lucas, ‘Revisiting the Decline and Fall of the Shah of Iran’, Asian Affairs, 40/3 (2009), 419; 
Amin Saikal, ‘Islamism, the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan’, in: Melvyn 
Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds) The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume Three: Endings 
(Cambridge, 2010), 118. 
9 United States interests and objectives in respect of the Near East (NSC 155/1), 14 July 1953, 
Abilene, Kansas, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (hereafter document, date, DDEL), White 
House Office, NSC Series, Policy Papers; Roger Stevens (British Ambassador, Iran) to Selwyn Lloyd 
(Foreign Secretary), 1 June 1957, Kew, Richmond, The National Archives, BW 49/13 (hereafter 
document, date, TNA, file reference). 
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US and British policymakers, therefore, authorised the provision of considerable military and 
economic aid to Iran. As well as deterring the Soviets from making incursions into the 
country, they aimed to transform Iran into an anti-Communist buffer for the whole region.10 
Complementing this military and economic aid were a whole host of Anglo-American 
soft power initiatives. Rather than deterring or coercing the Soviets, these policies aimed to 
persuade and attract Iranians away from the Soviet Union and more towards Western 
powers. The main aim of this thesis, therefore, is to establish how the UK and US used soft 
power between 1953 and 1960 to combat Communism and promote their respective ways of 
life in Iran. It identifies their motives, the types of initiatives employed and the extent to which 
they were successful. While British and American policymakers placed a considerable 
importance on diplomatic ties with Iran, little scholarly attention has been paid to how UK 
and US diplomats and officials used cultural diplomacy to foster ties with the country. 
Moreover, despite the considerable body of literature dedicated to the ‘special relationship’ 
in the Middle East, there has been little comment on how ties between the UK and US were 
shaped by both countries’ dealings with Iran. As a means of introducing the thesis, this 
chapter begins by examining American and British soft power, establishing a theoretical 
framework for this PhD in the process. It proceeds to review the literature on Anglo-
American relations in the Middle East, followed by an analysis, in turn, of scholarly work 
undertaken on the US and UK’s diplomatic engagements with Iran. The introductory section 
finally moves on to outline the project’s main research questions, the methods and sources 
employed and the overall chapter structure.  
 
The UK, US and Soft Power 
                                               
10 Memorandum from Robert Bowie (State Department representative on the NSC Planning Board) to 
Robert Cutler (President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs), 1 August 1957, Oxford, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII 
(hereafter document, date, FRUS, year, volume). 
  7 
 
Soft power is a crucial tenet of Anglo-American foreign policy. Coined in 1990 by political 
scientist Joseph Nye, the term is used to describe foreign policy initiatives that persuade and 
attract others to do one’s bidding.11 Examples include propaganda, cultural exchanges and 
language teaching. While contrasting with hard power - which involves the use of force to 
accomplish diplomatic aims – sources of soft power are not exclusively non-military. An 
attractive reputation that may influence others can also be achieved through military and 
economic means if these coercive sources of power are employed in ways widely perceived 
as legitimate. The employment of armed forces in a manner and for reasons other actors 
deem appropriate, for example, can bolster soft power appeal, which, in turn, can lead these 
countries and organisations to side with the US.12 Political elites may exercise soft power at 
a state level to set an example that they wish others to follow. Alternatively, governments 
may boost their soft power through establishing cultural institutions and radio broadcasters - 
such as the British Council, the Voice of America (VOA) and, in the case of Iran, the BBC 
Persian Service – that operate overseas.13 In so doing, these non-state actors highlight their 
home country’s values, culture or economic prosperity to worldwide audiences, creating a 
positive perception of their home nation.14  
The concept of soft power stems from international relations theory. Marxist scholars, 
such as Robert Cox and Stephen Gill, applied the ideas of the Italian theorist and politician 
Antonio Gramsci to the international sphere. As a political prisoner in the 1930s, Gramsci 
had devised the concept of cultural hegemony, the idea that societal norms, values and 
                                               
11 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, 2004), 12.  
12 Nye, Soft Power, 14-15.  
13 Joseph Nye, ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly, 119/2 (2004), 
255. 
14 Joseph Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 616 (2008), 97.  
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lifestyles had been shaped by elites as a way of furthering their goals. He cited the example 
of the Roman Catholic Church, claiming its scriptures were a means by which to control the 
public’s behaviour.15 Cox and Gill transferred these ideas to the realm of international 
politics. They argued that prominent states on the world stage, such as the UK and US, 
shape the actions of other actors. Focusing on proceedings in bilateral talks and 
intergovernmental summits, both scholars highlight the ways in which these nations and 
their governments use their reputation to persuade others to adhere to their proposals and 
agreements.16 
In recent years, British and American political elites have emphasised the value of 
soft power policies. In 2015, the UK government’s Strategic Defence and Security Review, 
extolled the virtues of British soft power. The paper referred to the UK as one of the most 
prominent proponents of soft power globally. Cultural exchanges and English language 
teaching, along with radio and television broadcasts, promote British ‘values and interests’, 
provide the UK with ‘international influence’ and can help ‘tackle the causes of security 
threats.’17 A Chatham House Report titled Strengthening Britain’s Voice in the World echoed 
these sentiments, calling on the government to ‘ensure continued funding of key elements of 
the UK's soft power such as the BBC World Service and the British Council.’18 Similarly, a 
2005 report by the US State Department underlined the importance of soft power to wider 
American foreign policy. According to the report, policies of attraction and persuasion are the 
                                               
15 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London, 2005), 18. 
16 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10/2 (1981), 128; Stephen Gill, ‘American Hegemony: Its 
Limits and Prospects in the Reagan Era’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 15 (1986), 332.  
17 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and 
Prosperous United Kingdom (Westminster, 2015).  
18 Strengthening Britain’s Voice in the World: Report of the UK Foreign and Security Policy Working 
Group (Chatham House, 2015). 
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only way that the United States can effectively ‘inform, engage and influence foreign publics 
over the long term.’19  
Despite the importance that UK and US policymakers’ place on soft power, historians 
of diplomacy and international affairs have only systematically investigated the subject in 
recent decades. Scholarly attention as to how this facet of foreign policy was used to 
achieve diplomatic goals began with the publication of political scientist Joseph Nye’s Bound 
to Lead. The book acted as a counter to claims by leading American scholars in the 1980s 
that the US’ international commitments outstretched its capacity, leading to the country’s 
decline.20 Nye urged those engaged in the study of diplomacy of the need to move beyond 
the examination of military and economic resources. The US had played a prominent role in 
the Second World War and it had led efforts to contain and combat the Soviet Union after 
1945. Its military strength and allocation of economic aid were abnormally high because of 
these events and it was only after the Soviet Union’s decline that American capabilities in 
these areas were coming back down to normal.21 Using the Cold War as a case study – 
which this thesis is also an example of - Nye recommends that scholars should instead 
investigate how the US sought to attract and coerce others into doing their bidding. It is only 
through this that we would understand why the United States triumphed over the Soviet 
Union.22  
Scholars have accordingly investigated the ways in which soft power is employed.  
                                               
19 ‘Cultural Diplomacy: The Lynchpin of Public Diplomacy’, Report of the Advisory Committee on 
Cultural Diplomacy, the US Department of State (September 2005).  
20 Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York, 1991), 3.  
21 Nye, Bound to Lead, 10-11.  
22 Nye, Bound to Lead, 27.  
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Utpal Vyas maintains that all agents wanting to use soft power initiatives exercise them in 
the following way. Actors first create a ‘pool’ of beliefs, norms, values and cultures.23 Others, 
including but not confined to, government bodies, businesses and NGOs, proceed to use 
resources from this ‘pool’ when interacting with overseas agents. Once links have been 
made, ideas can be transferred that alter the target’s perceptions.24 Building on this model, 
Seiichi Kondo analyses how the delivery of soft power can be evaluated. To assess its 
success, he recommends that there should be an examination of how soft power is received, 
namely the intended and unintended consequences of these initiatives.25  
Hence, soft power is generated in many forms and a detailed account of each type is 
beyond this dissertation’s remit. The policies undertaken by actors in this field usually 
encompass more than one form of soft power. They are also either interwoven with hard 
power initiatives or applied in tandem.26 For the purposes of this dissertation it is important to 
have a broad conception of soft power. This thesis focuses particularly on the production 
and dissemination of propaganda, the promotion of lifestyles, the sharing of language and 
literature, the advocacy of Anglo-American values, ideas and practices and the promotion of 
socio-economic advancements. Three key attempts to generate soft power are explored in 
this thesis. The first is cultural diplomacy. According to Milton Cummings, this is the 
exchange of norms, values and ideas across both cultures and borders to foster mutual 
                                               
23 Utpal Vyas, Soft Power in Japan-China Relations: State, Sub-State and Non-State Relations 
(Abingdon, 2013), 61.  
24 Vyas, Soft Power, 52.  
25 Seiichi Kondo, ‘Wielding Soft Power: The Key Stages of Transmission and Reception’, in: Yasushi 
Watanabe and David McConnell (eds) Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of 
Japan and the United States (London, 2008), 193.  
26 Nye, Bound to Lead, 35.  
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understanding.27 Policies can be undertaken at a state level, through cultural and 
educational exchanges, or at a non-state level. Government affiliated semi-independent 
institutions such as the British Council and the United States Information Agency (USIA) are 
key to this. Operating overseas, these organisations, among other things, translate British 
and American literature, organise exhibitions and offer language courses that provide 
students with an insight into life in the UK and US.28 When employed effectively, cultural 
diplomacy can help foster a dialogue with the people of a country immune to either regime 
change or governmental clashes on the world stage. It also provides a foundation from 
which future bilateral political, economic and military agreements can be achieved.29 
The second key form of generating soft power covered in this thesis is the power and 
influence of intelligence agencies. These are usually clandestine governmental 
organisations, most notably the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). As well as this, there are also open-source intelligence 
agencies such as the UK Foreign Office’s Information Research Department (IRD). As 
Andrew Defty explains, this was a department established to combat Communist 
propaganda and co-ordinate attempts to discredit the Soviet Union and its allies abroad.30 
To achieve this, the IRD collaborated with foreign political elites, as well as those it regarded 
as ‘opinion formers’, typically teachers, journalists and civil servants.31 Agencies such as the 
IRD, SIS and CIA exercise soft power through what Richard Aldrich termed the ‘hidden 
                                               
27 Milton Cummings, Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey (Washington, 
DC, 2003), 11. 
28 Cummings, Cultural Diplomacy, 26-48.  
29 Cummings, Cultural Diplomacy, 17.  
30 Andrew Defty, ‘“Close and Continuous Liaison”: British Anti-Communist Propaganda and 
Cooperation with the United States, 1950-51’, Intelligence and National Security, 17/4 (2002), 126-
128.  
31 Defty, ‘Close and Continuous Liaison’, 110-111.  
  12 
hand.’ They supplied individuals and organisations at home and abroad sympathetic to their 
cause with pro-Western and anti-Communist material for them to publicise and disseminate. 
In so doing, these agencies steered foreign and domestic publics unnoticed and from afar.32 
They occasionally collaborate with counterpart organisations in other countries should they 
share mutual goals. This is an area that has only recently gained scholarly attention. Priscilla 
Roberts highlights the ways in which the SIS’ Hong Kong Department established links with 
moderates in the Communist Chinese government during the 1970s.33 Moreover, Pearse 
Redmond charts the CIA’s relationship with the Hollywood film industry from the early 
twentieth century up to the present day. He examines how, during the Second World War, 
the Office of Strategic Services, the CIA’s forerunner, openly collaborated with American film 
studios in the production and funding of films that supported the American war effort. 
Developing these links further during the Cold War’s early stages, the CIA covertly continued 
this practice, assisting in the production of films that skewed the political messages behind 
George Orwell and Graham Greene’s novels.34  
The third form of soft power relevant to this dissertation is propaganda. This is a 
contentious term. Andrew Yarrow claims it is the ‘selling’ of ideas domestically and 
overseas.35 He suggests that, from a foreign policy perspective, political elites manipulate 
                                               
32 Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London, 
2001). 
33 Priscilla Roberts, ‘Rebuilding a Relationship: British Cultural Diplomacy Towards China, 1967-80’, 
in: Greg Kennedy and Christopher Tuck (eds) British Propaganda and Wars of Empire: Influencing 
Friend and Foe, 1900-2010 (Abingdon, 2014), 192-194.  
34 Pearse Redmond, ‘The Historical Roots of CIA-Hollywood Propaganda’, The American Journal of 
Politics and Sociology, 76/2 (2017), 280.  
35 Andrew Yarrow, ‘Selling a New Vision of America to the World: Changing Messages in Early U.S. 
Cold War Print Propaganda’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 11/4 (2009), 9. 
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popular opinion to cement or increase support for their approach to international affairs.36 
Such a definition, however, fails to acknowledge the complexities of propaganda. Kenneth 
Osgood agrees that shaping the views of the public is key but notes the importance of truth 
to propaganda’s effectiveness. Campaigns should be based on facts, even if these have 
been taken out of context.37 Osgood proceeds to note the importance of having a broad 
conception of propaganda. It is not just present in radio broadcasts, literature and films, but 
also in cultural initiatives and attractions.38 Equally, the Yarrow conception does not 
recognise that propaganda is a two-way process. As Nick Cull attests, propaganda involves 
not just the shaping of public opinion, but listening to it too. He recommends that the term 
public diplomacy should be used instead. Not only does it provide a more accurate 
description, but also it lacks the negative connotations of the term propaganda, which infers 
that foreign and domestic publics have had ideas imposed on them. Public diplomacy, in 
contrast, suggests that actors have taken on board the views of their target audiences, using 
these perspectives in the framing and shaping of initiatives.39 
Public diplomacy, though, does not just underpin propaganda efforts. It is, in fact, key 
to the success of the majority of soft power initiatives. According to Jan Melissen, public 
diplomacy describes foreign policy approaches that target both the general public and non-
state actors. It seeks to alter foreign perceptions, influence domestic audiences, promote the 
integration of cultures and encourage bilateral business dealings.40 Successful public 
diplomacy makes use of ‘short run’ instruments such as press releases and radio 
                                               
36 Yarrow, ‘Selling a New Vision’, 13.  
37 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad 
(Lawrence, KS, 2006), 22-24. 
38 Osgood, Total Cold War, 26.  
39 Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and 
Public Diplomacy During the Cold War (New York, 2003), 5-7.  
40 Jan Melissen, New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Basingstoke, 2005), 5.  
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broadcasts, as well as long-term educational and cultural programmes.41 William Rugh 
explains the workings of public diplomacy. He claims that political elites elucidate the aims of 
these initiatives and both embassy officials and non-state actors strive to achieve these 
objectives.42 Concurring, Laura Belmonte argues that there are three key aspects to this. 
First, actors have to explain their decisions to targets. Second, they have to finance and 
encourage pressure groups and other organisations to protest and advocate in favour of 
these norms, values and ideas. Thirdly, links have to be established with prominent 
individuals.43  
However, there are certain factors that undermine the effectiveness of soft power 
initiatives. As stated by Peter Von Ham, the money and hegemonic capabilities of Britain 
and the United States do not guarantee success in this field.44 Focusing on US soft power in 
the Arab world, Hosam Matar places these limitations of soft power into two groups, those 
within the government’s control and those outside of its jurisdiction.45 With regard to the 
former group, there are many Arabs suspicious of America’s motives in the region. To 
diminish the threat posed by Communism, and latterly Islamic fundamentalism, the US has 
directly intervened in the affairs of Arab states. In doing so, the Americans undermine many 
of their soft power initiatives in the region, many of which promote democracy and human 
rights.46 Moreover, Matar explains the problem of the American ‘deaf ear.’ In formulating and 
                                               
41 Melissen, New Public Diplomacy, 15.  
42 William Rugh, American Encounters with Arabs: The “Soft Power” of US Public Diplomacy in the 
Middle East (London, 2006), 28-30.  
43 Laura Belmonte, Selling the American Way: US Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia, 
2008), 56.  
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delivering soft power initiatives, policymakers assume it is a one-way process. Many in the 
Arab world are under the impression that the US assumes a supposed moral and intellectual 
authority over other actors in the region, imposing their values and ideas on others.47  
Outside the US government’s control, Matar states that the actions of other states 
regionally and internationally can undermine the effectiveness of American soft power. 
Locally, countries in the Arab world take defensive measures against US cultural and public 
diplomacy overtures. They impose Internet and media restrictions, promote local culture and 
provide clandestine support to paramilitary and terrorist groups opposed to the US. Other 
prominent global powers, such as the UK, France, Russia and China, may also devise their 
own soft power initiatives, competing with those of the United States and crowding it out. 
Furthermore, Matar argues that the US has failed to grasp the structural complexities of the 
Arab world. He claims that American policymakers have failed to appreciate the importance 
of Islam to societies here, as well as failing to recognise the fragmented nature of Arab 
cultures.48  
Matar’s critique brings the question of ‘culture’ to the heart of the debate on soft 
power. In Bound to Lead, Nye treats American values as universal, presuming all peoples 
and nations are attracted to them. This Western-centrism is not unique in the literature. 
Analysing American attempts to project US values in East Asia, Michael Hunt highlights the 
same mentality. He claims that efforts by American missionaries and business figures to 
export US-style freedom and liberty to the region was used to justify the failed intervention 
on the side of the Chinese Nationalists during the 1940s.49 The ‘Luce vision’ also failed to 
take into account the societal complexities of East Asia. Here, there was a suspicion of 
individualism, a value for order and a view that US prescriptions of change were paternalistic 
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at best and destabilising at worst.50 Equally, Nye fails to take into account that the exertion of 
soft power is a two-way process. As Edward Lock attests, Bound to Lead encourages 
scholars to focus on the agent exercising soft power. Not enough attention is therefore paid 
to the target, which does more than just receive. Their response to the soft power overtures 
of others is shaped by public opinion, the actions of non-state actors and the social and 
economic actions of states other than the agent.51 
As a result of these debates, historians have begun to incorporate the concept of soft 
power into their own work. For instance, a new wave of historical research on the Cold War 
has emerged that analyses how the US promoted American norms, ideas and lifestyles in 
their struggle against the Soviet Union.52 Walter Hixson examined how the United States 
used an exhibition in Moscow in 1959 to illustrate the superior living standards enjoyed by 
Americans to Russian people.53 Frances Saunders, likewise, highlighted the CIA’s indirect 
financial support for cultural movements that originated in the United States. She pays 
particular attention to Abstract Expressionism, an art movement that emerged in the mid-
1940s. Saunders explains how, to help transform America’s east coast into a cultural centre 
for art, the CIA provided funds via third party organisations to key Abstract Expressionist 
artists such as Jackson Pollock so they could showcase their work at European 
exhibitions.54 The works of both scholars here have contributed towards a new, emerging 
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strand of literature that asserts that the US ‘won’ the Cold War through its exertion of soft 
power. American fashion, music and values, most notably human rights and democracy, 
pervaded the ‘Iron Curtain’ into the Soviet Union, fuelling elite and popular desires for 
political and economic change.55  
Yet such revisionist analyses, despite their greater consideration of soft power, still 
largely dealt with diplomatic elements of the superpower rivalry. Many early ‘new Cold War 
histories’, Kenneth Osgood notes, focused on the US government’s attempts to showcase 
America abroad.56 In other words, there has been a greater emphasis on how cultural 
initiatives were used by institutions such as the State Department to highlight the ways in 
which a ‘typical’ American lifestyle was supposedly superior to the Soviet way of life. How 
these governmental bodies applied culture and propaganda to encourage those overseas to 
adopt US customs, perspectives and lifestyles has received little scholarly attention. It is only 
in recent years, according to Federico Romero, that this has changed. 57 A growing body of 
work has started to underline the domestic, transnational and cultural elements surrounding 
US diplomacy. Luminita Gatejel, for instance, assesses the impact of the marketing and 
production of automobiles – the ownership of which is a cornerstone of the American 
lifestyle – on the car industry in the Warsaw Pact.58 American firms, notably Ford and 
General Motors, promoted the idea in their advertisements that their automobiles were not 
only necessary for modern life, but also a luxury. Car ownership was something that was 
frequently presented to the public as something to aspire to, a supposed marker of personal 
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and professional attainment. Seeing the success of this strategy, Eastern European 
manufacturers such as the Romanian Dacia and the East German Wartburg incorporated 
these capitalist marketing techniques into their overall business strategy.59 
The analysis of US exertions of soft power in the Cold War have not just been 
confined to automobiles. Examining the projection of American movies overseas, both Peter 
Biskind and Nora Sayre argue that numerous Hollywood films of the 1950s, seemingly 
unrelated to the superpower struggle, contained implicit real-world messages that reinforced 
views espoused by the United States government.60 In Hollywood’s Cold War, Tony Shaw 
explains how this worked at length. He explores how filmmakers in California were 
influenced by the US government’s approach to Soviet inspired Communism. Shaw 
elucidates how officials from the State Department, CIA and USIA provided covert financial 
support to pro-Western filmmakers in a bid to create ‘grey’ propaganda. This conception of 
the persuasive tool was devised and implemented by non-state actors, with political elites 
shaping it from afar. American political elites regarded this form of propaganda as more 
credible than conventional, state-run alternatives. It was also more flexible, enabling films to 
be watched by both domestic and overseas audiences.61 
Despite this focus on US soft power in the Cold War, how the United States used this 
form of foreign policy in Iran and the wider Middle East during this period remains largely 
unexplored. By contrast, there has been much analysis of how institutions like the British 
Council and the BBC were used by the Foreign Office to achieve the UK government’s 
diplomatic goals in the region. James Vaughan discusses the British Council’s distribution of 
pro-British books, magazines and films that extolled Britain’s virtues throughout the region in 
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the aftermath of the Second World War.62 On the other hand, Alban Webb highlights the 
tensions between British diplomats and the BBC over the latter’s Arab language broadcasts 
to the Middle East during the early stages of the Cold War. Eager to have a greater editorial 
control over these transmissions, Foreign Office diplomats withheld funding and objected to 
content they felt contravened British diplomatic interests.63 The 1952 election of Egyptian 
Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser was a case in point. Due to his anti-British views, the 
UK government encouraged the BBC to be more critical of Nasser, something the BBC was 
reluctant to do.64 
Likewise, there has been a considerable amount of research undertaken on the 
IRD’s initiatives in the Middle East. James Vaughan focuses on the department’s activities in 
the Middle East and North Africa between 1945 and 1956. He explores the IRD’s financial 
support for the popular Arab language radio station Sharq-Al-Adna. Situated in Cyprus, this 
radio broadcaster transmitted light entertainment programmes across the Arabic-speaking 
world.65 Recent research has also stressed the ways in which Middle Eastern actors 
manipulated the IRD for their own ends. Chikara Hashimoto’s PhD thesis explores this 
department’s counter-subversion activities across the region between 1949 and 1963. He 
reveals how the IRD established links with pro-Western officials in the Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian 
and Pakistani governments to encourage the spread of anti-Communist propaganda in these 
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countries.66 Over time, however, these countries’ governments began to exploit the IRD. 
Fearful of the growing Arab nationalist threat, they coerced officials from this department into 
supplying them with anti-Egyptian propaganda, even though this contravened wider British 
foreign policy.67 
However, many of these histories pay little attention on the UK’s attempts to forge 
cultural ties with Iran during the Cold War specifically. Annabelle Sreberny and Massoumeh 
Torfeh, for instance, have explored how the UK sought to engage with Iran culturally, 
evaluating the BBC Persian Service’s role in promoting British interests in the country. They 
argue that the UK Foreign Office exerted considerable pressure on the broadcaster to 
adhere to its foreign policy stance on Iran. During the 1951-53 Iranian Oil Crisis, for 
example, diplomats expected the Persian Service to be critical of the Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mossagdeh.68 Yet whilst surveying its broadcasts between 1945 and 2012, 
Torfeh and Sreberny only analyse the Persian Service and Iran at certain key points. These 
include the 1951-53 Oil Crisis, the 1979 Revolution and the 2008 launch of the BBC Persian 
television channel. The writers pay little attention to proceedings before and between these 
events.69  
 
Anglo-American Relations and the Middle East 
 
A key element of Anglo-American foreign policy is the ‘special relationship’ shared between 
Britain and the United States. According to Christopher Phillips and William Wallace, this 
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bilateral relationship is complex and multi-faceted. Close ties between the UK and US began 
during World War Two and continued thereafter. Policymakers from both countries realised 
that they shared an aversion to Communism and a penchant for free trade. By working 
together, British and American diplomats and officials were convinced that these objectives 
could be achieved more quickly.70 At a transnational level, Anglo-American collaboration has 
led to the establishment of global institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
and the World Trade Organisation, that promote UK and US geopolitical and economic 
values.71 Nationally, close ties between both countries led to intelligence sharing between 
clandestine agencies, co-operation on military campaigns and frequent dialogue and 
collaboration between British and American political leaders.72  
Since the 1950s, Britain has been regarded as the ‘junior partner’ in this ‘special 
relationship’, particularly in the Middle East. Prior to this, the UK was perceived to be the 
hegemonic Western power in the region. It straddled two prominent British diplomatic 
interests, the Suez Canal and the Indian Subcontinent. Since 1763, the Royal Navy had 
maintained a presence in the Persian Gulf, while Foreign Office diplomats and officials held 
influential positions in the courts of many of the state’s ruling regimes.73 Historians have 
accordingly debated why Britain’s prominence in the Middle East declined at the United 
States’ expense. According to Corelli Bartlett and Frederick Northedge the Second World 
War was behind the UK’s international demise. The conflict had crippled the UK 
economically and the country no longer had the monetary means to pursue its ambitious 
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foreign policy goals.74 Recent research, though, has given more specific reasons as to why 
the UK’s financial capabilities diminished after the Second World War. Between 1941 and 
1945, the United States had provided Britain with 13.5 billion US dollars expecting these 
loans to be paid back upon the cessation of hostilities. The UK, though, was unable to raise 
the capital to repay the United States post-1945. Prior to the outbreak of war, British 
businesses had various markets in both Europe and South-East Asia in which to export their 
goods and services to. Nations in both these regions though had seen much of the fighting 
during the Second World War and were unable to resume commercial activities at their pre-
1939 levels.75 
Other scholars, however, have posited different reasons as to why Britain declined in 
international prominence after 1945. Paul Kennedy, for example, argued that a post-war 
desire for a welfare state and healthcare system led to the British government neglecting its 
foreign policy.76 Contemporary research, though, has proffered radically different 
explanations for Britain’s demise on the world stage. Rather than considering the UK’s 
declining political and economic capabilities, scholars have emphasised the agency of 
colonised subjects: namely how they resisted and overthrew imperial rule. Caroline Elkins, 
for example, analyses how the 1952-1964 Mau Mau Uprising culminated in the end of British 
rule in Kenya. The rebellion had been instigated by the Kikuyu, the largest ethnic group in 
the country, in response to being forced off their ancestral lands for white settlers. The 
British government’s response to the rebellion was unmeasured and barbaric. Officials 
overlooked and covered up its military forces’ internment, rape and execution of suspected 
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dissidents and whole Kikuyu villages. Yet the nature of the fighting culminated in the British 
relinquishing their East African colonies in the 1960s.77  
The United States, in comparison, emerged from the Second World War as a 
booming superpower. Military action against Germany and Japan had stimulated its 
domestic economy and it was showing a greater willingness to involve itself in international 
affairs, especially those of the Middle East.78 This growth in political, economic and cultural 
reach coincided with growing Soviet involvement in the region. The USSR had established 
strong links with the governing regimes in Egypt, Iraq and Syria. It was also providing 
significant financial support to movements like the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the 
Communist Tudeh Party that sought to undermine the pro-Western regimes in Israel and 
Iran respectively.79 Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic feared that a significant Soviet 
presence in the region would jeopardise the safe supply of Middle Eastern oil and undermine 
the British and American military interests in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean 
respectively.80  
Traditionally, historians of twentieth century British foreign policy have regarded the 
Suez Crisis as the watershed moment. In response to Nasser’s decision to nationalise this 
shipping route – which had hitherto been under British control – UK, French and Israeli 
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soldiers seized the Suez Canal in October 1956. The international condemnation that 
followed, first from the UN and then, crucially, the US, compelled the three countries to 
acquiesce to the Egyptian President and withdraw their armed forces.81 Scholars have 
regarded the UK’s climbdown here as the beginning of the end of Britain’s dominance over 
the Middle East and the start of the United States’ role as the dominant Western power in 
the region. Keith Kyle claims that UK officials were reluctant to intervene in Middle Eastern 
affairs after 1956 for fear of repeating the embarrassment caused by the Suez Crisis.82 
Similarly, William Roger Louis asserts that Britain’s failure to reverse the Egyptian 
nationalisation of this vital shipping route persuaded policymakers in London of the need for 
the UK to relinquish most of its overseas colonies.83 More broadly, historians have pointed to 
the Suez Crisis as the point where Britain became the ‘junior partner’ to the United States. 
William Scott Lucas and John Charmley argue that the British acquiesced to the US in all 
foreign policy matters post-Suez. UK policymakers realised that their foreign policy aims 
were similar to those of their American counterparts, but that the US had the greater political 
and economic clout to achieve these objectives.84  
From the mid-1990s, however, a new wave of literature emerged, questioning the 
extent to which the Suez Crisis was a watershed moment for the UK and US in the Middle 
East. It urged researchers to view the diplomatic incident in its wider context. Tore Petersen 
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claims that Britain’s decline in the Middle East actually began earlier, in 1952. It was then 
that the Egyptian Prime Minister Abdel Gamal Nasser, who was opposed to the UK, came to 
power and it also marked the beginning of the US’ expansion of its role in Saudi Arabia.85 
Both these events resulted in the crowding out of Britain in the region, with the Suez Crisis 
serving to confirm this.86 On the other hand, Ritchie Ovendale opines that UK policymakers 
had been aware of Britain’s declining role in the Middle East for six years before the Suez 
Crisis. Having already shed most of its territories in Southeast Asia and the Indian 
Subcontinent, Foreign Office and Downing Street officials knew that the UK’s Middle Eastern 
interests were next. UK policymakers recognised that the United States was paying greater 
attention to the region’s affairs and was taking its place as the dominant Western power 
there.87  
The perception, however, that British diplomats and officials were happy for the 
United States to have significant influence over the Middle East is not something shared by 
all scholars on the subject. Nigel Ashton claims that underneath this ‘special relationship’, 
there were significant tensions between the UK and US. Focusing on proceedings in the 
Middle East during the 1950s and 1960s, he refers to Britain and America’s relationship as 
one of ‘competitive collaboration.’ Both countries worked together on the larger regional 
issues, most notably in fighting the Cold War, but had different regional priorities.88 A wave 
of research has accordingly sought to examine the dynamics of the Anglo-American ‘special 
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relationship’ in the Middle East. Research by Simon Smith, for example, explores how the 
UK and US sought to bolster their presence in the Persian Gulf states between 1956 and 
1971 to prevent the spread of Soviet-inspired Communism here. Underneath this 
collaborative effort, though, there were significant tensions. As the region had long been 
under British influence, UK policymakers frequently resisted attempts by their American 
counterparts to encourage leaders in the region to invest their surplus revenue into dollars.89 
Furthermore, according to David Watry, Britain’s global political and economic decline was 
something that the United States welcomed.90 Suspicious that the UK still harboured 
imperialist ambitions in the Middle East, US policymakers sought to accelerate the 
weakening of the UK internationally.91 During the Eisenhower presidency, the White House 
and the State Department pursued a foreign policy of ‘brinkmanship’, where America would 
be poised on the verge of war without being in conflict. Not only did this contravene British 
foreign policy – which called for a more pragmatic approach of détente towards the Soviet 
Union – but it was also something that the UK could not afford to adhere to financially.92  
Few histories have discussed how these tensions in the ‘special relationship’ 
manifested themselves in Anglo-American interactions with Iran in this period specifically. 
There has been a greater focus on the UK and US response to the rise of Arab nationalism, 
which called for political and cultural unity and a rejection of Western powers across the 
Middle East.93 In 1952, the prominent Arab nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser was elected 
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Egyptian Prime Minister, rising to President in 1956. Syria, in turn, was taken over by an 
Arab nationalist government, too, with both countries joining together in 1958 to form the 
United Arab Republic (UAR).94 As Iran is not an Arab country, how Arab nationalism’s 
emergence shaped the UK and US approach towards the country has been ignored. This is 
in spite of Arab nationalist advocates calling for the deposing of regimes like the Shah’s, who 
relied on political, military and economic aid from Western powers.95 Equally, histories of 
Britain and the United States’ response here do not acknowledge the soft power elements of 
their approach, focussing principally on the military and economic aspects of their 
diplomacy. 
Convinced that Arab nationalism jeopardised their Middle Eastern interests, the 
British encouraged the pro-Western governments in the Middle East – Iraq, Iran, Pakistan 
and Turkey – to sign the Baghdad Pact.96 The signatories pledged to extensively cooperate 
with one another economically, culturally and militarily, promising to defend one another if 
attacked or invaded. The British government regarded the Baghdad Pact as a buffer against 
any possible Soviet and Arab nationalist involvement in the Middle East.97 Nigel Ashton 
explores how the formation of the Baghdad Pact exacerbated the differences in the ‘special 
relationship.’ Despite the US State Department’s involvement in all general meetings of this 
organisation, its officials opposed the Baghdad Pact. The State Department rightly noted the 
potential to heighten Arab-Israeli tensions and stoke up Arab nationalist feeling across the 
Middle East. US policymakers accordingly resisted British attempts to persuade the United 
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States to become full Baghdad Pact members and did little to support its initiatives.98 In a 
December 1955 meeting with the Jordanian monarchy, for example, both Eisenhower and 
Dulles discouraged Jordan’s leaders from joining the organisation.99 
In contrast, the US initially sought to appease the UAR. Fearful that many Arab 
nationalists possessed Communist sympathies, State Department figures in Washington felt 
that this would deter Nasser and his followers from collaborating closely with the Soviet 
Union.100 Moreover, US policymakers regarded Arab nationalism as something that was of 
more threat to British interests in the Middle East. Its anti-colonial doctrine was more critical 
of the UK, and its proponents had paid little attention to the expanding regional role of the 
United States.101 Analysing the British approach towards Egypt between 1952 and 1957, 
Robert McNamara attributes the United States’ decision to not support Britain during the 
Suez Crisis down to these reasons. If they backed Britain, American policymakers feared 
that the Soviet Union would exploit the inevitable downturn in US-Egyptian relations and that 
such support would enhance Britain’s role in the Middle East.102 
It was only in the months after the Suez Crisis that the Eisenhower administration 
adopted a tougher stance towards Arab nationalism. In January 1957, Eisenhower used a 
speech to Congress to announce an alteration in his administration’s approach towards the 
Middle East. Termed the Eisenhower Doctrine, it offered economic and military support to 
US allies in the region.103 In so doing, American policymakers hoped that this financial 
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backing would compel Arab states to lean more towards the United States, and away from 
Nasser. US diplomats and officials deemed Egypt’s regime too closely aligned with the 
Soviet Union.104 Historians have accordingly explored the ramifications of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine on Anglo-American ties. Both Salim Yaqub and Ray Takeyh argue that the US 
aimed to ensure that the UK remained subservient to America in the Middle East.105 Britain’s 
historical ties to the region and its aversion towards Soviet-style Communism meant the 
Eisenhower administration, as well as the State Department, were content for the UK to 
retain a significant presence in the Middle East. Yet US diplomats and officials did not want 
this influence over the region’s affairs to supersede its own. The Eisenhower Doctrine was 
aimed at ensuring that the UK’s Baghdad Pact played a secondary role to American 
diplomatic manoeuvres in the Middle East.106 
Likewise, scholars have deliberated over the impact of the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
According to Salim Yaqub, it was an unsuccessful foreign policy approach. Eisenhower and 
Dulles overestimated US influence in the Arab world and failed to realise the influence 
Nasser had over other states in the region.107 Eisenhower’s diplomatic stance was also 
undermined by internal disputes in the Arab world. Many of its leaders were hamstrung by 
domestic popular opinion - which was significantly anti-US - and they were suspicious of the 
motives of other Arab governments to approach the United States as a bloc. Moreover, 
Eisenhower and Dulles’ attempts to use the doctrine to sideline the British in the Middle East 
proved unsuccessful. Reviewing Anglo-Jordanian ties before during and after the Suez 
Crisis, Stephen Blackwell claims that its leader, King Hussein, relied significantly on UK and 
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US support equally, despite American diplomats’ protestations that he should discuss 
regional affairs with US officials only.108  
 
The United States and Iran  
 
Scholars have traditionally paid little attention to the United States’ use of soft power in Iran. 
The body of literature exploring US-Iranian relations in the Cold War has, instead, 
emphasised the role of elites in exerting military and economic power. Historical 
commentaries of Eisenhower and Iran are a case in point. As well as being limited in scope, 
research focuses specifically on the Republican President’s handling of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Crisis. In April 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected Prime Minister of Iran. One of the 
first acts of his premiership was to halt the British government-backed AIOC’s monopoly 
over the Iranian oil industry.109 By August 1953, however, the failure to resolve this dispute, 
combined with significant British diplomatic pressure, compelled the CIA to support an MI6 
backed coup against Mosaddegh. Officials from both intelligence organisations paid Iranians 
opposed to their Prime Minister to demonstrate and topple Mosaddegh.110 Much of the 
literature on Eisenhower and Iran therefore focuses on his administration’s motives for 
involving itself in Iranian affairs. Truman’s White House had distanced itself from the issue, 
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claiming it was a dispute for Britain and Iran to settle.111 While supporting the British-led 
economic embargo of Iran, White House and State Department officials believed the incident 
would make the Iranians more inclined to deal with the Americans in future.112 
Scholarly views as to why the US involved itself in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis are 
varied, with some historians attributing it to global developments and others claiming it was 
down to events occurring within the country. Links have been made between the 
Eisenhower administration’s approach towards Iran and its stance towards big business. 
Both Richard Barnet and David Horowitz regarded Eisenhower’s attempts to liberalise 
markets in the Middle East, Asia and Africa as a crucial tenet of his administration’s 
approach to the Cold War. Whereas Barnet deems the American 1953 involvement in 
Iranian firms as part of Eisenhower’s wider embrace of commerce, Horowitz regards it as a 
reactionary manoeuvre to the growing Soviet influence in Iran.113  
Beyond commercial considerations, certain historians have discussed how events 
internationally shaped Eisenhower’s approach towards the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis. Barry 
Rubin claims Eisenhower’s stance was influenced by his aversion to Communism and the 
‘loss of China’ under his predecessor, Harry Truman. In 1949, the Soviet-backed 
Communists had wrestled control of the Chinese mainland from the Nationalists, supported 
by the Americans. The Communist takeover of China surprised officials in Washington, and 
had considerable implications on wider US foreign policy. Policymakers had presumed that 
China would be a vital Cold War ally, a counterbalance to the Soviets in Southeast Asia. 
They were now determined that this would not be repeated in the Middle East.114 Similarly, 
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Mark Gasiorowski argues that a conviction that the US should play a bolder, more prominent 
global role compelled the White House to take a greater interest in Iranian affairs. Both 
Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles were keen for the US State 
Department and the CIA to have a larger international presence. 115  
In comparison, James Bill and Barry Rubin attribute the change in US policy towards 
Iran during the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis to political proceedings within the country. During 
Mosaddegh’s first two years in office, American diplomats and officials believed that they 
could have a productive relationship with Mosaddegh at Britain’s expense.116 By 1953, they 
realised this was not the case for two reasons. First, while he was not a Communist, Iran’s 
then Prime Minister did not possess pro-Western views. Mosaddegh was convinced that Iran 
should adopt a ‘third way’, staying neutral in the Cold War by distancing itself from the 
superpowers. Second, Mosaddegh’s government was close to collapse. By April 1953, 
internal squabbling in his party, the National Front, had caused the movement to split in two 
and the dissolution of parliament. Key allies with more moderate pro-US views, such as 
Interior Minister Fazollah Zahedi and Chairman of the Iranian Parliament, Ayatollah Abol-
Ghasem Mostafavi-Kashani, had abandoned Mosaddegh. He was instead making overtures 
to the Communist Tudeh Party, something US officials deemed untenable.117  
The implications of US intervention in Iranian affairs in 1953 was highly significant. A 
prominent political opponent of the Shah, the removal of Mosaddegh strengthened the 
Iranian monarch’s grip over his country’s affairs.118 It also signalled the beginning of a 
change in the United States’ approach to fighting the Cold War in the Middle East. Before 
1953, initial attempts by American diplomats and officials to achieve their foreign policy 
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goals in the Middle East had been confined to the forging of bilateral ties with the Saudi 
Arabian monarchy.119 Yet the Shah’s enhanced political position, combined with his 
vehement opposition towards Communism, compelled figures in the White House and the 
State Department to work more closely with Iran. Diplomats and officials envisaged 
providing both nations with enough support to make them the two most powerful states in 
the region. In so doing, they hoped to maintain a balance of power between them.120  
From Iran’s perspective, there has been considerable focus on the extensive US 
military and economic support provided to the Iranians between 1953 and 1979, as well as 
on the clashes between the Shah and certain US presidential administrations in this period. 
While the Iranian monarch sought high-tech weaponry to ward off internal threats, American 
policymakers pushed for the Shah to deal with domestic issues.121 The literature’s tendency 
to neglect cultural aspects of American diplomacy towards Iran is unsurprising. In spite of 
wider historiographical developments in the importance of soft power to foreign policy goals, 
historians were under the impression that, after 1953, US policymakers were uninterested in 
fostering cultural ties with Iran. According to Deborah Kisatsky, geopolitical security 
concerns overrode all other priorities in Iran. While Truman had indicated a willingness to 
increase the number of Persian language VOA radio broadcasts, engaging and shaping the 
views of Iranians was of little interest to US policymakers.122  
With this in mind, histories have, instead, considered the Soviet Union’s application 
of soft power and cultural diplomacy in Iran. This focus has stemmed from the conviction, 
articulated by Kristen Blake, that the Iranian plateau was one of the main theatres for US-
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Soviet Cold War competition outside Europe.123 Researchers have assumed that the USSR 
regarded schemes in this field as one of the only means by which to match or adequately 
compete with American initiatives in Iran. Charting proceedings during and after the Second 
World War, James Pickett examines the activities of the Soviet All-Union for Cultural Ties 
Abroad (VOKS). He argues that this organisation established links with left-wing Iranian 
intellectuals in the cities of Tehran, Mashhad, Tabriz and Gilan. Through planning activities 
and exhibitions, the organisation emboldened Iran’s leftist intellectuals, making them much 
more politically active. Their determination to promote Iranian-style Communism in Iran and 
in the Turkic regions of the USSR frightened the Shah, compelling him to order VOKS’ 
closure in 1955.124 Analysing proceedings in the 1950s and 1960s, likewise, Nodar Mossaki 
and Lana Ravandi-Fadai analyse Soviet cultural diplomacy in the wake of VOKS’ departure 
from Iran. With the Iranian government’s increasingly draconian measures towards Soviet 
activities in the country, they note that the USSR’s officials had low hopes for the success of 
soft power and cultural diplomacy initiatives. Yet figures in Moscow and the Soviet Embassy 
in Tehran were frequently surprised at the overwhelmingly positive popular reception 
towards Soviet musicians, dancers and sporting figures visiting or competing in Iran.125  
A significant body of literature has instead been dedicated to elite level US-Iran 
interactions. There is a considerable focus in the literature on how President John F. 
Kennedy’s ‘New Frontier’ approach to domestic and foreign affairs shaped his 
administration’s approach towards the Iranian government. Accepting the Democrat 
Presidential nomination in June 1960, Kennedy claimed that the United States was on the 
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cusp of the ‘new frontier’ of the 1960s. If elected, he promised to enact significant political, 
social and economic reforms to reflect this.126 From a foreign policy perspective, this entailed 
the promotion of democracy in developing countries as a key to winning the Cold War. 
Countries that received significant US economic and military support, but were ruled by 
authoritarian governing regimes, were told to reform themselves for American backing to 
continue.127 In Iran’s case, Kennedy signalled his intention to shift the US approach away 
from a policy of appeasement. Previously, the US provided the Iranian military with 
advanced weaponry and tactical training, while ignoring the Shah’s flagrant abuse of human 
rights and his authoritarian rule. A task force, comprised of National Security advisors 
McGeroge Bundy, Walt Rostow and Robert Komer, as well as Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk, was appointed by Kennedy to resolve these issues in Iran.128  
Traditionally, Cold War histories on the United States’ diplomatic approach towards 
Iran’s government presumed that American policymakers rode roughshod over Iranian 
affairs in this period. James Goode examines the ‘revolutionary change’ that the Kennedy 
administration enacted in Iran.129 Ignoring the Iranian monarch’s protestations, the White 
House’s task force forced the Shah into undertaking a series of domestic reforms to prevent 
the spread of Communism in the country. Officials from this working group offered the Shah 
US economic and military support on the condition that he streamline Iran’s armed forces, 
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delegate government responsibilities and distribute land owned by nobles to peasants.130 
Goode argues that, by 1963, American pressure compelled the Iranian monarch to 
implement his own reform programme, dubbed the ‘White Revolution’, which aimed to 
advance Iran socially and economically.131  
Contemporary analyses, however, have questioned the extent to which US 
policymakers influenced Iranian foreign and domestic policy. Such publications have formed 
part of the much broader revisionist Cold War historiography, which pays significant 
attention to how actors in the developing world manipulated the UK, US and the Soviet 
Union for their own ends.132 Roham Alvandi, for instance, disputes the notion that the Shah 
was an American stooge, arguing instead that he was an autonomous ruler.133 He claims 
that, in September 1962, the Iranian monarch promised the Soviet First Leader Nikita 
Khrushchev that no US missiles would be installed in Iran. Not only did this pledge intend to 
highlight the Shah’s independence from Washington, but it was also a means by which to 
leverage more military and economic aid from the United States.134 Ben Offiler, likewise, has 
discussed the tension between the need to modernise Iran’s infrastructure and economy on 
the one hand and the Shah’s push for military aid on the other. Charting proceedings during 
the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations, he argues that this issue shaped US-Iran 
relations throughout the 1960s and 1970s. By the end of this period, he notes how White 
House and State Department officials gave up on their efforts to modernise Iran and just 
provided the Iranian monarch with the weaponry he coveted. Their acquiescence to the 
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Shah’s demands was in part caused by his manipulation of US officials, playing on their 
fears of Communism and by disagreements surrounding how Iran should be modernised.135  
Alvandi and Offiler are not alone in perceiving the Shah as a ruler willing and able to 
tactically outmanoeuvre American policymakers. David Collier discusses the ways in which 
the Iranian monarch curtailed the activities of Kennedy’s Iran Task Force, fearing that this 
working group would eventually remove him from power.136 Suspicious that his pro-American 
Prime Minister, Ali Amini, was a US puppet, the Shah replaced him with his close confidante, 
Asadollah Alam. The Iranian monarch proceeded to outmanoeuvre the Iran Task Force, 
implementing his own set of reforms through his ‘White Revolution.’137  
Accordingly, there has been a reassessment in the literature of the effectiveness of 
the Kennedy administration’s Iran Task Force in enacting long-term social, economic and 
political change in the country. Roland Popp argues that John F. Kennedy’s failure to 
understand regional politics resulted in the failure of US policymakers’ attempts to reform 
Iran. Corruption and nepotism were rife in Iranian society and politics, and this undermined 
the initiatives conceived by White House and State Department officials to redistribute 
farmland to Iranian peasants.138 The historiographical re-evaluation of the US approach to 
Iran during the Kennedy presidency is not just confined to its initiatives. Scholars have also 
explored the inner workings of the administration’s Iran Task Force. Victor Nemchenok 
highlighted the tensions between the two different factions of this working group. He 
differentiates between the advocates of New Frontier thinking, like Bundy, Rostow and 
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Komer, and the traditionalists, such as Rusk and State Department officials.139 The 
individuals in the latter group wanted to support the Shah regardless of his human rights 
record and regime’s lack of democratic accountability.140 Similarly, April Summit examines 
how disagreements between these two factions of the Iran Task Force undermined US 
attempts to promote democracy in Iran. Tensions within Kennedy’s inner circle compelled 
the Democrat to take the ‘middle road’ in his diplomatic approach towards Iran.141 The 
Democrat still provided the Shah with significant economic and military aid and discussed, 
instead of forced, the issue of reform with the Iranian monarch. Compromising in this way 
made Kennedy’s diplomacy towards Iran appear weak, incoherent and contradictory, 
enabling the Shah to delay or curtail US-led initiatives to promote land reform and 
democratic accountability in Iran.142 
Similarly, there have been a significant number of publications dedicated to Richard 
Nixon’s close relationship with the Shah. Much is made of Nixon’s decision to provide the 
Shah with a ‘blank cheque.’ In a May 1972 visit to Tehran, the US President promised the 
Iranian monarch that Iran would receive unlimited American military and economic 
support.143 The ‘blank cheque’ is referred to often in the literature as the pinnacle of US-Iran 
relations, comparing bilateral ties then with the strained, complicated relationship shared 
between both countries after the Iranian Revolution.144 The motives behind Nixon’s promise 
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to the Shah of unlimited US support have been discussed in depth. According to David 
Schmitz, Nixon’s provision of a ‘blank cheque’ to the Shah formed part of wider US foreign 
policy goals.145 In the wake of the withdrawal from Vietnam, there was less willingness 
among both the public and Congress for the US to directly intervene in foreign affairs. In 
response to this, the Republican President and his Secretary of State devised the ‘Nixon 
Doctrine.’ To assist in the global fight against Communism, both figures pledged to provide 
their allies on the world stage indirectly with military equipment and financial support.146 
Likewise, Roham Alvandi discusses how the ‘blank cheque’ formed part of a wider desire 
between both Nixon and the Shah for Iran to play a greater role in Middle Eastern affairs. 
Between 1968 and 1972, the Iranian monarch urged Nixon to alter his diplomatic approach 
towards the Middle East. Instead of trying to maintain a balance of power between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, the Shah persuaded the US government to dedicate most of its resources in 
the Middle East to support his regime.147  
 
Britain and Iran 
 
In contrast to the significant body of literature on US-Iran relations, there has been far less 
research dedicated to the study of Anglo-Iranian interactions. This can be attributed to the 
United States’ emergence as Iran’s main ally, and the scholarly perception that Britain’s 
post-war political and economic decline meant that it was less interested in the Middle East 
after the 1950s. Compounding this were the events of January 1968, when the Prime 
Minister, Harold Wilson, announced the withdrawal of all British armed forces ‘east of Suez’, 
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with all Royal Navy ships ordered to leave the Persian Gulf by December 1971.148 The 
decision was part of a broader British foreign policy strategy that stressed the need for the 
UK to concentrate more on European affairs. It was also in response to the ongoing counter-
insurgency campaign mounted by British military forces in the Aden protectorate, which now 
forms part of modern-day Yemen, that was proving unwinnable.149 The Royal Navy’s 1971 
Persian Gulf departure had created the impression that Britain no longer had an interest in 
the Middle East. As there was no longer a Royal Navy presence in the Persian Gulf, 
historians felt the British government were no longer willing or able to engage with nations in 
the region.150 
The perception that Britain only had a minor role in Iran after the 1950s had meant 
that historians have paid little attention to Anglo-Iranian interactions after the 1953 coup. As 
historian Edward Posnett surmises, analyses of dealings between Britain and Iran after 1953 
tend ‘to be the preserve of those who formulated it.’151 As these publications are geared 
towards a non-academic audience, they focus on events of public interest involving Iran, 
namely the 1979 Revolution. Former Foreign Secretary David Owen pays great attention to 
the actions of the Shah towards the end of his reign. Writing in his memoirs, he rues the 
British government’s unwillingness to try and encourage the Shah to rein in his autocratic 
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style of leadership.152 Likewise, the Foreign Office’s former Middle East Department head 
Ivor Lucas and the former British Ambassador to Tehran Anthony emphasise how the 
government department sought to strengthen Britain’s ties with the Shah. The former 
focuses specifically on the ways in which the Foreign Office supported the Shah at the 
outbreak of the Iranian Revolution.153 Parsons, on the other hand, spells out the various 
methods he used to appease the Iranian monarch and how this ensured that France, Italy, 
West Germany or Japan did not take Britain’s position in Iran.154  
Traditionally, scholarly works concerning the UK and Iran after 1945 have tended to 
emphasise the actions of political elites and diplomats in seeking to limit the Soviet Union’s 
involvement in Iranian affairs. In writing about the Iran-Azerbaijan Crisis – where USSR 
loyalists in Northwest Iran formed a breakaway state - Daniel Yergin focuses on the 
response of London and Washington to this event. He discusses how British and American 
officials urged their counterparts in Moscow to stop supporting the Communist rebels.155 
Similarly, Fred Halliday attempts to place the Iran-Azerbaijan Crisis into its historical context. 
By referring to the incident as one of the first superpower clashes of the Cold War, he 
argues that this was the first in a series of direct attempts by the USSR to bolster its 
presence in the Middle East.156  
Equally, the first wave of literature on the British response to the 1951-53 Anglo-
Iranian Oil Crisis analyses proceedings from the ‘top down.’ Ian Speller discusses the 
Foreign Office’s failure in persuading British armed forces to invade the oil rich region of 
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Khuzestan to reverse the nationalisation of Iran’s oil industry. In meetings with the Chief of 
Air Staff, Sir John Slessor, diplomats were informed that it was beyond the military’s means 
to muster an invading force. The Second World War had economically crippled Britain, the 
country had recently relinquished control of the Indian army and the UK’s global 
commitments meant it lacked the manpower to effectively intervene.157 Mark Curtis, likewise, 
focuses on the British government’s attempts to impose an international embargo of Iranian 
oil in response to Mosaddegh’s nationalisation of the AIOC. Between 1951 and 1953, 
Foreign Office officials took advantage of the UK’s relative global power and influence to 
deter other nations, in particular the United States, from purchasing Iranian oil.158 
The complex, interdependent strands of the UK’s ties with Iran were only recognised 
with the emergence of the ‘new diplomatic history’ standpoint. Contrary to the suggestions of 
many traditional diplomatic histories, non-state actors such as cultural institutions and 
private sector firms have a significant influence on the shaping of a nation’s diplomacy. In 
turn, the actions of diplomats and officials impact on the activities of these non-state 
actors.159 Reflecting these historiographical developments, Rowena Abdul-Razak has 
analysed the British government’s use of propaganda to shape the views of Iranians during 
the 1941-1945 Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran. Commencing in August 1941, the joint 
occupation stemmed from fears that the then Shah, Reza Khan, was going to side with the 
Axis powers in World War Two. In so doing, they would possess a foothold in the Middle 
East and would deprive the Allied forces of oil. Throughout the occupation, Abdul-Razak 
notes how the Foreign Office disseminated propaganda in Iran through the BBC Persian 
Service and the establishing of links with the Iranian press. Via literary and audio news 
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content, they hoped to persuade the country’s people of the need to fight Nazi Germany, as 
well as promote Britain in Iran. The latter was crucial to ensuring that Iran became a pro-
British nation after the Second World War’s conclusion.160  
Analysing proceedings in the Cold War period, moreover, Louise Fawcett’s 
exploration of the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis moves beyond the analysis of prominent powers. It 
instead considers how Iran manipulated the demands and wishes of the UK, US and Soviet 
Union. Using evidence from the Russian archives, she highlights how the Iranian 
government threatened to cut off the USSR’s access to oil unless it withdrew from its 
northern territories.161 Similarly, Steve Marsh gives pronounced consideration to the actions 
of the ‘Seven Sisters’ in the making and shaping of Anglo-American policy towards Iran 
during and in the immediate aftermath of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis. The ‘Seven Sisters’ 
were the major oil companies of the period, composed of the AIOC, Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of 
California, Texaco, Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Standard Oil of New 
York.162 According to Marsh, this consortium of petroleum firms had unprecedented access 
to British and American diplomats and officials. Desiring to control the Iranian oil industry, 
the ‘Seven Sisters’ used their governmental links to force the UK and US to directly 
intervene in August 1953. Prior to this, both countries had been content to use the oil 
embargo to wear down Mosaddegh.163 
However, analyses of Anglo-Iranian relations after 1953 that consider the role of soft 
power, transnational networks and non-state actors are noticeable by their absence. 
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Researchers are under the impression that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis marked the end of 
the UK’s role as the main Western hegemonic power in the country. Focusing on the 
immediate aftermath of the diplomatic incident, Juan Romero points out that the AIOC lost 
its monopoly over Iran’s oil industry.164 In 1954, British, American and Iranian government 
figures, as well as officials from the seven prominent petroleum firms, agreed that a 
consortium of Western oil companies, and not the AIOC, would take over control of the 
cultivation and distribution of Iranian supplies of the commodity.165 A greater degree of 
attention, in contrast, is paid to how the events of August 1953 had a detrimental effect on 
Iranian popular perceptions of the British. Ofer Israeli contends that Mosaddegh’s failed 
attempt to nationalise the Iranian oil industry strengthened anti-imperialist feeling across the 
Middle East. Britain’s August 1953 decision to intervene in Iranian affairs appalled 
policymakers from other countries in the region opposed to colonialism. The incident 
encouraged them to challenge and undermine other British Middle Eastern interests such as 
the Suez Canal. Scholars have suggested that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis cemented the 
idea of ‘perfidious Albion’ into the Iranian popular consciousness. According to Maysam 
Behravesh, this is a term used to describe suspicion towards British motives and intentions, 
the idea that Britain is involved in Iranian affairs from behind the scenes and is responsible 
for unfortunate events that befall Iran.166 
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The literature review highlights soft power’s importance to American and British 
policymakers and the extent to which both countries competed with one another for 
supremacy in the Middle East. However, an appraisal of the historiography concerning the 
UK, US and Iran indicates a dearth of research on British and American soft power initiatives 
in the country. Analyses of how Britain and the United States promoted their respective 
lifestyles have either been confined to the Arab world or tackle the Middle East as a whole. 
With regards to Iran, a significant body of literature has, instead, been dedicated to military 
and economic dealings between the White House and the Shah, while historians assume 
that Britain had a minor role in Iran after the events of August 1953. As such, prior research 
has neglected to examine how the UK and US interacted and competed with one another to 
be the dominant Western power in Iran. This thesis addresses these gaps in the literature. It 
will do so by answering the following questions: What were American and British 
policymakers’ motives for seeking to improve diplomatic relations with Iran via soft power 
initiatives? How did the UK Foreign Office and the US State Department use cultural and 
propaganda initiatives to achieve their diplomatic goals in Iran? What was the nature of the 
policies implemented by the British Council and the United States Information Service 
(USIS)? How successful were the UK and US here? More broadly, what consequences did 
Anglo-American cultural diplomacy in Iran between 1953 and 1960 have on the UK-US 
‘special relationship’ in the Middle East? And what implications did it have on the wider Cold 
War? 
In seeking answers to these questions, the dissertation will adopt a thematic 
approach. Chapter I explores the background behind American and British cultural 
diplomacy in Iran. It analyses the development and nature of the UK-US ‘special 
relationship’, both countries’ historic dealings with Iran and the roots of their respective 
cultural diplomacy programmes. The chapter proceeds to chart the development of 
American and British government backed initiatives in this field before August 1953.  
The next two sections pay specific attention to US cultural diplomacy in Iran. Chapter 
II focuses on the USIS’ attempts to contain Communism in Iran, as well as protect and 
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bolster the Shah’s regime. It highlights the motives behind these objectives, as well as how 
these aims were achieved. The chapter discusses how the USIS forged links with certain 
Iranian governmental institutions to disseminate propaganda through the state broadcaster 
Radio Tehran. Chapter III explores how the USIS promoted the American way of life in Iran. 
It notes how USIS officials expanded the US-Iran exchange programme, collaborated with 
Iranian universities and sought to foster a culture of regular extra-curricular activities for 
Iran’s youths. 
Chapter IV proceeds to discuss how the UK Foreign Office sought to reassert 
themselves in Iran through working with SAVAK, the Iranian secret and intelligence service, 
in the production and dissemination of anti-Communist propaganda. Collaborative efforts 
were initially undertaken through the Baghdad Pact, a non-aggression treaty signed in 1955 
between the UK, Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan. As the period progressed, though, the 
Foreign Office and their SAVAK counterparts would increasingly work bilaterally. Chapter V, 
on the other hand, focuses on UK cultural diplomacy in Iran. Outlining the British Council’s 
1955 return to Iran after its 1952 departure, it explains the Foreign Office’s motives for 
relying on the agency to implement cultural initiatives on its behalf. The chapter explores the 
British Council’s efforts in English language teaching, notably the conception and production 
of a programme for Iranian television titled English by Television. It proceeds to analyse the 
USIS’ response to British cultural diplomacy in Iran. 
Bringing the American and British sides together, Chapter VI assesses the impact of 
both countries’ cultural diplomacy efforts in Iran between 1953 and 1960. It explores how UK 
and US policymakers perceived the success of their respective initiatives in this field, as well 
as noting some of the limitations that constrained their activities. Though not an exhaustive 
comparison, the chapter makes preliminary inferences on whether one country was more 
successful than the other, as well as whether certain sections of Iranian society were more 
receptive towards American and British cultural diplomacy than others. It also explores how 
the UK and US’ respective soft power policies in Iran impacted on the Anglo-American 
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‘special relationship’, as well as how both countries’ initiatives shaped the Cold War more 
widely.  
In addressing these themes and concepts, there are two key issues that need to be 
considered. First, it is difficult to define the success of soft power initiatives. Due to the 
intangibility of many of these policies, they are difficult to measure. As Christopher Layne 
explains, public opinion does not make foreign policy, policymakers do. Attitudes are 
transient, not static, and it is difficult to establish a causal link between a state’s soft power 
exertions and the views of targets domestically and overseas.167 Second, there is a scholarly 
tendency to deal with hard and soft power as separate entities. This raises the question of 
where hard power stops and soft power starts. The literature assumes that methods of 
coercion, such as military intervention and economic embargoes are far removed from 
policies of attraction. Both foreign policy forms are instead entwined with one another. 
Policymakers utilise elements from both at the same time to achieve diplomatic objectives.168 
To alter this misconception, Nye recommends that we should refer to a combination of hard 
and soft diplomacy as smart power. He claims that this was frequently exercised by the 
Obama administration to achieve US diplomatic goals. In encouraging Iran to halt its nuclear 
programme, for example, a combination of economic sanctions and cultural overtures were 
utilised.169 Meanwhile, Andras Simonyi and Judit Trunkos suggest the viewing of hard and 
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soft power through a ‘spectral lens’, with each foreign policy form at either end.170 As a 
country’s diplomatic initiatives would be situated in the middle of this spectrum, they claim 
that this would enable a better understanding of both foreign policy tools and the relationship 
between the different elements of international affairs.171  
These issues can be explained by the fact that there has not been enough focus on 
policies of persuasion and attraction from a historical perspective. As soft power was a 
concept devised and elucidated by political scientists, more literature exists on soft power 
from an international relations standpoint. While scholars from both fields examine global 
developments, they do so in different ways. Colin and Miriam Elman explain the general 
differences between diplomatic history and international relations. Diplomatic historians 
generally seek to explain singular events, arguing that outcomes occur due to the 
congruence of several factors at once. Historians, as such, are wary of making predictions 
about the future and favour narrative and context-based explanations to concepts and 
events.172 In comparison, the arguments of international relations scholars are founded on 
theory. Researchers in this field are more willing to make predictions, advise political elites 
on policy and examine multiple cases in order to determine more universal ‘truths’ about 
political life.173 
However, as Jack Levy explains, history and international relations should be 
regarded as two ends of a spectrum, with most scholars of both disciplines operating 
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somewhere in the middle.174 While retaining historical methods, this dissertation will 
incorporate theory by international relations scholars on the concept of soft power. British 
and American government papers, particularly those of institutions such as the British 
Council and USIA, will provide answers to this project’s research questions and support its 
arguments. More broadly, such documents will highlight the complexities of this particular 
case study and the differences in the use of soft power in theory and in practice.  
The examination of both British and American soft power in Iran means that primary 
research has been undertaken in both the UK and US. The thesis focuses on American and 
British cultural diplomacy, particularly the nature of the policies pursued and policymakers’ 
perceptions of their success. As such, there is little scope for research to be undertaken on 
the Iranian side. The majority of the research undertaken on the UK aspects of this project 
was at the National Archives in Kew. The British Council and Foreign Office papers formed 
the bulk of the primary evidence for the UK side of this thesis. The former highlighted the 
nature of the agency’s 1952 departure from Iran, as well as its return in 1955. The 
documents reveal the motives for UK cultural diplomacy, the nature of the initiatives 
employed and their perceived success. The annual reports, notably, provide a fascinating 
insight into Britain’s response towards American soft power initiatives. Interaction between 
British Council and Foreign Office officials convey the UK’s frustration at the superior 
resources of the US and its seemingly greater success at attracting Iranians towards 
American norms, ideas and lifestyles. Papers from the Foreign Office’s Political and Cultural 
Relations departments complemented the British Council records, illustrating the 
government department’s input in shaping the agency’s activities in Iran. Documents from 
the BBC’s Written Archives Centre in Reading were also consulted to assess the BBC 
Persian Service’s contribution to British cultural efforts. 
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On the American side, research was undertaken at the National Archives at College 
Park, Maryland. The US State Department’s papers identify the motives behind American 
cultural diplomacy in Iran. The documents highlight the State Department officials’ 
determination to combat Communism in Iran and change popular political and cultural 
perceptions of the United States. They also underline some of the key cultural and 
propaganda initiatives by the USIS on the USIA’s behalf. Documents illuminate the State 
Department and Embassy’s input here, as well as the extent of the collaboration with Iranian 
governmental officials. Moreover, the National Archives house documents belonging to the 
two agencies responsible for US soft power in Iran, the USIA and its constituent 
organisation, the USIS. These papers highlight how the agency used, among other things, 
cultural exchanges, Iranian universities and Radio Tehran to combat Communism and 
promote the American way of life. The documentary record also enables judgements on the 
American use of soft power in the country to be made. Not only do these sources highlight 
the role of these actors in the making, shaping and delivery of foreign policy, but they will 
also indicate whether certain societal groups were more receptive towards US cultural 
overtures than others. Complementing this, the NSC and OCB papers from the Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, place American cultural diplomacy in 
Iran in its wider context. The documents here provide a background to the motives and 
objectives of US foreign policy in Iran. They proffer explanations as to why White House and 
State Department figures paid so much attention to shaping the views of Iranian people. To 
strengthen and support the findings from both these archives, oral histories from the 
Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training’s project were used. With interviews from key 
USIS and Embassy personnel, these provide a personal perspective on the American 
cultural initiatives employed in Iran. 
To assess these Anglo-American cultural and soft power overtures, reports from 
Ettelat (Information), one of Iran’s most prominent newspapers in this era, were used. 
Located on microfilm in the British Library, they provide an insight into the reception of 
British and American cultural initiatives at an elite and popular level. As the newspaper was 
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controlled by the state, reports provide some insight into the Iranian establishment’s 
response to UK and US cultural diplomacy. They also underline the Iranian public’s 
reception towards exhibitions and other events organised by the British Council and USIS.  
The analysis of British and American soft power in Iran between 1953 and 1960 
makes three key contributions, each of which is revisited in the Conclusion. First, it views 
Anglo-American relations with Iran through the prism of soft power. This is an original take 
on the topic. Previous research has emphasised economic and military interactions between 
the UK, US and Iran. Second, the thesis explores how Britain and the United States 
responded to the changes in their respective global positions. During this period, the UK was 
a declining power, crippled by the financial cost of the Second World War and was in the 
process of relinquishing most of its overseas colonies. The US, in comparison, was a 
booming superpower, taking a greater interest in the struggle against Communism in regions 
such as the Middle East. Finally, it highlights the tensions and competitive element of Anglo-
American relations in the Middle East. Both countries, while collaborating in many fields, had 
similar aims but different regional priorities. The project points out the ways in which they co-
operated and competed with one another for regional supremacy. 
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Chapter I - The ‘Special Relationship’, the Cold War and Soft 
Power: The Motives Behind Greater American and British Cultural 
Diplomacy in Iran 
 
‘We saw Turkey on the one hand, and Pakistan on the other. Each was fairly stable and with 
some strength, and Iran was in the middle. That was our picture of the Middle East; so, Iran 
was very important to us. It was the soft underbelly of Russia.’1 
 
Henry Byroade, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs between 1952 
and 1955, served in this role at a tumultuous time for Iran’s relations with the United States 
and Britain. Not only were British and American officials forced to contend with the fallout 
from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis, but it was also the period in which America took Britain’s 
place as the dominant Western power in the country. Due to the country’s geographic 
proximity to the USSR, American and British officials regarded diplomatic ties with Iran as 
crucial, as Byroade noted in the quote above. With these aforementioned developments in 
mind, he argued that US policy should move beyond ‘just preserving’ the country from the 
Soviets. In strengthening America’s ties with Iran, a ‘dangerous gap’ between Europe and 
Asia would be closed. It would form a barrier to Soviet expansionism, preventing the USSR’s 
influence from transcending regions.2 Byroade’s views were shaped by his formative years 
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as a military officer. During the Second World War, he presided over the building of airbases 
in the Pacific. After the conflict, Byroade became a senior figure in the mission to China 
headed by the US General, George Marshall. The diplomatic endeavour aimed to reconcile 
warring Chinese Communists and Nationalists to form a united government. The Marshall 
Mission’s failure, coupled with the 1949 ‘loss of China’ to Soviet-inspired Communists, 
hardened Byroade. Not only was he acutely conscious of how political and transnational 
forces could subvert nation states, but also, he was aware of how and why people were 
attracted to Communism.3  
Byroade’s close friend, the then US Ambassador to Iran, Loy Henderson, shared his 
views. The two had built a close rapport in the late 1940s while working in the State 
Department. Byroade had been the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, while 
Henderson had been at the Bureau for Near Eastern and African Affairs. With little-to-no 
experience of the Middle East when appointed to his current role, Byroade had relied on his 
friend to advise him on regional matters. Henderson had underlined the importance of 
engaging with Iran to maintain geopolitical stability in the Middle East. Both feared that if the 
country succumbed to Communism, the ideology would spread to the Arab world and the 
Indian Subcontinent. They, accordingly, viewed US cultural diplomacy in Iran as the best 
means to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the region. Byroade and Henderson 
were convinced that once Iranians were aware of the superior living standards and the 
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enhanced socio-economic opportunities in the ‘free world’, they would be less inclined 
towards Communism.4 
Both Byroade and Henderson were among the initial exponents of the need to 
expand US cultural diplomacy in Iran after 1953. Their respective State Department and 
ambassadorial roles provided them with the authority and credibility to push this strategy 
through and make it a reality. American and British cultural diplomacy programmes had 
been in place in Iran and elsewhere before 1953. Each country’s initiatives in this field were 
shaped by the actions of the other. As well as providing a methodological and theoretical 
framework for this thesis, the previous chapter reviewed the literature on Anglo-American 
interactions with Iran and the Middle East. The aim of this chapter, though, is to provide a 
contextualisation and historical background to this thesis. It pays specific attention to the UK-
US ‘special relationship’, America and Britain’s historic ties and interests with Iran, as well as 
their respective soft power policies. Charting proceedings prior to August 1953, it outlines 
how both countries’ geopolitical motives compelled them to employ the United States 
Information Service (USIS) and the British Council respectively to foster cultural ties with 
Iran. The first section examines the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ and the Cold War. 
Specifically, this explores the origins of the UK and US’ ties in the nineteenth century, how 
these developed before and during the First World War and how both nations shared a 
similar worldview by the Cold War’s onset. The section proceeds to chart both countries’ 
respective fortunes on the world stage after 1945.  
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The second part of the chapter explores the UK and US’ prior diplomatic dealings 
with Iran. From the late Eighteenth Century, the former had significant interests in Iranian 
affairs. Desperate to ensure geopolitical stability for their Indian and Suez concessions, the 
British frequently intervened in Iran’s politics. The US, conversely, only dedicated significant 
attention to its relations with the country during the Cold War. With the Shah, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi, wary of Communist incursions into Iran, the US had a vital ally in fighting the 
superpower struggle in the Middle East. The third section analyses British and American soft 
power more broadly. It charts the development of these initiatives, traditionally implemented 
by religious groups and non-state actors on the UK and US’ behalf, into a key tenet of Anglo-
American foreign policy. The transformation here was influenced by a fear of Communism, 
compounded by the realisation that producing their own soft power policies would enable 
both countries to conduct public diplomacy abroad. The fourth and final part considers UK 
and US cultural diplomacy in Iran before 1953. The former was more longstanding, with the 
British Council and BBC Persian Service in operation from 1934 and 1941 respectively. 
American cultural diplomacy in Iran, comparably, developed significantly during the early 
years of the Cold War, as part of the Truman administration’s broader efforts to contain 
Communism globally. As the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis progressed, the British Council was 
forced to leave Iran, while the US Embassy had to radically alter their soft power policies. 
 
The Origins of the ‘Special Relationship’ and the Cold War 
 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain and the United States have shared a 
close, unique relationship. Prior to this, ties between both nations had been convivial and 
intertwined, yet tense. Between 1775 and 1783, the US had fought for independence from 
Britain and was eager to maintain its territorial sovereignty and autonomy. Its thirst for 
imperial expansion, moreover, brought it into conflict with the British Empire. Across the 
nineteenth century, US officials resisted the UK’s attempts to secure more colonies in the 
Americas. Opposition to European – notably British – attempts to further colonise the 
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Western hemisphere compelled the then President James Monroe to devise the Monroe 
Doctrine. In a December 1823 speech to Congress, he referred to the Americas as falling 
within the US’ sphere of influence, urging European powers to withdraw from the continent.5 
Closer to America’s borders, moreover, both nations frequently clashed over America’s 
westward expansion. Since declaring independence from the British, the US and its people 
had sought to move beyond the 13 colonies on the east coast, across the American plains to 
the Pacific seaboard. Britain had resisted these territorial acquisitions on the grounds that it 
endangered their Canadian interests. These fears were only allayed with the signing of the 
1846 Oregon Treaty. The agreement set the boundary between America and Canada, with 
all territory below the 49th parallel belonging to the United States and shared ownership of 
the Great Lakes in the upper east mid-region of North America.6 
Despite these geopolitical tensions, both the US and the UK were tied together 
economically and culturally. Throughout the nineteenth century, both countries were 
prominent trading partners, most notably in agricultural products such as cotton. Up until the 
US Civil War’s onset in 1861, mills in the British counties of Yorkshire and Lancashire solely 
relied on cotton grown through slave labour in America’s south.7 Long after recognising its 
independence, Britain’s culture retained a stranglehold over the American populace. For 
much of the 1800s, middle and upper classes across the US’ east coast looked to British 
fashion trends and literature. Many deemed the consumption of these as a symbol of high 
status, contributing towards the rising public demand for American household products from 
the 1870s onwards.8 
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From the US Civil War’s aftermath, though, Anglo-American ties increasingly strayed 
beyond the economic and cultural into the political. Between 1865 and 1900, the US 
transformed from an agrarian into an industrial economy like Britain. Both countries, 
accordingly, shared a desire to protect, expand and invent new global markets for goods. 
Anglo-US political interests further converged after the 1898 Spanish-American War. The 
American government’s assistance to Cubans in their fight for independence from Spain 
compelled Spanish forces to declare war on the US. A succession of naval victories between 
April and August 1898 forced Spain to cede Cuba, Guam, Hawaii and the Philippines to the 
US.9 Now possessing overseas imperial territories, an industrial economy and a shared 
cultural heritage, UK and US officials increasingly worked together on the world stage to 
achieve and develop these mutual interests. The first successful Anglo-American diplomatic 
endeavour was the building of the Panama Canal. The construction of a shipping route to 
negate the need for merchants to circumnavigate the perilous Cape Horn in South America 
to reach the other side of the US coastline had been an oft-stated policy goal. British and 
French attempts, however, to build such a route had been costly and disastrous. In 1901, 
Britain permitted the US the right to build a canal through Central America to connect the 
Atlantic and Pacific shipping routes.10 
Events during the two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century served to 
cement and further Anglo-American political and economic mutual interests. The sinking of 
UK and US ships by German U-boats in the First World War did not just hinder UK and US 
Atlantic trade, but also resulted in many casualties. By 1917, the increasing loss of life and 
damage to commerce, combined with the increasing American public backlash, compelled 
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the US to side with Britain and declare war on Germany.11 During the Second World War, 
likewise, both governments cooperated with one another to combat and curtail the 
expansionist policies of Germany and Japan. It was during this conflict that the notion of an 
Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ supposedly became a reality. Erstwhile Conservative 
Party leader, and former British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill coined the term in 1946. It 
originated from his ‘Iron Curtain’ speech he gave at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri 
as part of a speaking tour across America. Churchill argued here that the UK and US 
possessed a ‘special relationship’ due to both governments’ near identical military, political 
and economic aims.12  
Both countries’ similar visions for the post-war international system became apparent 
towards the Second World War’s end. Eager to be the main economic beneficiaries of the 
post-1945 world order, the UK and US established global institutions and treaties to 
encourage free trade. The 1944 Bretton Woods system agreed by Japan, Australia, North 
American and Western European powers maintained favourable currency exchange rates, 
tying the US dollar to the value of gold. The agreement here also led to the establishment of 
the World Bank, an institution that promoted foreign investment and international trade by 
providing loans to developing world countries. Just three years later, the success of these 
initiatives encouraged the Bretton Woods signatories, among others, to agree to the General 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The treaty called for the reduction of trade barriers 
to foster free global trade.13 
The Cold War’s onset consolidated the sense of an Anglo-American ‘special 
relationship.’ Having annexed Eastern Europe and imposed Communist governments on the 
region’s nations, UK and US officials feared that the Soviet Union desired to further expand 
its influence. The British and American governments, moreover, were concerned that the 
Soviet Union’s emphasis on state ownership would jeopardise their attempts to foster a 
world economy driven by low tariffs and free trade.14 Developments on the world stage by 
the late 1940s exacerbated their concerns. On 22 September 1949, the Soviet Union 
successfully tested an atomic bomb, a capability only the US had hitherto possessed. 
Having used such weapons on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 
1945, American officials presumed it would be 10-15 years before the Soviets possessed 
nuclear capabilities. Now that the USSR had access to atomic bombs, the US could no 
longer rely on its supposed superior weapons arsenal to deter and contain the Soviet 
Union.15 Further shaking Anglo-American interests and influence on the world stage was the 
October 1949 loss of mainland China to Communism. Since 1927, left-wing revolutionaries 
led by Mao Tse-tung had wrestled for control of the country with US-backed Nationalists 
fronted by Chang Kai-shek. Presuming the latter would emerge victorious, American and 
British officials assumed China would play a vital role in fighting the Cold War in Southeast 
Asia. The country’s ‘loss’ to Communism, combined with Mao’s February 1950 signing of the 
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Treaty of Sino-Soviet Friendship, meant that the UK and US had to play a larger role in 
combating Communism in Asia.16  
In response to these Cold War developments, American and British officials further 
cemented their geopolitical ties. They regarded the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ as 
the most efficient way to overcome Soviet-inspired Communism. Through sharing similar 
foreign policy perspectives, the UK and US could also exert combined diplomatic pressure 
on other global actors or persuade or coerce them to do their bidding.17 Both countries, 
notably, worked to counter the Communist threat to West Berlin. Between June 1948 and 
May 1949, the Soviet Union had imposed a blockade on rail, road and canal routes into the 
city. The embargo was in response to Anglo-American attempts to reform and strengthen 
Germany’s economy. UK and US officials responded by approving the supply of food, coal, 
water and medicine to the city’s people by air. Lasting nearly six months, the Berlin airlift’s 
success forced the Soviet Union to reopen the routes into the city.18 Likewise, to deter and 
contain Soviet incursions in Asia and Africa, the UK and US maintained a military presence 
in these regions. The British, thanks to their naval base in the Persian Gulf, focused on the 
defence of the Middle East and North Africa. The Americans, in part motivated by their 
desire to bolster their standing in the Pacific, concerned themselves with preserving 
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Southeast Asia from Communism.19 Beyond military matters, UK and US intelligence 
agencies also fostered close ties. The British SIS and the American CIA worked closely 
together to subversively undermine pro-Communist governments and share intelligence.20  
At the outset of their collaborative efforts during the Second World War, both 
countries were prominent global powers. As the post-war era progressed, however, it 
became increasingly clear that the United States was the ‘senior partner.’ The disparity in 
Anglo-American relations can be explained by both countries’ contrasting fortunes after 
1945. An imperial power for the previous two centuries, Britain was now facing political and 
economic decline. In seeking to secure a greater number of overseas territories, the UK had 
overstretched itself.21 The Second World War highlighted the British Empire’s 
unsustainability. The cost of protecting Britain’s borders, as well as mounting military 
campaigns in Europe, North Africa and Asia, forced the UK government to accept 
considerable loans from their American counterparts.22 An inability to juggle repayments with 
the cost of their global commitments forced the British to begin relinquishing their overseas 
territories and responsibilities. In 1947, UK officials were forced to concede to their American 
counterparts that they could no longer provide military and economic assistance to the 
Greek and Turkish governments. Fearful that both countries would succumb to Communism, 
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US President Harry Truman devised the Truman Doctrine. He asked Congress for 
permission to provide Greece and Turkey with military and economic support in Britain’s 
place.23  
In contrast, having been a regional power with considerable standing in East Asia 
and Latin America since the nineteenth century, the US was now a superpower with a global 
reach. The country emerged from the Second World War as the world’s best performing 
economy, with its government’s success in establishing a post-war world order enhancing 
the US’ global standing. The country’s involvement in international affairs was boosted 
further by its determination to combat Communism globally. To prevent the Soviet Union 
from expanding its influence into Western Europe, US officials agreed in 1948 to implement 
the Marshall Plan. To dissuade the region’s people from turning to Communism, the 
programme pledged considerable economic aid and expertise to rebuild war-torn Western 
Europe.24 America’s commitment to fight the Cold War globally was enshrined in April 1950 
when Truman approved NSC Document 68. Established in 1948, the NSC met to discuss 
pressing foreign policy and national security issues. Meetings were comprised of White 
House, Cabinet, State Department, intelligence and military figures, with policy papers and 
proposals produced as a result of their discussions.25 Fully titled ‘US objectives and 
programmes for national security’, NSC 68 called for the US to commit to containing 
Communism by involving itself in world affairs. It was only through American involvement 
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across the globe that the Soviet Union’s aggressive, expansionist tendencies could be 
curtailed.26  
In achieving mutual diplomatic goals, the United States increasingly played a 
prominent role, with the UK supporting and supplementing American-led initiatives. The shift 
in the balance of power towards the US in the ‘special relationship’ was illustrated in the 
1949 talks to establish NATO. The institution aimed to bring together North American and 
Western European nations to coordinate on military, security and intelligence matters, 
pledging to directly assist one another should they be attacked by the Soviet Union.27 While 
the UK and US jointly conceived this regional defence arrangement, it was the latter that 
encouraged and contributed most to NATO initiatives. American officials also played a 
greater role in persuading the institution’s other members to adopt a stronger stance against 
the Soviet Union.28  
Such developments inevitably caused tensions within the Anglo-American ‘special 
relationship.’ Despite the country’s political and economic decline, Britain still sought to 
maintain its prominent international standing. British diplomats and officials envisioned 
themselves as ideally situated between the ‘three circles’ of Europe, the Commonwealth and 
the United States. While the country’s political and economic clout had clearly diminished, its 
foreign policy aims remained the same. UK officials were in the process of identifying ways 
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in which Britain could retain its international presence in spite of its reduced means.29 Their 
American counterparts, by contrast, were happy with this unequal balance of power in the 
‘special relationship.’ It enabled the US to act unilaterally if convenient, and bilaterally if its 
interests coincided with the UK’s. Such freedom of manoeuvre meant that the pitfalls of 
cooperating with other nations, such as striking compromises when both actors’ aims 
clashed, did not occur.30 Many American diplomats and officials, moreover, were opposed to 
European-style imperialism. Not only would colonial expansion diminish America’s 
international standing, but it also went against the US’ supposed founding principles which 
emphasised the need for states to be governed by democratic consent. In seeking to 
reassert itself on the world stage, the US government feared that Britain still harboured 
ambitions to be an imperial power.31 
Equally, while they possessed, and worked towards achieving, mutual foreign policy 
goals, the UK and US’ contrasting global fortunes meant their priorities often differed. Often, 
this resulted in Britain and the United States adopting different policies in particular regions. 
Anglo-American attempts to secure geopolitical objectives in the Middle East were a case in 
point. As approximately 90% of Britain’s oil supplies came from the Middle East, the British 
government were more concerned with the economic implications of the Communist threat 
in the region. They feared that any pro-Soviet regime that came to power in the Middle East 
would seek to disrupt the supply of Middle Eastern oil. Such developments would initiate a 
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multiplier effect, encouraging any Persian Gulf and Arab neighbours to be less amenable 
towards British demands for the resource, too. Foreign Office officials instead accordingly 
strove to ensure the safe supply of the resource from the region. After 1945, they paid 
significant attention to maintaining and bolstering the pro-British Iraqi monarchy, which 
controlled vast oilfields in the south of the country.32 The American government, in contrast, 
placed a greater priority on fighting the Cold War in the region. Relying on its own oil 
supplies in Alaska, Texas and the Gulf of Mexico in this period, the US had little need for 
Middle Eastern oil. It, therefore, paid greater attention to curtailing and combating 
Communism more generally in the region. With the Iraqi government looking more towards 
Britain for support, the US instead pledged considerable economic and military aid to Saudi 
Arabia. State Department officials envisioned that the country’s anti-Communist ruling 
regime would provide a strong pro-Western bulwark to the spread of Soviet-inspired 
Communism in the Middle East.33 
 
Iran’s Importance to British and American Foreign Policy Goals 
 
The UK and US’ cooperative, tense and competitive relationship is illustrated in how both 
nations sought to boost ties with Iran in the 1950s. The country had been crucial to British 
foreign policy objectives in the Middle East since the late eighteenth century. Initially, 
Britain’s interest in Iranian affairs was primarily geopolitical. The country fell between the 
Suez Canal and the Indian Subcontinent, two regions of increasing colonial and economic 
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importance to the UK.34 From 1790 onwards, the Royal Navy maintained a permanent 
presence in the Persian Gulf, while the Foreign Office sought to strengthen ties with Iran’s 
ruling Qajar dynasty.35 Throughout the nineteenth century, Britain’s Iranian interests were 
challenged by the Russian Empire’s growing presence in central and southern Asia. Foreign 
Office officials suspected Russia of using its newly gained territories in modern day 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as a platform from which to expand into India and the Middle 
East.36 As a regional power straddling these two areas of interest, Iran quickly became 
integral to the Anglo-Russian ‘Great Game’ for Asian dominance. Beginning in the 1860s, 
officials from both imperial powers sought to accrue as many Iranian commercial 
concessions as possible.37 The UK and Russia’s carving up of Iran’s infrastructure and 
resources culminated in a 1907 treaty between the two imperial powers, the terms of which 
divided Iran into two spheres of influence. Britain would concern itself with affairs in the 
south of the country, while Russia would focus on the north.38  
With the 1908 discovery of oil in the Khuzestan region of southwest Iran, the Foreign 
Office began to prioritise Anglo-Iranian relations for economic reasons. Britain needed 
supplies of the resource and it was apparent that Iran had it in abundance.39 Backed by the 
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British government, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) quickly secured a monopoly over 
the country’s oil industry that it enjoyed until 1953.40 Whenever these economic interests 
were threatened, Britain directly intervened in Iranian affairs. By the 1920s, Foreign Office 
officials suspected the ruling monarch, Ahmad Shah Qajar, was not sufficiently protecting 
British oil interests in Iran. Between 1921 and 1926, they provided considerable assistance 
to cavalry colonel Reza Khan’s successful campaign to seize the Iranian throne.41 In August 
1941, moreover, British armed forces, in tandem with their Soviet counterparts, invaded 
central and southern Iran. Both countries’ governments were concerned that Shah Reza 
Khan was going to side with the Axis powers and deprive the Allied forces of the oil they 
needed to fight the Second World War. They replaced the Iranian monarch with his son, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, deeming him more accommodating towards their oil interests.42  
From the beginning of the Cold War after 1945, US government officials started to 
place greater importance on ties with Iran. As well as being a vital oil source, the Shah’s 
opposition to Communism made him a crucial ally in the struggle against the Soviet Union in 
the region.43 It was for this reason that the United States began to pay considerable attention 
towards Iranian affairs. Previously, US-Iran interactions had been confined to a series of 
American private missions that visited Tehran at the Iranian government’s behest in the 
1890s and early 1900s. Officials in Iran had requested the US’ help with modernising 
practices in its Treasury as it did not want to cede control of the country’s finances to the 
                                               
2017), 3; Ian Speller, ‘A Splutter of Musketry? The British Military Response to the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Dispute, 1951’, Contemporary British History, 17/1 (2003), 39. 
40 Steve Marsh, Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil (Basingstoke, 2003), 75. 
41 Muhammad Gholi Majd, Great Britain and Reza Shah: The Plunder of Iran (Gainesville, 2001), 7-9.  
42 Jennifer Jenkins, ‘Iran in the Nazi New Order, 1933-1941’, Iranian Studies, 49/5 (2016), 728-29.  
43 Douglas Little, ‘The Cold War in the Middle East: from the Suez Crisis to the Camp David Accords’, 
in: Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds) The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume Two: 
Crisis and Détente (Cambridge, 2010), 324-326. 
  68 
British or Russians.44 The high value American policymakers placed on US-Iran relations in 
the early Cold War stems from discussions during NSC meetings and from the policy papers 
devised as a result of these dialogues. These placed great emphasis on Iran’s role in 
fighting the Cold War in the Middle East.45 Containing and combating the spread of 
Communism in this region was a high priority to the NSC. Much of the world’s oil supplies 
and shipping routes, notably the Suez Canal, were located in the Middle East. Its region and 
surroundings were also of military and religious significance. The US and Royal Navy 
maintained a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf respectively, while 
the region contained many Christian, Jewish and Moslem Holy places. As parts of the 
Middle East bordered the Soviet Union, the USSR sought to increase its influence here, 
undermining these Anglo-American interests in the process.46 
UK and US policymakers regarded close ties with Iran as crucial to achieving and 
securing these regional objectives. They were helped by the Shah’s enthusiasm for greater 
dealings with Britain and the United States. From his 1941 ascension to the throne, the Shah 
had courted Anglo-American economic and military assistance. He regarded considerable 
UK and US support as key to his attempts to modernise Iran’s infrastructure, and westernise 
its society. In so doing, the Iranian monarch hoped to leave a country for his successor that 
was on a social and economic par to Western European nations.47 Militarily, moreover, the 
Shah envisioned Iran as a state with the potential to be a substantial power on the global 
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stage. Through investment in military equipment and training, the Iranian monarch hoped to 
transform his country into a regional bulwark with the capabilities to police the Arab world 
and the Persian Gulf.48 
The Shah’s vision and approach directly contrasted with the stance taken by most 
other Middle Eastern governments. As well as the pro-Soviet Syrian and Afghani 
governments, newly independent Arab nationalist regimes in Egypt and Syria were also 
particularly hostile to the UK and US’ regional presence. Influential proponents of this anti-
Western ideology, such as the then Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser, sought to 
undermine the regimes of key Anglo-American allies in the region like the Shah. Within 
months of his 1952 ascension to power, Nasser encouraged domestic dissent and unrest 
towards the Iranian monarchy. He helped establish Radio Cairo, an Arabic language 
broadcaster aimed at appealing to overseas audiences. Targeting Arab and Kurdish peoples 
living in Iran, its news and current affairs content was particularly critical of the Iranian 
monarch. Programmes would depict the Shah as a ruler indifferent to the plight of non-ethnic 
Iranians, highlighting the better treatment of Arab and Kurdish peoples in other Middle 
Eastern countries and Soviet held territories. Broadcasts would also foster self-identity 
among these peoples by playing notable folk songs and anthems daily.49  
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Therefore, to British and American policymakers, strong ties with Iran became even 
more important than before. UK officials were especially concerned about how the spread of 
nationalism and Communism across the Middle East would affect their oil interests in the 
region. By the early 1950s, approximately three quarters of Britain’s supplies of the resource 
came from Iran, so they were determined to ensure the Shah’s regime did not fall. If the 
Iranian monarch was toppled, Foreign Office figures were convinced that a Soviet or Nasser-
backed government reluctant to supply Britain with the same levels of oil would replace 
him.50 As the US had less need of Iranian oil, American officials, comparably, regarded Iran 
as a potential bulwark against these regional threats. Several NSC policy papers noted how 
the emergence of several nationalist and socialist governments in the Middle East would 
lead to the West ‘losing’ their standing and influence in the region by the end of the decade. 
NSC figures saw building a strong political, economic and social relationship with Iran as an 
effective way to reverse these ‘unfavourable trends.’ Through commercial, military and 
cultural agreements, Iran could be made into a symbol of US influence in the Middle East 
and Asia. Its relative prosperity compared to neighbouring countries would not only serve as 
an example of what can be achieved with American support, but also illustrate the benefits 
of being part of the ‘free world’.51  
However, from 1945 onwards, several threats undermined the Shah’s rule and 
endangered British and American interests in Iran. Internally, the Tudeh Party was growing 
in prominence and becoming increasingly radical. Established in 1941, the organisation had 
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over 10,000 members and eight seats in the Majlis (Iranian Parliament) in 1944. Its initial 
manifestoes espoused moderate, liberal ideals, emphasising women’s rights and the need 
for Iran to have a constitutional monarchy. The onset of the Cold War, though, compelled the 
Tudeh hierarchy to shift the party more towards the left. The senior leadership were 
increasingly concerned with what they saw as US expansionism across the globe. They 
feared that, if a war broke out between the superpowers, the Shah’s pro-Western tendencies 
would mean that Iran would side with the United States. The Tudeh, therefore, became more 
closely aligned with the USSR. Thanks to Soviet influence and financial aid, a weekly 
newspaper, titled Rahbar (Leader), was distributed across Iran. Articles would praise the 
USSR, while criticising the Shah and the United States. By the end of the 1940s, Rahbar 
had proved so popular that it had an estimated circulation of 100,000, three times more than 
the state-run Ettela’at (Information) newspaper. At the same time, Soviet assistance was 
pivotal in the formation of the Tudeh’s military wing. With USSR military equipment and 
training, the organisation’s armed dissidents attempted to destabilise the Iranian 
government, notably by making a failed attempt on the Shah’s life in 1949.52 In response to 
this, the Iranian monarch had led efforts to restrict and quash the Tudeh’s activities. As well 
as preventing the organisation’s members from participating in Iranian politics, the Shah had 
ordered the authorities to arrest and interrogate all known or suspected Tudeh officials.53 
The Soviet Union, moreover, was also seeking to directly undermine and intimidate 
the Iranian monarchy. Since Reza Khan’s 1941 removal by the Soviets and the British, both 
armies’ soldiers remained in Iran. UK forces were stationed in the south of the country, while 
the USSR’s were located in northwest Iran, a region with a large Azeri and Kurdish 
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population.54 At the 1943 Tehran Conference, British, Soviet and US representatives agreed 
that their forces would depart Iran at the Second World War’s resolution. By 1946, however, 
the USSR’s army had not left the country. Maintaining its presence in this Iranian region, it 
was, instead, providing funding and encouraging Azeri and Kurdish nationals to fight for 
independence from Iran. Dubbed the Azerbaijan Crisis, the ensuing standoff between 
Iranian armed forces and these separatists was regarded as one of the first US-Soviet Cold 
War confrontations in the Middle East. At the Shah’s behest, American officials petitioned 
the fledgling UN organisation to exert diplomatic pressure on the USSR to withdraw. By 
1947, international condemnation, combined with the Iranian government’s refusal to supply 
oil to the Soviets, compelled the Communist power to order its military forces to depart 
Iran.55  
Beyond Soviet attempts to meddle in Iranian affairs, many of the country’s citizens by 
the early 1950s were increasingly shifting towards nationalism and Cold War neutralism. 
Initially, such developments endangered Britain’s oil interests. April 1951 saw Mohammad 
Mossagdeh, a figure influenced by the nationalist ideals espoused by Nasser, elected as 
Iran’s Prime Minister. Throughout his campaign, the incumbent premier had called for an 
end to foreign meddling in Iranian affairs and for the country to adopt a ‘third way’ of 
neutralism in the Cold War. He immediately nationalised the Iranian oil industry, which had 
been under the British government-backed AIOC’s control since 1908. This decision proved 
highly popular among Iran’s governing elites and general public. Many resented the UK’s 
monopolisation of the country’s extraction and refining of oil, convinced it deprived Iran of 
much needed revenue. Government officials and ordinary citizens were also opposed to 
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Britain’s treatment of Iranian workers in Khuzestan’s oilfields; most were paid less, required 
to work longer hours and housed in worse conditions than their British counterparts.56  
The UK responded strongly to Iran’s attempt to seize control of what they regarded 
as a British commercial asset. From the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis’ outset, Foreign Office 
figures pressed for a military response. Working with their Ministry of Defence colleagues, 
they petitioned Prime Minister Anthony Eden, to approve the occupation of the Iranian 
oilfields by British military forces. Foreign Office officials argued that this would intimidate the 
Iranian government, compelling Mossagdeh to reverse his oil nationalisation decision. Eden, 
along with his Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison, rejected this plan. As well as the likely 
UN and US condemnation of this course of action, both figures were convinced that the 
British public would respond unfavourably to the military occupation of Iran’s oilfields.57 The 
UK government instead resorted to imposing economic sanctions on the country. They 
refused to trade with Iran, persuaded other Western nations to the same, and used the 
Royal Navy’s Persian Gulf fleet to blockade Iranian oil refineries.58 
Despite adhering to the British imposed economic embargo on Iran, the American 
government distanced itself from the UK’s actions. Publicly, the Truman administration 
referred to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis as a bilateral dispute between Britain and Iran. 
Portraying themselves as caught between Cold War allies, US policymakers attempted to 
negotiate a compromise between Mossagdeh and the British government. In November 
1952, State Department officials pressured the AIOC, as well as Eden and Morrison, to cede 
control of the Iranian oil industry to a consortium comprised of Western petroleum firms and 
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the Iranian government. In tandem with the State Department, officials from the American 
Embassy in Tehran offered the same terms to Mossagdeh.59 While it appeared as if the 
Americans were trying to reach a mutually beneficial agreement, US policymakers were 
actually seeking to weaken Britain’s ties with Iran. To the Truman administration and State 
Department officials, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis presented a perfect opportunity to 
strengthen US-Iran ties. Their proposed settlement would not just reduce Britain’s presence 
and dominance over Iranian affairs, but they envisaged that it would foster goodwill towards 
the US among Iran’s political elites. In so doing, prominent figures such as Mossagdeh 
would be more willing to reach diplomatic agreements with the United States.60  
By the spring of 1953, however, the US abandoned its policy of seeking to reach a 
compromise between the UK and Iran over control of the latter’s oil industry. American 
policymakers instead sided with Britain. There were three reasons for the US’ changing 
approach. First, Truman’s successor in the White House, Dwight D. Eisenhower, pushed for 
a tougher stance towards Iran. Inaugurated in January 1953, the Republican President 
regarded the country as pivotal to the Cold War in the Middle East. Eisenhower accordingly 
advocated for the removal of any hurdles, such as Mossagdeh, that would prevent Iran from 
playing a prominent role against the Soviets in the region.61 Second, in dispatches to 
Washington, US Embassy officials in Tehran frequently complained that the Iranian Prime 
Minister was a difficult person to deal with. In discussions with American ambassador, Loy 
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Henderson, Mossagdeh would appear aloof and uncooperative, often attending meetings in 
his nightwear.62 Third, and more importantly, was the growing threat of Communism in Iran. 
By April 1953, the economic unrest caused by the Royal Navy’s blockade – as well as 
political disagreements about how to approach this issue – resulted in the dissolution of the 
Iranian parliament. To secure his political position, Mossagdeh sought to foster left-wing 
support. He sought to create a coalition government comprised of Communist affiliated 
members of his party, the National Front, as well as Tudeh representatives. As it would be 
closely aligned with the Soviet Union, US officials feared that this government would result in 
the Shah’s overthrow and the end of America’s involvement in Iran.63  
With the approval and assistance of their British SIS counterparts, the CIA initially 
implemented a propaganda campaign to discredit Mossagdeh. Much of the agency’s 
propaganda was based on information leaked to the press or on publications produced and 
distributed by the UK and US embassies in Tehran. These emphasised the reduced military 
and economic aid to Iran while Mosaddegh remains in power, as well as highlighting his 
faults. They would illustrate his power-hungry nature, most notably his attempts to hold on to 
office at all costs, as well as his eagerness to overthrow the Iranian monarchy.64 The joint 
CIA-SIS campaign’s success in undermining and discrediting Mossagdeh provided the 
impetus for the Shah to dismiss the Prime Minister. On the 15 August 1953, the Iranian 
                                               
62 Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 54; Gasiorowski and Byrne, Muhammad Mossaddeq, 126. 
63 Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 16 February 1952, FRUS, 1952-
1954, Iran, 1951-1954; Telegram from the Central Station in Iran to the CIA, 14 April 1953, FRUS, 
1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954; Briefing notes prepared in the CIA for Director of Central Intelligence 
Dulles, 21 April 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954; Loy Henderson interviewed by Don North, 
14 December 1970, DDEL.  
64 Memorandum prepared in the Directorate of Plans, campaign to install pro-Western government in 
Iran, CIA, 8 March 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954; Project outline prepared in the CIA, 15 
June 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954.  
  76 
monarch issued a decree, replacing Mossagdeh with a close confidant, the pro-Western 
Fazlollah Zahedi. The incumbent Prime Minister, however, refused to leave office, instead 
ordering the arrest of all his political opponents and suspected pro-monarchists. CIA and SIS 
figures responded by fuelling public discontent among Iranians. They ordered the Shah to 
temporarily depart Iran, making it appear to pro-monarchists that he was the victim of a 
coup. British and American intelligence officials then paid the Shah’s supporters to protest 
against Mossagdeh. The wave of public demonstrations that followed – exacerbated by 
Anglo-American agents in the crowd escalating the sale and intensity of these protests - 
made the Iranian Prime Minister’s position untenable. By the 19 August, both the Tudeh and 
left-leaning allies in the National Front had turned on Mossagdeh, placing him under house 
arrest.65 
 
The Roots of British and American Cold War Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power 
 
In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis’ aftermath, a crucial aspect of Britain and the US’ approach to 
Iran was the implementation of cultural programmes. These sought to persuade and attract 
Iranians towards British and American norms and values respectively. The conception and 
application of these initiatives across Iran formed part of the UK and US’ broader use of soft 
power, through institutions and transnational networks, to export and promote their 
respective cultures overseas. Before the early twentieth century, Britain and the United 
States had relied on non-state actors and the transnational spread of ideas to promote their 
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norms, values and ideas to foreign publics. Through this they not only aimed to expand their 
informal empires and acquire new territories, but also open up new markets for domestic 
products. Underpinning this drive for cultural and economic hegemony were a number of 
religious groups, including the Young Men’s Christian Group and the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union. While regarding themselves as above the state – doing the work of God 
to promote moral righteousness globally – missionary work was a pivotal tenet of the 
broader Western colonial project. American and British governments provided funding and 
support for their ‘civilising missions.’ They hoped that these missionaries would persuade 
and attract foreign publics in places like East Asia and Africa to trade and interact with 
them.66 
Religious groups were not the only non-state actors that both governments relied on 
for cultural diplomacy. American exhibitors, for example, exposed and promoted aspects of 
US culture to audiences across Europe. Displays of cars, rudimentary X-ray machines and 
cinematography, for example, dominated media and visitor discussions in the aftermath of 
the 1900 Paris Universal Exhibition. In 1886, likewise, organisers from Earls Court in London 
invited William ‘Buffalo Bill’ Cody to front their exhibition of America. Before presenting to 
London’s public, the performer had been famed for his shows depicting life in America’s ‘wild 
west’ that toured across the US. Cody’s first foray beyond the American border was 
undoubtedly a success. Involving 150 cast members, and nearly 400 animals, Cody’s shows 
sold out weeks in advance and were given rave reviews. Through fostering these 
conceptions and imaginations of America that resonated with the British public, Cody was 
subsequently invited to organise and deliver shows across Europe. He was asked by the 
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French authorities to perform at the 1899 Universal Exhibition in Paris, as well as by the 
Vatican to put on a show in Rome for the then Pope, Leo XIII.67 
The UK and US government’s reliance on fostering bilateral relations through non-
state actors and transnational networks lasted well into the twentieth century. Their decision 
to change tack here was motivated by two factors. First, both countries sought to dissuade 
domestic and foreign publics away from Communism. The Soviet Union, according to 
Foreign Office and State Department officials, was undermining ‘free world’ regimes through 
peddling pro-Communist propaganda. Stations such as Radio Moscow would broadcast to 
European and Asian nations closely aligned to the US and UK, criticising the governing 
regimes in these states to foster domestic discontent. The USSR was also providing 
considerable technical and financial assistance to left-wing groups in these countries so that 
they could produce and distribute propaganda to destabilise these governments from 
within.68 To combat domestic discontent in Western Europe and Asia, while also fostering 
popular support for the UK and US in the Cold War, programmes needed to be put in place 
to counter Communist subversive activities. Not only would these circumvent Soviet 
initiatives, but they would also persuade and attract these foreign publics to back the US and 
UK in the struggle against the USSR.69 Second, the American and British governments 
became increasingly convinced that this was a better and more effective means of 
promoting their respective cultures and way of life overseas. Through policies devised and 
implemented by government-run institutions, British and American officials could 
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communicate directly with foreign publics. They hoped that this would cement and bolster 
the UK and US’ global positions, open up new markets for British and American businesses 
and nullify potential external threats.70 
For Britain it was in the years prior to the Second World War’s outbreak that its 
government considered the possibility of creating formalised state-run institutions to devise 
and implement cultural diplomacy. In 1934, the Foreign Office established the British 
Council. Operating overseas, either through embassies or office buildings, the institution 
sought to inform foreign publics about British norms, values and lifestyles. Key to this was its 
English language courses, which enhanced students’ linguistic skills, while also showcasing 
the way of life in the UK.71 To give the British Council’s activities greater authenticity, Foreign 
Office figures distanced themselves from the institution. However, it sponsored its initiatives, 
while also providing funding so that it could establish offices in cities across the globe. The 
government department’s decision to expand Britain’s cultural diplomacy programmes 
overseas was motivated by its desire to bolster British commerce, as well as by the rise of 
totalitarian regimes across Europe. Fascist governments in Germany and Italy, as well as 
the Communist Soviet regime, were increasingly peddling propaganda demonstrating their 
strength and highlighting Britain’s global decline. Foreign Office figures sought to use the 
British Council’s activities to counter this perception, combating the propaganda activities of 
these states.72  
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Britain’s advocacy of cultural diplomacy further expanded during the Second World 
War. Having transmitted radio broadcasts overseas since 1932, the BBC’s activities in this 
field increased exponentially in the early years of this conflict. The broadcaster introduced 
services in all the major languages of Europe, the British Empire and countries of 
geostrategic interest. The BBC Persian Service was a case in point. Established in 1941, its 
twice-daily Farsi news and current affairs programming sought to foster Iranian support for 
Britain’s wartime efforts, while also informing and educating listeners on British culture. From 
its inception, its transmissions proved particularly popular in Iran. Surveys undertaken by the 
BBC in the country, as well as letters sent to the broadcaster in London, highlighted that 
many Iranians trusted the Persian Service’s coverage over domestic news content.73 The 
success of these broadcasts in promoting Britain overseas encouraged the British 
government to make cultural diplomacy a key tenet of its approach to world affairs after the 
Second World War. In July 1946, the Deputy Prime Minister, Herbert Morrison, published a 
white paper calling for the BBC overseas services to be editorially independent yet funded 
by the Foreign Office. Such an arrangement, he argued, would ensure that its broadcasts 
would not contradict government policy while also appearing to foreign publics as if the BBC 
was not an instrument of the British state. The report received parliamentary assent, forming 
an integral part of the 1947 Charter that outlined how the BBC was structured and funded.74  
While sponsoring and influencing policies of institutions such as the British Council 
and the BBC, the Foreign Office also implemented cultural initiatives of its own. In January 
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1948, it established the Information Research Department (IRD). Operating from within the 
Foreign Office until its 1977 close, this open source intelligence agency coordinated the 
production and dissemination of British Cold War propaganda. In particular, the IRD strove 
to counter pro-Communist publications, discredit the Soviet Union and promote British 
values domestically and overseas. Its officials sought to achieve these aims by working with 
prominent individuals and organisations at home and abroad who also opposed 
Communism.75 In the Middle East, for example, the IRD provided media outlets in the region 
wary of Communism and Arab nationalism with relevant material. Between 1951 and 1953, it 
supplied the Jordanian government backed radio station, the Hashemite Broadcasting 
Service, with anti-Soviet content. The IRD also supplied articles to pro-Western Egyptian, 
Iraqi and Syrian newspapers. Many of these publications criticised Nasser, highlighted the 
Soviet Union’s aggressive expansionism in the Middle East and extolled Britain’s virtues.76 
Beyond Middle Eastern affairs, IRD officials cooperated with the US State Department to 
produce and disseminate anti-Communist propaganda when their motives converged. As 
both countries’ governments were concerned about the spread of Communism in Southeast 
Asia, UK and US officials worked together to devise a psychological programme for the 
region. To ensure a streamlined operation, each agency focused their efforts on a particular 
area. As the IRD had more experience and contacts in Singapore and Hong Kong, its 
officials focused their subversive activities on these territories and their surroundings. State 
Department figures, on the other hand, paid greater attention to proceedings on the Korean 
Peninsula, Taiwan and China.77 
                                               
75 Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945-53, 1-3; 74. 
76 James Vaughan, ‘“Cloak Without Dagger”: How the Information Research Department Fought 
Britain’s Cold War in the Middle East, 1948-56’, Cold War History, 4/3 (2004), 61-62.  
77 Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945-53, 154-156; Tony Shaw, ‘The 
Information Research Department of the British Foreign Office and the Korean War, 1950-53’, Journal 
of Contemporary History, 34/2 (1999), 279-280.  
  82 
Indeed, it was by the Cold War’s early stages that the US became increasingly 
interested in cultural diplomacy. Prior to this, its activities in this field had been confined to 
the overseas radio transmissions of the Voice of America (VOA). Established in 1942, its 
broadcasts, in English and 40 other languages, initially targeted citizens living in Latin 
America and Europe. The VOA aimed to foster resentment towards Nazi political parties and 
occupying German forces respectively.78 The US’ role in liberating North Africa, southern 
Europe, and East Asia enabled the VOA to expand. Transmitters were built in all three 
regions, enabling radio broadcasts to reach new audiences. Such an accelerated expansion 
in its formative years made the VOA crucial to the US’ attempts to combat Soviet 
propaganda after 1945. As its transmitters were placed across the globe, the radio 
broadcaster was perfectly poised to communicate to overseas audiences the pitfalls of 
Communism and the socio-economic benefits of siding with America.79 
With the Cold War’s onset, however, senior figures within the Truman administration 
had become increasingly dissatisfied with this informal arrangement. They feared that the 
work of businesses, religious groups and mass culture in promoting America overseas was 
minuscule in comparison to the anti-US ideology espoused and disseminated by the Soviet 
state. So as to better promote America overseas, the US government increasingly looked 
towards formalising cultural diplomacy, giving them greater control over the scale, funding 
and nature of the endeavours pursued. In January 1948, the US Congress approved the 
Smith-Mundt Act. The legislation enacted into law the provision of greater funding for state-
sponsored soft power initiatives more broadly, specifically in the fields of propaganda and 
cultural diplomacy. It provided the State Department, and its constituent overseas 
embassies, monies to open information centres, produce broadcast films and print literature. 
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While much of this aimed at swaying foreign publics away from Communism, its content also 
extolled the virtues and values of America.80 
The Smith-Mundt Act was the impetus behind President Harry Truman’s ‘Campaign 
for Truth.’ Launched in April 1950, this was the US’ first sustained, unified attempt to combat 
Communist propaganda and promote America overseas. The campaign was influenced by 
the arguments outlined in NSC 68, which had been approved by Truman several weeks 
before. The aim, therefore, was to contain Communism, through strengthening the will of the 
US and its allies to resist Soviet propaganda, as well as outlining the faults of the USSR and 
its satellite states to the people residing in these nations.81 The VOA played a pivotal role in 
achieving these objectives. Targeting citizens beyond the Iron Curtain, its programming was 
increasingly critical of the Soviet Union. In tandem with the VOA’s activities, the State 
Department established the USIS to conduct all its subversive and propaganda activities. 
The in-house agency operated through US embassies across the globe, publishing and 
disseminating anti-Communist propaganda, while also translating American books and films 
into foreign languages.82 
The nature and scale of US cultural diplomacy was further developed during the first 
year of the Eisenhower administration. Building on his predecessor’s ‘Campaign for Truth’, 
Eisenhower sought to make this aspect of foreign policy central to the US’ approach to the 
Cold War. He had two motives for doing so. First, during his command of the Allied forces in 
Europe during the Second World War, Eisenhower had come to see the merits of cultural 
diplomacy. Not only was it cheaper than the use of tanks and guns, it was less costly in 
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terms of lives. Second, there was an increased need to foster public support for American 
initiatives. The early years of Eisenhower’s presidency dovetailed with a period in which 
technological progress had made information and media more accessible. Such 
developments had resulted in audiences at home and abroad becoming much more 
politically aware and active.83  
Upon entering office, Eisenhower established the Jackson Committee. Comprised of 
national security officials, intelligence figures and individuals within the presidential 
administration, the committee analysed and evaluated America’s cultural and propaganda 
initiatives. Its final June 1953 report called for, among other things, an organisation under 
the State Department’s auspices to oversee all American cultural and propaganda 
campaigns.84 The Jackson Committee’s findings compelled Eisenhower to expand and 
institutionalise the USIS, establishing the United States Information Agency (USIA) in August 
1953. Reporting to the State Department, this institution strove to explain and advocate US 
policies to overseas audiences; provide information about American officials and initiatives 
to foreign publics; foster cultural and economic ties between the peoples and businesses of 
America with their overseas counterparts; and advise the US government on how foreign 
peoples will receive American policies and overtures.85 The USIA maintained a formal 
presence in cities across the globe. It oversaw and coordinated all USIS activities, with the 
department being institutionalised and provided with greater autonomy from US embassies 
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and consulates. The agency would often strive to achieve its objectives through exhibitions 
showcasing the American way of life, translating US books and Hollywood films into foreign 
languages and by offering English language teaching courses.86 
 
American and British Cultural Diplomacy in Iran Before August 1953 
 
UK government sanctioned initiatives promoting British values, norms, ideas and way of life 
in Iran had been in place in the two decades prior to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis. From 1934 
to 1952, the Foreign Office had funded the British Council’s presence in the cities of Tehran, 
Esfahan, Tabriz and Mashhad. These centres aimed to educate and promote British norms, 
values and lifestyles to Iranians. Beginner, intermediate and advanced English language 
courses were offered to Iran’s students, many of which provided the opportunity to study at 
UK universities. Exhibitions, concerts and British Council libraries, likewise, showcased 
elements of Britain’s musical, art and literary traditions to Iran’s citizens.87 Beyond these 
large urban settlements, the British Council in Iran had a negligible presence, something 
they were reluctant to change. The agency, for instance, rejected the AIOC’s December 
1946 requests to expand its operations into the UK government-controlled oilfields in the 
south-west region of Khuzestan. In meetings with British Council officials, senior AIOC 
figures maintained that, while this was an area of Iran where the UK’s influence was strong, 
its culture was ‘inadequately put across’ to locals. Resolving this issue, they asserted, would 
alleviate the increasing public disquiet over Britain’s control of the Iranian oil industry.88 
British Council officials, though, dismissed the AIOC’s claims, regarding the opening of 
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centres in the region a futile exercise. As the oil company already had fully established 
education facilities catering for Iranian workers and their families, there was no need for 
similar British Council centres. The agency’s officials instead offered to provide books, 
transcripts of lectures and musical recordings to AIOC staff.89 
As the Cold War intensified, the UK Foreign Office placed greater pressure on the 
British Council in Iran. Previously, the government department had paid little attention to the 
agency’s functions in the country. During the Second World War, for example, diplomats and 
officials had relied more on the BBC Persian Service to disseminate pro-British 
propaganda.90 Up until the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis, the British Council had been left to 
provide English language teaching to Iranian people without the need or demand from the 
Foreign Office to promote the UK in the process. In the diplomatic incident’s aftermath, 
however, the government department called on the agency to overhaul its strategy in Iran. 
According to senior Foreign Office figures, the British Council should concentrate less on 
educating Iranians and more on promoting Britain’s values. In so doing, it should undertake 
the bulk of the work that was being undertaken by the UK Embassy in Tehran’s Information 
Department, which included the publication of magazines and the organising of exhibitions.91 
As the British Council had a degree of independence from the government, the Foreign 
Office maintained that it would be best served to undertake these operations. With the 
Soviet Union’s apparent desire to expand into the Middle East, combined with increasing 
domestic disquiet in Iran, Britain needed to do more to engage with Iranians and allay 
popular concerns.92 
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The British Council acquiesced to some of the Foreign Office’s demands. The 
agency jettisoned its three permanent lecturers from Britain, on the grounds that they were 
over-qualified for the work the British Council needed to do in Iran. It also expanded its 
offices and activities in certain provincial cities, notably those in Rasht, Mashhad and Tabriz 
that were close to the Soviet border, hiring more local staff to teach English.93 While happy 
with being used by the British government as an instrument of soft power, the British Council 
took issue with the approach the UK Foreign Office recommended. Justifying its stance to 
the government department, the agency’s senior officials in Iran claimed that many Iranians 
would see through this change in tack and lose trust in the British Council. Victor Blomfield, 
the chief of the institute’s operations in Iran between 1945 and 1952, instead recommended 
that the British Council be allowed to adopt a subtler, nuanced approach. Rather than relying 
on publications and exhibitions to promote Britain, the agency should be given the 
capabilities to train Iranian teachers. Through this, the British Council could immerse these 
educators in the norms and values of Britain, with these figures subconsciously relaying 
these ideals to their students.94  
In tandem with the British Council’s efforts, the BBC’s Persian Service communicated 
UK news, culture and perspectives. Established in 1942 and broadcasting out of the Foreign 
Office in London, its twice-daily 30-minute radio transmissions had proved popular with 
Iranians. Many of Iran’s citizens, particularly the educated middle classes residing in urban 
areas, preferred the broadcaster’s current affairs content to its domestic equivalent. As well 
as supposedly appearing more objective and impartial – many of Iran’s radio stations were 
government controlled – its coverage of global affairs was supposedly more 
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comprehensive.95 It was for these reasons that the Foreign Office relied on the BBC Persian 
Service as the main exponent of British government-sanctioned soft power in Iran. During 
the Second World War, British diplomats and officials ensured that much of the 
broadcaster’s news content emphasised the expansionist desires of the Axis powers. The 
Foreign Office, in particular, hoped to underline the extent of German and Japanese 
transgressions in Europe, Africa, East Asia and beyond.96 
By 1953, however, British cultural programmes in Iran faced considerable 
challenges. Crucially, the BBC Persian Service and British Council’s initiatives to promote 
Britain’s norms, values and ideas to Iranians were undermined by the UK’s diplomatic 
approach towards the country. Many of Iran’s citizens were convinced that Britain was using 
the country as a tool to achieve its own diplomatic objectives, possessing little regard for its 
fate. In particular, many Iranians disapproved of the UK’s frequent direct intervention in 
Iran’s affairs. Throughout the modern period, the British government had encroached on the 
country’s territorial sovereignty, undermined its international standing and hindered its social, 
political and economic progress.97 Popular Iranian opposition to British foreign policy began 
in the early nineteenth century. In 1826, Britain refused to side with Iran in its war with 
Russia, despite pledging to do so. Two years later, after it was defeated, the British 
government forced their Iranian counterparts to sign the much-contested Treaty of 
Turkmenchay. The terms forced Iran to cede control of its north-Western territories – modern 
day Armenia and southern Azerbaijan – to the Russian Empire.98 Iranian resentment 
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towards the British government increased in the following years. The UK’s assistance to 
Reza Khan in his 1926 seizure of power, followed by its 1941 invasion and removal of the 
monarch, demonstrated that the UK was willing to ride roughshod over Iran’s political affairs 
to achieve their aims.99 Constant British intervention in Iran’s affairs had resulted in the 
notion of ‘perfidious Albion’ becoming engrained in the Iranian popular consciousness. 
Sections of Iran’s public had falsely attributed the British government’s ‘hidden hand’ as 
being behind the country’s political developments.100 
Buoyed by the increasing traction of the ‘perfidious Albion’ notion, many Iranians 
were now rejecting British culture. In the midst of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis in February 
1952, pro-Mossagdeh loyalists ransacked the British Council offices in Esfahan, Mashhad 
and Shiraz. They suspected the organisation of using cultural activities as a means of 
turning public opinion against the National Front and the nationalisation of Iran’s oil 
industry.101 Fearful of reprisals and repeat attacks, the British Council closed all of their 
provincial Iranian offices, relying solely on its centre in Tehran. While this still offered English 
language courses, the number of applications retrieved by Iranian students reduced 
dramatically. The unpopularity of British Council initiatives sparked fears among the 
organisation’s officials that Iranians were not just opposed to UK foreign policy, but 
everything attributed to Britain. The organisation’s representatives in Iran were concerned 
that attacks on the Tehran office were imminent. In light of Mossagdeh’s October 1952 
decision to expel Britain’s Iranian Embassy and consulates, the organisation would be 
isolated without diplomatic support. It was with these concerns in mind that by November 
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1952, the British Council announced its suspension of all its Iranian activities and its 
departure from the country.102 
In the British Council’s absence, the US became the dominant Western cultural 
power in Iran, displacing the role Britain had enjoyed since the eighteenth century.103 
America’s programme in the country had not been as longstanding as their British 
equivalent. Their cultural diplomacy initiatives had begun in 1925, with the establishment of 
the Iran-American Relations Society in Tehran. As a bi-national centre, the institute focused 
on English language teaching, while also providing a forum for Western-orientated Iranians 
to meet and interact with one another. Clashes between the older, established patricians 
and a newer generation of members over the organisation’s direction culminated in the Iran-
American Relations Society splitting in 1936. In forming the America-Iran club, those within 
the latter group claimed that the institute was not doing enough to attract new members and 
was unwilling to organise activities beyond the teaching of the English language.104 With no 
US governmental financial support, despite repeated requests, both organisations relied on 
member donations and lacked the money to establish and maintain a sustained cultural 
programme. It was only from 1951 onwards that American government officials in Iran took a 
greater interest in the bi-national centres. At the State Department’s behest, both 
organisations were forced to amalgamate into the Iran-America Society. The US Embassy 
pushed for the centre to have a board of 21 directors, 11 Iranians and 10 Americans, 7 of 
whom were American staff working in its office. By August 1953, the organisation had 13 
part-time teachers and 807 members, 721 of who were enrolled in English language 
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classes. The overwhelming majority of the membership were middle or upper-class Iranians. 
60% of members were government officials, 20% were merchants and 7% were teachers or 
university students. As well as lectures, concerts and a lending library, the Iran-America 
Society focused on English language teaching, offering 46 classes and an annual seminar 
held every July for secondary school teachers.105 
The provision of governmental funds to the Iran-America Society was part of the US’ 
broader efforts to expand its global cultural diplomacy as a result of the 1948 Smith-Mundt 
Act. From the late 1940s onwards, the American Embassy in Tehran was given the 
authorisation and the finance from the State Department to devise and implement an 
information programme for Iran. Initiatives aimed to complement the US’ broader foreign 
policy goals, specifically the promotion of ‘economic vitality, military strength and political 
stability.’ The achievement of these objectives would ensure that Iran became a vital US ally, 
resistant to Communism. Chief of its operations was Edward Wells, who had worked in the 
US Embassy as a liaison officer since the beginning of the Second World War. As someone 
who had previously collaborated with business and government figures in Iran, the Embassy 
regarded him as best placed in this role.106 
Rather than focusing on engaging with the general public, Wells’ initial programme 
sought to foster US ties with Iranian elites, particularly senior government, education and 
business figures. As Iran’s society was deeply hierarchical, with those higher up the social 
order possessing disproportionate levels of wealth, power and status, Wells regarded the 
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shaping of these people’s views as imperative. Most of them also predominantly resided in 
Tehran or its surroundings, meaning that all his efforts could be concentrated on the capital 
city.107 Initiatives focused on both the fostering of unfavourable views of Communism and 
the demonstration of Iran’s socio-economic progress. A series of American books, 
pamphlets and periodicals, for example, were translated by US Embassy figures and 
distributed across Tehran. Such publications, including a biography of Thomas Jefferson 
and a leaflet entitled The New Soviet Empire, extolled so-called American values like 
freedom and were critical of the USSR’s expansionism. While only distributing a small 
volume of publications, the Embassy hoped that they would become popular, encouraging 
Iranian publishers to translate more and other American works into Farsi.108 Complementing 
this, Wells authorised the supplying of stories critical of Communism to the Iranian press and 
approved the production of a bi-monthly magazine for the agrarian sector. Titled Land and 
People, the publication was sent to all leading figures in the agricultural sector. Articles 
demonstrated how the US was at the forefront of numerous advancements in farming 
animals and crop production, and how the country was seeking to modernise practices in 
Iran.109 
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Beyond the production and distribution of publications, the most significant scheme 
devised and implemented by Wells was the newsreel programme. The cinema had become 
an increasingly popular pastime among Iran’s middle classes, with the overwhelming 
majority wanting to watch the latest Hollywood films. Exploiting this phenomenon, Wells 
established links with various cinema managers and proprietors across Tehran, paying them 
to allow the Embassy to broadcast content before the showing of each film. These 
newsreels would often last for 15-20 minutes and would highlight the pitfalls of Communism 
and the various infrastructure and modernisation projects taking place across Iran. With 
regards to the latter, Wells was able to secure State Department funding to pay for mobile 
film units to travel across Iran to obtain video content.110 
After 1952, however, Wells and the US Embassy were forced to change tack. The 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis showed no sign of abating. Mossagdeh’s refusal to back down, 
coupled with the American government increasingly siding with their British counterparts 
forced Wells to halt all newsreel, book translation and press initiatives. The diplomatic 
dispute had the potential to irreparably damage US-Iran ties, compelling the State 
Department to order the Embassy to distance itself from Iranian politics. If Iran’s elites and 
general public came to regard its cultural activities as a propaganda tool, then its schemes 
would have no credence.111 With these concerns in mind, Wells increasingly worked to 
promote the Embassy’s library. As one of the only lending institutions in the country, he 
hoped to attract more educated 16-25-year-old students, most of whom could speak and 
read English to a proficient level. Wells presumed that they would like to read American 
factual magazines such as Time, Life and Newsweek, stocking the library with more of these 
publications. At the same time, moreover, Wells worked to establish and promote a 
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dedicated children’s section of the library. No other Iranian institution in Tehran or elsewhere 
provided a reading room and lending service for those younger than 12 years of age. Not 
only would this facility seek to rectify this, but it would also provide an opportunity for US 
officials to interact with the children’s parents. To achieve this, Wells organised a one-hour 
weekly story time session every Friday morning to be read by the librarian, inviting children 
and their parents along.112 
Wells’ attempts to promote the US Embassy’s Library lasted until the August 1953 
coup that toppled Mossagdeh and ended the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis. The impact of the CIA 
and MI6-led coup, though, on popular perceptions of the US and UK in Iran resulted in the 
expansion and transformation of the American and British soft power programme in Iran. 
This chapter has highlighted the nature of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, 
specifically how the supposed shared values and aims of both countries on the world stage 
have sustained and developed US-UK bilateral ties. Both nations’ differing priorities, 
however, compounded by their contrasting political and economic fortunes post-1945, 
strained the ‘special relationship.’ These tensions were highlighted in Iran, a country of 
historic importance to the UK and part of its ‘informal’ empire. With America’s increasing 
interest in developing US-Iranian ties in light of the Cold War, Britain’s position as the 
dominant Western power in Iran was in jeopardy. As demonstrated by its growing cultural 
diplomacy programme, American diplomats and officials were displaying an increasing 
interest in persuading and attracting Iranians towards US norms, values and ideas. The 
attentiveness of policymakers towards this aim would only develop as the 1950s progressed, 
something the next chapter explores in more depth.
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Chapter II - Maintaining Geopolitical Stability: The USIS’ backing of 
the Shah’s Regime and its Attempts to Counter the Spread of 
Soviet-inspired Communism in Iran 
 
‘We now have a second chance in Iran.’1 
 
To US State Department and White House figures, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis had nearly 
resulted in Iran’s ‘loss’ to Communism. This would have proved a considerable setback that 
would have repercussions for US prestige across the region. A stable and strong Iranian 
government was therefore required, as was an armed force able to maintain internal security 
and make a considerable contribution to the defence of the wider region. More broadly, 
State Department and White House officials deemed it crucial that Iran developed into a 
prominent regional political and economic power. Not only would this serve as an example of 
what can be achieved with American support and influence, but also highlight the benefits of 
being part of the ‘free world.’2 The then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, concurred 
with this view. With the August 1953 toppling of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossagdeh, and 
the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s restoration, the US now had a ‘second chance’ 
to achieve these foreign policy goals in Iran.3 Upon retaking the throne, the Iranian monarch 
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shifted his role away from that of a constitutional ruler. Taking a greater interest in Iran’s 
political affairs, he dissolved the National Front, the party hitherto led by Mossagdeh; 
ordered the police to clamp down further on the Tudeh; and appointed his key ally, Fazlollah 
Zahedi, as Prime Minister.4  
To support the Shah with his efforts here, US policymakers authorised the provision 
of considerable military and economic aid. From 1953 onwards, the Iranian armed forces 
were provided with modern American weapons, hardware and training. White House officials 
anticipated that this would not only make Iran’s soldiers capable of repelling internal 
dangers, but also enable them to make a considerable contribution to the defence of the 
wider Middle East.5 In February 1955, Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey signed the 
Baghdad Pact. As well as providing a regional buffer to Soviet incursions in the Middle East, 
the signatories pledged to support one another if attacked.6 American policymakers, while 
refusing to join the pact, gave the arrangement their approval. They envisaged that Iran’s 
military, due to the Shah’s vociferous opposition towards Communism, would play a 
prominent role in defending the Baghdad Pact nations should the USSR attack.7 Likewise, 
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recognising that it would take over a decade for the country to benefit from oil revenue, US 
policymakers provided substantial financial and technical assistance to bolster Iran’s 
economy.  
The State Department focused specifically on modernising Iran’s agricultural sector. 
Through the US Embassy in Tehran, they invested in machinery that would enable Iranian 
farmers to modernise their practices, increase crop yields and harvest produce more quickly 
and efficiently. To improve the plight and prospects of Iran’s rural population, Embassy 
officials strove to develop the infrastructure in many Iranian villages. They approved projects 
to improve access to clean water and sanitation, as well as authorising the building of 
schools and hospitals.8 
Complementing US military and economic support for Iran were cultural diplomacy 
and propaganda initiatives devised and implemented by the United States Information 
Service (USIS). As discussed in the previous chapter, the Americans already had a soft 
power programme in place in Iran. Since the late 1940s, the USIS had sought to engage 
with the Iranian public through book publications and cinema newsreels critical of 
Communism. In so doing, they hoped that these individuals would push these anti-Soviet 
views to their peers and acquaintances. To promote American values, moreover, the USIS, 
via the State Department, provided funding and support to the Iran-America Society, which 
offered English lessons to Iranians willing to learn the language. During the early 1950s, the 
organisation was forced to conduct its activities in the face of growing Iranian public 
antagonism towards Western institutions as a result of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis.  
Once the diplomatic dispute was resolved the USIS changed tack somewhat. The 
agency initially operated out of the American Embassy in Tehran, proceeding to open offices 
in US consulates in major Iranian provincial cities. Overseen by the United States 
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Information Agency (USIA) in Washington, the institution initially sought to sway Iranians 
away from Communism, as well as protect and bolster the Shah’s ruling regime.9 The aim of 
this chapter is to examine the policies the USIS implemented to achieve these objectives. It 
charts the development of this aspect of US soft power in Iran while also highlighting its key 
tenets. The chapter begins by discussing the US government and USIS’ rationale for 
expanding their cultural diplomacy activities in Iran. It proceeds to outline the agency’s initial 
initiatives, including its book publication programme, its attempts to foster a library culture in 
Iran and the USIS’ collaboration with Iranian journalists. The chapter finally explores how the 
agency fostered ties with pro-US elements in the Iranian government and military to 
disseminate anti-Communist propaganda and counter Soviet-subversion in Iran. 
From August 1953, America’s cultural diplomacy programme in Iran expanded 
exponentially. Heading up the running and implementation of these initiatives at the USIA’s 
behest, USIS officials in Iran focused particularly on containing and combating the 
Communist threat in Iran. Their rationale for doing this was based on demands from various 
branches of the US government. Individuals on US President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s NSC, 
most notably CIA Director Allen Dulles and the then Under Secretary of State, Herbert 
Hoover Junior, were desperate to protect the Shah’s regime from the Soviet threat. On the 
other hand, the Iranian Embassy in Tehran, supported by the State Department, aimed to 
foster negative views regarding Communism and the Soviet Union among the Iranian middle 
classes. The USIS’ first initiatives in Iran centred on promoting the free world, illustrating to 
Iranians the contrast between the freedoms enjoyed by Western societies and the 
authoritarian nature of the Communist regime. This was achieved through forging ties with 
the Iranian press, supplying stories to journalists that were critical of the Soviet Union and its 
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allies. At the same time, the USIS also devised a book programme, translating works from 
English into Farsi that extolled the virtues of American politics and history. 
From 1955 onwards, however, the USIS reconsidered their strategy in Iran. The 
aforementioned initiatives, crucially, relied on most Iranians being able to read and write, 
something only one fifth of the population was able to do by the mid-1950s. Consequently, 
the American agency increasingly relied on using the country’s radio stations to combat 
Communism and bolster the Shah’s regime. To do this, they forged ties with several officials 
within the Iranian government who possessed pro-American sympathies. The most notable 
figures the USIS worked with included the Deputy Prime Minister, Nasser Zolfghari, and the 
head of the Department of Press and Broadcasting (DPB), Nosratollah Moinian. Along with 
these individuals, the American agency was instrumental in establishing the Information 
Council. A joint enterprise between the USIS and the Iranian government, this advisory 
group sought to bolster Iran’s capabilities in the field of radio, focusing particularly on the 
country’s sole state broadcaster, Radio Tehran. Through the Information Council, the USIS 
provided the station with a new studio and transmitter. The latter was particularly crucial in 
combating Soviet jamming of Iranian radio and for ensuring that Radio Tehran’s signal could 
be reached in the volatile provincial areas in northern and eastern Iran. The success of 
these collaborative efforts culminated in the Shah seeking US assistance to establish a new 
radio station in Iran to broadcast to the wider Middle East. It also encouraged the USIS to 
work closely with the Iranian army to improve its production and dissemination of anti-
Communist propaganda. 
 
The Expansion of the USIS’ initiatives in Iran 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis, figures within the State 
Department looked to expand the USIS’ cultural diplomacy and propaganda programme in 
Iran. The most prominent proponent was the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
Affairs, Henry Byroade. Writing to the American Embassy in Tehran in 1953, he stressed the 
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need for USIS officials in the country to convince Iran’s leaders and public of the need to 
side with Western powers. In so doing, the agency would be able to highlight the 
‘speciousness’ of Soviet friendship to the Iranians, foster the country’s socio-economic 
development and demonstrate the extent of US friendship.10 Both the Embassy and the 
USIS agreed with Byroade’s recommendations. The former deemed it imperative that an 
American agency should focus on backing the Shah’s regime. With the CIA’s involvement in 
the August 1953 coup, the White House and the Iranian monarchy were now closely 
entwined. So as to reflect well on the US globally, every effort should be made to bring Iran 
more into the international community and to encourage its domestic development.11 The 
USIS in Iran, similarly, specifically discussed how they could make Byroade’s vision a reality. 
In an October 1953 telegram to his USIA superiors, the PAO and chief of agency operations, 
Edward Wells, claimed that the changed Iranian political situation means that they can do a 
‘full scale job’ on Iran. A new programme should be put in place that relies on press and 
broadcasting to encourage unfavourable views of Communism and foster the country’s 
socio-economic development. In achieving these aims, the USIS would require more staff. 
To develop contacts and effectively distribute literature, officials would need to be placed in 
the Tabriz, Esfahan and Mashhad consulates. The agency would also require a dedicated 
information officer, an individual to focus on publicising aid programmes and three more 
secretaries to deal with the increasing bureaucratic burden.12 
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Yet it was only through the actions of Herbert Hoover Junior, a senior State 
Department official with considerable experience of Iran, that the USIS and Byroade’s vision 
was put into practice. In 1944, the newly crowned Shah invited Hoover, then a successful 
businessman and manufacturer, to Iran to act as an economic advisor. The close rapport 
that developed between the two figures resulted in the Iranian monarch also consulting 
Hoover on military and political matters.13 As a result, Eisenhower sent Hoover to Iran in 
1953 to assist with the settlement over the oil industry in Iran. Negotiations between the UK 
and Iranian governments, as well as BP, had stalled. The British wanted to reassert their 
control over the country’s oil industry, which Iran’s representatives deemed unthinkable. 
Hoover’s brief was to restart the talks and help reach a settlement that sidelined the British 
and was amenable to the Iranians. Arguing that Iran’s public would not accept British control 
over the country’s oil supplies, Hoover was crucial in persuading BP to accept one seventh 
of Iran’s oil industry. The rest would be owned by each of the other ‘seven sisters’, the most 
prominent European and North American petroleum firms, with the Iranian government 
receiving a 15% share of the profits.14  
Hoover’s approach impressed Eisenhower. Despite antagonising both British and 
American Embassy officials, Eisenhower appointed him Under-Secretary of State upon his 
October 1954 return to Washington. Second only to John Foster Dulles in the State 
Department, Hoover was crucial in making and shaping policies that sought to affect Iranian 
public opinion. Crucially, he feared a negative popular response to the October 1954 oil 
settlement. He was convinced that this settlement would not go down well with the Iranian 
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people. While the agreement sidelined the British, it did not give control of this lucrative 
industry to Iran. Hoover was aware that public dissatisfaction of foreign control of Iranian oil 
had significantly contributed to former Prime Minister Mohammad Mossagdeh’s election, the 
attempted nationalisation of this industry and the August 1953 coup. He accordingly wanted 
to try and foster a favourable feeling towards this settlement in Iran to ensure similar 
situations did not occur in the future.15  
More broadly, as a close ally of the Shah, Hoover was convinced policies should be 
put in place to protect the fledgling pro-US regime. CIA Director, Allen Dulles, shared his 
convictions. The younger brother of the then Secretary of State had been the architect 
behind the propaganda campaign that undermined the Mossagdeh regime in the final 
months of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis.16 As they spent considerable time monitoring the 
Iranian domestic situation, both figures were aware that public antagonism towards Zahedi, 
the new Prime Minister, was high. Living standards among many Iranians were low in 
comparison to nations of an equal economic standing to Iran, with many in the country also 
resenting the Shah and Zahedi’s increasingly authoritarian rule.17 As such, Hoover and 
Dulles were concerned about how changes in Iran’s position towards the Cold War would 
resonate among the country’s general public. They sought to persuade the Iranian people of 
the importance of siding with the United States. Mosaddegh’s removal, as well as the 
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exponential increase in American aid, meant Iran was quickly becoming a key US ally in the 
Middle East. They calculated that the general public would notice the country’s shift away 
from Cold War neutrality. Dulles and Hoover suspected that many Iranians, especially those 
with nationalist and pro-Mosaddegh tendencies, would be opposed to Iran’s changing 
diplomatic tack.18 
Mindful of the Iranian people’s views, Communists in and outside of Iran waged a 
propaganda campaign to exploit this public dissatisfaction and destabilise the Shah’s 
regime. Radio Moscow broadcasts and Farsi editions of Pravda, the Soviet Union’s official 
newspaper, sought to discredit the oil settlement. Its reports argued that the agreement was 
a way for the US ‘to squeeze profits’ out of Iran, a means for America and the Shah to take 
control of Iran’s resources and gift them to private companies.19 Meanwhile, Iran’s Soviet-
backed underground Communist party, the Tudeh, sought to foster popular resentment 
against the government, publishing and distributing anti-Shah leaflets, booklets and 
periodicals. The content of these mythologised the Mossagdeh regime, arguing that the US 
and the Shah rode roughshod over the Iranian people’s interests in removing him. It drew 
unfavourable comparisons between this administration and the government that replaced it. 
Since its August 1953 formation at the Shah’s behest, the Prime Minister and his Cabinet 
had been plagued by accusations of incompetency and corruption. Tudeh literature 
repeatedly accused the government of being composed of the Shah’s favourites. It was 
allegedly an administration ill equipped to govern Iran, slow to respond to domestic and 
international developments, and whose members lacked the political antennae to devise and 
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enact legislation.20 Senior US government officials were greatly alarmed by the Tudeh 
Party’s activities, deeming the Iranian Communist party the ‘best organised and most 
effective Communist force in the Near East.’ If they failed to deal with organisation, they 
feared that its tactics and practices would spread to left-wing movements in other countries 
in the region.21 
Moreover, USSR officials collaborated with Arab nationalist regimes in the Middle 
East, who shared their opposition towards the US’ growing regional presence. Originating in 
the nineteenth century, the movement grew exponentially with the 1952 Egyptian military 
coup that resulted in the prominent Arab nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser becoming Prime 
Minister, rising to President in 1956. In 1954, the Syrian electorate had also opted for an 
Arab nationalist government, with both countries joining in 1958 to form the UAR. Such 
regimes called for the deposition of neighbouring regimes like the Shah’s that were closely 
aligned with Western powers.22 Senior figures on the NSC were wary of Arab nationalism. 
They regarded the ideology and its adherents as being one step removed from Communism. 
Despite not being an Arab country, US government figures were concerned Arab 
nationalism could take hold in Iran. The 1951 election of Mossagdeh, a figure with neutralist 
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and nationalist views, indicated that many Iranians sympathised with Arab nationalism’s key 
ideological tenets.23 
With Soviet assistance, Egyptian Arab nationalists sought to destabilise the Shah’s 
regime. They aimed to foster resentment against the monarch among non-ethnic Iranians, 
especially the Arab diaspora residing in the oil-rich region of Khuzestan and the Kurdish 
peoples living in the Northeast of the country. In so doing, the Egyptian regime hoped to 
cause economic and political instability that could affect the whole of Iran.24 Much of these 
subversive activities centred on radio broadcasting. In 1953, Nasser had helped establish 
Radio Cairo. Recognising the broadcaster’s potential to destabilise pro-Western regimes in 
the Middle East and Arab world, the Soviet Union immediately provided financial and 
technical assistance. Radio Cairo’s transmissions paid particular attention to Arab and 
Kurdish peoples living in Iran. The broadcaster, according to US Embassy officials, sought to 
‘stir up trouble in Iran’s frontier areas.’ Programmes would highlight the better treatment of 
Kurds in Soviet-held areas, as well as foster Kurdish self-identity by playing the national 
anthem daily.25 
It was with these developments in mind that the American Embassy in Tehran 
lobbied for the implementation of policies to shape Iranian popular opinion. In particular, they 
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were concerned that Communist and Arab nationalist propaganda would have a 
disproportionate and detrimental effect on Iran’s middle classes. Much of this burgeoning 
political stratum had left-wing and neutralist tendencies. As such, they were more 
susceptible to Soviet propaganda, which Embassy officials feared would play on their 
dissatisfactions and political leanings.26 Figures from the American Embassy in Tehran were 
determined to dissuade urban middle class Iranians from deeming Communism ‘a good 
thing.’ In telegrams to both the CIA and the State Department, they called for more literature 
and media critical of the Soviets. This would help keep Communism to ‘manageable 
proportions’, enhance the prestige of the monarchy and crush the Tudeh.27  
Yet it was only after Hoover’s October 1954 return to Washington that the State 
Department’s desire for policies that sought to shape Iranian public opinion became a reality. 
As Under-Secretary of State, Hoover was required to attend all NSC Planning Board 
meetings. Composed of representatives from the White House, Central Intelligence, State 
and Defence departments, this committee reviewed papers and proposed strategies. Their 
recommendations and conclusions would then be forwarded to the NSC as a whole, where 
they would be accepted and implemented as policies.28 A December 1954 Planning Board 
report on the situation in Iran pushed for the shaping of Iranian public opinion to become a 
                                               
26 Loy Henderson (US Ambassador to Iran) to John Foster Dulles (Secretary of State), 2 September 
1953, NAII, US State Department papers, Iran, US-Iran Political Relations (1950-1954); American 
Embassy (Tehran) to the State Department, 6 November 1954, NAII, US State Department papers, 
Iran, Communism in Iran (1950-1954); Despatch from the American Embassy (Tehran) to the State 
Department, 30 October 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954; Project outline prepared in the 
CIA, 14 June 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954. 
27 Memorandum from Anthony Cuomo (Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Tehran) to 
Roy Melbourne (First Secretary of the American Embassy in Tehran), 19 October 1953, FRUS, 1952-
1954, Iran, 1951-1954. 
28 Paul Miller, ‘The Contemporary Presidency: Organising the NSC: I Like Ike’s’, Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, 43/3 (2013), 592.  
  107 
key part of US foreign policy in the country. The report tied the need to shape the views of 
Iran’s citizens with the US’ on-going provision of military aid to the country. It argued that the 
American desire for Iran to be crucial to the defence of the Middle East from the Soviets 
would only be successful if Iran’s ‘national morale’ improves. The ‘psychological elements’ of 
the Iranian situation were ‘not static.’ Many of its citizens were either ambivalent or sceptical 
towards the threat posed by Soviet-inspired Communism. As a result, they were opposed to 
the Shah and Zahedi’s acceptance of American weaponry and military training. Policies, 
accordingly, needed to be implemented that highlight the ways in which the USSR was 
subversively undermining the Iranian government and the country’s territorial sovereignty. In 
so doing, this would highlight the geopolitical threats faced by Shah and Zahedi, vindicating 
their decision to side with the US in this superpower struggle and bolster support for the 
regime.29  
The findings of this report were approved in a 13 January 1955 NSC meeting. It was 
during discussions here that Hoover and Dulles pushed for the NSC to apply initiatives 
aimed at steering Iranian public opinion towards the Cold War, the Shah’s regime and the oil 
settlement. Dulles and Hoover played on the US government’s deep-rooted fear of USSR 
and Communist expansionism. Citing the American Embassy in Tehran’s reports on Soviet 
propaganda, they argued that the ‘precarious Iranian situation’ would not be resolved without 
policies shaping the public’s views.30 The Planning Board report’s findings formed a key part 
of the Eisenhower administration’s 1955 policy paper, NSC 5402, which outlined the US’ 
diplomatic approach towards Iran. As well as calling for sustained American military and 
economic support for Iran, this emphasised the importance of the country’s ‘attitude’ towards 
receiving this support. It highlighted the need to bolster public enthusiasm for the fledgling 
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Iranian government, as well as for initiatives that would help Iran’s citizens become more 
anti-Communist. These programmes would direct popular nationalism into ‘constructive 
channels’, militating against ‘a relapse’ into the neutralism and left-wing thinking seen under 
Mossagdeh.31 
Largely concurring with the NSC’s vision for combating Communism and protecting 
the Shah’s regime, the USIA devised a psychological programme for Iran aimed at achieving 
these aims. The agency’s policies, programmes and initiatives immediately became a pivotal 
aspect of US foreign policy towards the country, overseen by the OCB’s Working Group of 
Iran. Comprised of figures from all major sections of the US government, the committee met 
bi-monthly to ensure the NSC’s objectives for the country were being met.32 During these 
discussions, USIA representatives pushed for the council to make the implementation of 
policies dissuading the Iranian public from Soviet-inspired Communism and fostering 
favourable popular impressions of the Shah’s regime a priority. Opening up USIS offices in 
the Esfahan, Mashhad and Tabriz consulates, they called for a tailor-made psychological 
programme for Iran reflective of the ‘post settlement period’ after August 1953. This would 
help foster and promote political, social and economic developments, while also combating 
Soviet propaganda. Even though USIA figures regarded the promotion of the oil settlement 
as important, they absolved themselves of responsibility for it, overruling Herbert Hoover 
Junior in the process. Such initiatives, they argued, should be left to the four American 
petroleum companies that comprise the new oil consortium, Esso, Texaco, Standard Oil 
Company of New York and Standard Oil Company of California. The agreement was instead 
something that the USIA claimed the American government should keep a distance from. 
The Iranian public were keenly aware of the US’ involvement in launching the coup and 
securing the ensuing oil settlement, objecting to foreign control over Iran’s oil industry. Any 
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American attempt to promote the oil settlement, therefore, could lead to a popular Iranian 
backlash against the US.33 
Instead, USIA figures ordered USIS officials in Iran to differentiate between the 
different ideologies of freedom and Communism. In underlining this dichotomy, they aimed 
to illustrate the loss of liberty under regimes of the latter, especially intellectual freedom of 
expression. In extolling the virtues of the ‘free world’ of Western Europe and North America, 
though, it was important to avoid specifics. Each Western society was diverse, possessing a 
different understanding of the ‘free world’s’ key tenets. Senior USIA officials were also 
concerned that overstating the American conception could generate popular resistance. 
While they envisioned that many Iranians would be easily swayed away from Communism, 
they were not confident that Iran’s public regarded a US-style society or politics as a credible 
alternative.34  
To promote the ‘free world’ effectively and efficiently, USIS officials should strive to 
foster ties with prominent Iranian governmental and societal figures. Having spent most of 
their formative years being educated in Europe, most of these individuals possessed pro-
Western views. Much of this political and societal elite were accordingly far keener to 
strengthen US-Iran ties than their predecessors. Due to the UK’s imperial past and its 
historic hold over Iranian affairs, previous generations had been much more deferential 
towards the British government. The newer generation of elites, however, sought to detach 
Iran from de facto UK control, regarding the building of ties with the US as the most effective 
means to achieve this.35 Through working with these figures the USIA hoped that the USIS 
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could engage with its ‘principal targets in Iran’ to create a broad middle class coalition 
against Communism. This included urban population government officials, university faculty, 
students, school children, merchants and soldiers. Not only did the USIA deem members of 
this section of society more receptive to American norms, values and lifestyles, but they also 
regarded appealing to these individuals as an effective means of shoring up the Iranian 
regime. Engaging with this specific group, it was hoped, would create a ‘trickle down effect.’ 
As Iran’s middle classes became more politically, socially and economically prosperous, 
membership of this societal group would become more aspirational. Other Iranians would 
copy their habits and practices, which would be based on American values and culture.36 
Indeed, greater educational and white-collar employment opportunities meant that 
Iran’s urban middle classes were growing in size and prominence by the early 1950s. 
Possessing mainly moderate, centrist views, a growing number of this societal group’s 
members had become more politically aware and active, eager to have more of a say in 
Iranian political life. Robert Payne, the USIS’ chief officer for Iran from 1955 to 1958, had 
become increasingly concerned that many of these individuals were opposed to Iran’s closer 
relationship with the US. In a telegram to his USIA superiors in Washington, he noted that, 
while most of Iran’s middle classes were appreciative of American economic support, they 
were opposed to Iran siding with the US in its superpower struggle with the Soviet Union. 
There had already been ‘an adverse reaction’ to a December 1955 Time magazine article, 
which discussed the prospect of a defence line across the Zagros Mountains. Spanning the 
length of northwest Iran, northeast Iraq and Southeast Turkey, US officials had regarded the 
mountain range as an excellent buffer against a possible Soviet invasion. The ensuing 
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Iranian backlash against this Time story, however, compelled Payne and his USIS 
subordinates in Iran to develop the ‘most favourable possible public opinion for US 
initiatives’. Not only would this help placate domestic opposition towards Iran’s new Cold 
War allegiances, but it would also help make the Iranian public more amenable towards US 
policies and objectives.37 
 
Initial USIS initiatives in Iran 
 
Initially, USIS officials in Iran sought to influence popular perceptions of Communism and the 
ruling regime through supplying stories to the press and a book translation programme. 
Providing stories to Iran’s media outlets was something that other sections of the US 
government had been undertaking to steer popular Iranian views since the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Crisis. Between 1951 and 1953, the CIA - in conjunction with the US Embassy – had 
implemented a propaganda campaign to foster support for the Shah and discredit 
Mossagdeh. Through agents entrenched in the Iranian political system, the CIA subsidised 
publication media and leaked information to the Iranian press. Reports suggested that the 
US would reduce aid to Iran while Mossagdeh remains in power, while also highlighting the 
Iranian prime minister’s supposed faults. Articles would illustrate his power-hungry nature, 
most notably his attempts to hold on to office in the last few months of the oil crisis. Eager to 
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resolve the dispute, the Shah had dissolved the Iranian parliament and cabinet in April 1953, 
something that Mossagdeh refused to acknowledge.38 
After the crisis, the USIS were determined to establish their own links with the Iranian 
press. Figures from the agency were primarily affected by the views of Iranian government 
officials with pro-US sympathies. In a meeting with Payne, Foreign Minister Abbas Aram 
claimed that that Iran’s print press possessed ‘great power and potential.’ As publications 
were state-run - with editors closely monitored by the government - these outlets provided a 
perfect platform from which to extoll the virtues of government policies and criticise the 
Soviet Union.39 The USIS, moreover, were concerned by Soviet attempts to woo Iran’s press 
officials. At a 4 December 1956 press convention, for example, Nikolai Pegov, the USSR’s 
Ambassador to Iran, invited 12 Iranian journalists on a tour of Moscow.40 All of these 
reporters wrote for left-leaning publications such as Tehran Mossavar and Omid Iran, critical 
of the US’ presence in Iran, as well as the Shah. Despite regarding these journalists as 
‘second rate’, the USIS successfully lobbied the Iranian government to reject their exit 
visas.41 The Soviet response to this was to invite 12 more journalists to Moscow, five from 
the Tehran Times and seven from Ettelat, Iran’s two most popular newspapers.42 In this 
case, and despite not being wholly comfortable with the idea, the USIS and the Iranian 
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government allowed these journalists to visit the Soviet Union. Two of the invitees, Kayhan 
editor Mostafah Mezbezadeh and Ettelat columnist Majid Davami, had close ties to the US. 
Both writers extensively collaborated with the CIA during the oil crisis and were the USIS’ 
closest journalist contacts. Preventing them from visiting Moscow could antagonise them, 
jeopardising the USIS’ relationship with these figures. Besides, officials from the American 
agency envisaged that both journalists could be used to write critical stories of their Russian 
experiences in the future.43 
 The stories USIS figures supplied to Mezbezadeh and Davami emphasised the 
inferior economic conditions and restricted political freedoms in Communist societies. 
Reports claimed that everyday life in the People’s Republic of China was a ‘nightmare’, and 
revealed how governments in the Eastern Bloc were kept in check by the fear of a Soviet 
military invasion.44 To foster favourable popular views towards the Shah’s regime, the USIS 
were instrumental in establishing a new Iranian newspaper, Daily Bamshad. Its editor, 
Ismael Purvali, was an ardent pro-American, a close confidante of the Iranian Prime Minister 
from 1957-1960, Manoucher Eqbal, from their time as students at Dar ul-Funun, forerunner 
to the University of Tehran. As an advocate of the Shah’s rule, Purvali was determined to 
ensure the continuation of the Pahlavi Dynasty. He approached Payne, requesting financial 
support and information for stories, requests the PAO for Iran was only too happy to comply 
with. The first editions of Daily Bamshad were printed on 1 May 1957. Spanning four pages, 
its reports highlighted Iran’s socio-economic progress under the Shah, while also praising 
US foreign policy in the Middle East.45 
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To further sway the Iranian literate classes from Communism, the USIS translated 
various books and publications into Farsi. Before 1955, this was not a particularly successful 
enterprise. The agency’s officials focused on translating ‘instructional publications.’ They 
supplied books to stores and libraries on topics such as agricultural practices and the best 
ways to rear children. According to USIA figures in Washington, such a strategy was too 
simplistic. While it undoubtedly assisted Iran’s socio-economic development, it did little to 
contain Communism and bolster the Shah’s regime.46 They instead recommended to the 
USIS that any book translation programme for Iran should be modelled on the thoughts of 
Donald Wilbur, an archaeologist who specialised in the study of Iran and Ancient Persia. 
While conducting research in Iran for his PhD thesis, an analysis of Ancient Persian 
languages, Wilbur had also moonlighted as an intelligence officer. In 1942 he had joined the 
Office of Strategic Services, the CIA’s forerunner. He was charged with monitoring the 
German and Italian consulates in Iran and the Persian Gulf. At the Second World War’s end 
he joined the CIA, providing information on popular Iranian perspectives to the agency 
during the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis, as well as directly paying pro-Shah loyalists to 
demonstrate against Mossagdeh in August 1953. Due to his experience of Iran, a New York-
based company, Franklin Publications, had commissioned Wilbur to write a report on the 
literary scene in Iran. The publisher was considering whether to enter the Persian market.47  
The USIS had been privy to this report, with the USIA in Washington handing them a 
copy. Wilbur had bemoaned the lack of Iranian knowledge on promoting and displaying 
books. While Tehran had 12 major bookstores, each stocking 4000-20,000 publications at 
any one time, there was no promotion of books in newspapers, on the radio or in shop 
windows. The number of readers in the country was also very small. Wilbur estimated that 
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only roughly 20% of Iran’s 16,000,000 people were literate. Out of these, only around 
20,000, mostly young, college-educated individuals residing in Tehran or other major 
provincial cities were keen readers. Many had confined themselves to Persian history books 
and had little appreciation of works written by foreign authors. Wilbur pointed out that in his 
visits to Tehran’s 12 book stores, only one in the province of Shemiran, in northern Tehran, 
had copies of books from American literary giants such as Mark Twain, Jack London and 
John Steinbeck. Readers, in contrast, were keen on foreign news publications; Time 
magazine, in particular, had proved popular with Iran’s literate classes.48 In light of this 
supposed Iranian appreciation of US perspectives on current affairs, Wilbur recommended 
publishers to supply biographies and autobiographies, especially those centred on 
individuals who had overcome significant obstacles to achieve success. These should 
include biopics on ‘great’ Americans such as George Washington and Ulysses Grant, as well 
as notable living figures like Eisenhower. Wilbur, likewise, called for more books to be 
supplied to Iran that extolled the virtues of US history, geography and business. Due to the 
low literacy levels in Iran, these should not be technical, accessible to high school students 
and above. It would also be prudent to provide books on US perspectives on the Middle East 
and critiques of Communism.49 
 
USIS-Iranian Government Collaboration: The Information Council 
 
The US State Department, however, halted the USIS’ book translation programme before it 
could be implemented. As officials from its Bureau of Near Eastern, African and Asian Affairs 
pointed out, the illiteracy rate, close to two-thirds of the population, was too high to justify 
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such action. Unless USIS figures focused on translating and promoting illustration-heavy 
publications, book translations and engaging with the press were ‘futile exercises.’ State 
Department officials instead called for USIS officials in Iran to engage with the less literate, 
especially those in provincial cities such as Tabriz and Mashhad close to the Soviet border. 
These north and eastern regions were where Communist support was at its highest. Popular 
unrest in these cities would not just endanger the Shah’s regime but also potentially 
destabilise the region.50 Figures from the Bureau of Near Eastern, African and Asian Affairs 
recommended to the USIS that they should only seek to solely engage with Iran’s middle 
classes once this threat had abated. By this point, book translation and library expansion 
initiatives would be much more far-reaching. Due to the Iranian people’s widening 
participation in education, the country’s literacy rate would have improved immeasurably.51 
Complying with the State Department’s demands, Payne claimed that the only way 
these aims could be achieved was through collaborating with Iranian government officials. 
As PAO, Payne was in charge of the agency’s operations in the country, devising, approving 
and presiding over all of the USIS’ cultural diplomacy activities. People in Iran, Payne 
argued, were generally wary of big powers, so a sustained USIS campaign across the radio 
waves would be counterproductive. In the same way that the American agency supplied 
stories to the Iranian media, the USIS should instead engage with Iran’s people through 
radio via a third party. For such an approach to be effective, Payne recommended to the 
USIA that he should work closely with Nosratollah Moinian, the head of the DPB. 
Established by the Shah in 1953, it oversaw all Iranian print, audio and visual media. Its 
head, Moinian, was vociferously pro-American. Wary of both the Soviet Union and Britain in 
equal measure, he regarded the US as best placed to combat the influence and presence of 
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both nations in Iran. Moinian was one of a new generation of Iranian politicians sceptical of 
the former imperial powers. This group had grown tired of the frequent Anglo-Russian 
interventions in Iranian affairs since the seventeenth century. Due to the US’ oft-stated anti-
imperialist stance, Moinian and his contemporaries deemed dealing with the Americans as a 
vastly superior alternative.52 The views of this new generation of politicians had become 
much more prominent and powerful, with the Shah increasingly favouring these figures. Now 
that he was taking more of an interest in political affairs, the Iranian monarch wanted to 
sweep away many of the established patricians, many of whom were old and pro-British, 
replacing them with younger figures such as Moinian that were more amenable to dealing 
with modern superpowers such as the US.53 
As a result, the USIS sought to engage with these pro-American figures through 
establishing an organisation that brought together American and Iranian officials, the 
Information Council. In a February 1955 meeting with Moinian, Payne suggested that an 
advisory group, comprised of USIS, DPB and pro-American government officials, be 
established. This committee, Payne suggested, would make the final decision on all 
propaganda and information policies, with all other Iranian government departments required 
to defer to it. Payne had taken inspiration for this idea from a July 1955 USIA circular. Sent 
to all USIS posts in the Middle East, this had suggested to PAOs that they should help 
establish advisory committees composed of Americans residing in these nations. 
Representatives in these meetings should hail from business, education, religion or the arts. 
They could then subsequently use their Iranian associates and acquaintances to provide 
feedback to the USIS on popular perceptions of the US and for constructive suggestions as 
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to how these could be improved.54 Unlike the USIA’s conception, this advisory group, due to 
the nature of its activities, would remain unknown to all but the higher echelons of the Iranian 
government. US involvement, if it emerged, would be very embarrassing.55 Per the USIS’ 
recommendation, and unlike the USIA’s conception of an advisory committee, there would 
be non-American representatives. Moinian fronted the Information Council, supported in this 
role by Iran’s Deputy Prime Minister, Nasser Zolfghari, and Senator Ali Hejazi. Moinian had 
recruited both due to their desire for stronger US-Iran bilateral ties and greater American 
involvement in Iranian political and economic affairs.56 
Beyond Moinian and Zolfghari, Payne was unwilling to invite other Iranian 
government officials to join the advisory group. According to the USIS’ PAO for Iran, most of 
the figures surrounding the Shah did not possess an understanding of information processes 
and techniques. The DPB, in particular, had many ‘un-talented hangers-on.’ Any attempt to 
rectify this would take too long, blighted by the ‘personal ambitions and jealousies’ of officials 
in the DPB, as well as in and outside the Information Council.57 One such individual, with the 
potential to destabilise the US-Iranian advisory group, was the Minister of Interior, Asadollah 
Alam. Born into a wealthy landowning family, he was ever-present in the Shah’s inner circle 
from 1953 until his death in 1978. Alam was a vehement Anglophile, helping to orchestrate 
the August 1953 coup.58 After hearing about the Information Council’s existence, he sought 
to force his way onto the advisory group and curtail its work with US officials. Alam 
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petitioned the Shah, to no avail, to force the DPB and Moinian to work with the UK Foreign 
Office’s IRD and model its activities on the British system.59 
While aware of the Information Council’s existence, the Shah was not particularly 
interested in its functions. Rather than preside over it, he trusted Zolfghari to oversee its 
activities on his behalf. In a September 1956 audience with the Iranian monarch, the then 
American Ambassador to Iran, Selden Chapin, enquired about the Information Council to 
gauge the Shah’s views on this committee. Uneasy about the monarch’s relative silence on 
this US-Iran arrangement, the USIS had asked Chapin to bring this up in the meeting. The 
Shah claimed that, while he was aware of the Information Council’s existence, he was 
ambivalent about its workings and initiatives. He claimed the dissemination of anti-
Communist propaganda was inconsequential, instead arguing that greater American military 
and economic support was the most effective way to contain Communism. The Shah 
proceeded to portion responsibility for the Information Council to both Zolfghari and Moinian. 
The advisory group was something conceived by these figures, so it should be in their 
remit.60 
In bringing together USIS and selected Iranian government figures, the Information 
Council oversaw and approved all US-Iran anti-Communist initiatives and activities that 
involved the Iranian media. In so doing, it became the ‘third party’ that the USIS were looking 
for to engage with the Iranian public and dissuade them from Communism. Still, in relying on 
the Information Council as a vehicle for the anti-Soviet activities in Iran, the USIS were wary. 
Despite their ardent pro-Americanism, they feared that both Zolfghari and Moinian could 
develop their own interests counter to the US’ as time progresses. Equally, should the Shah 
suddenly take a greater interest in the Information Council’s activities, he could wield his 
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considerable power to shape the programme according to his interests. To ensure that the 
Information Council focused on dissuading the Iranian public from Communism, the USIS 
were convinced that they had to play a hands-on role in the committee. As well as attending 
all scheduled meetings, they aimed to inform and share stories with Iranian radio and press 
outlets, while also assisting and advising Iran’s government on media matters.61 
The Information Council began operating in February 1956. From the outset, it 
became the main conduit for all US-Iranian anti-Communist propaganda and counter-
subversive initiatives. As per Payne’s suggestion, the advisory group focused on enhancing 
the functions and reach of Radio Tehran, a government owned broadcaster run by the DPB 
and overseen by Moinian. As the main - and only - Iranian audio broadcaster, it had various 
satellite stations in provincial cities that predominantly used Radio Tehran content, but also 
devised programming of their own to suit local, regional audiences. Despite its relative 
national monopoly, the broadcaster faced considerable external competition, notably Radio 
Moscow and the BBC Persian Service. The coverage, content and reception of these 
stations were vastly superior to that of Radio Tehran. According to Payne, the Iranian 
broadcaster not only had a weak signal outside the capital city, but its programming was of a 
‘low budget with even lower production values.’ While Radio Tehran broadcast for 17 hours 
a day, most listeners, especially in rural areas and provincial cities, were unable to obtain an 
audible signal. Compounding these issues, the broadcaster suffered from a shortage of staff, 
numerous programmes that lacked a clear central message and not enough modern radio 
equipment. Initial reports from US engineers visiting Iran at Payne’s behest indicated that a 
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new 50-kilowatt transmitter was required to resolve these issues. This would cover the area 
surrounding Tehran by day and the whole country by night.62 
Payne had been placed under considerable pressure by senior figures in the US 
government and his USIA superiors to focus specifically on improving Iranian radio. 
Crucially, the OCB’s Iran Working Group reports on the threat of Soviet-inspired 
Communism in the country had lauded the ‘special importance of radio’ in fostering the 
‘goodwill of the Iranian public.’ Not only was most of the country illiterate, but also broadcast 
news was considered by many Iranians to be more reliable than print journalism. Listeners 
instead placed greater importance on news programming. The Soviets, according to the 
OCB’s Iran Working Group, had been quicker to realise this. Through Radio Moscow and 
Radio Baku’s Farsi broadcasts, they were gathering listeners at an alarming rate. 
Recognising Iran’s cultural and linguistic diversities, they also offered radio programmes in 
Turkish and Kurdish, appealing to Iranians in border areas. Radio Moscow, for example, had 
dedicated major sections of its Farsi and Kurdish broadcasts to comparing the Soviets’ 
‘peace-loving’ approach with the US’ ‘warmongering stance.’ Seeking to appeal to young, 
college educated Iranians with an understanding of current affairs, programmes often 
emphasised supposed American militancy and colonialism in Asia. They often paid 
considerable attention to the US’ reliance on Chang Kai-shek in China, drawing 
unfavourable parallels between this and America’s relationship with the Shah.63 
The USIA, equally, had made the improving of Iran’s communication capabilities a 
key objective for USIS officials working in the country and the wider region. The aim had 
come direct from Theodore Streibert, the USIA’s Director from 1953-1957. Before heading 
the organisation he had served as an executive on the board of RKO Pictures, one of the 
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‘big five’ Hollywood studios of the early twentieth century. Through this role Streibert had 
come to see the merits and potential of both televisual and audio media in reaching mass 
audiences. In the case of nations allied to the US in the Near East, Asia and Africa, Streibert 
had called on USIS subordinates stationed in these countries to pay significant attention to 
improving radio facilities. The agency’s officials, consequently, could use this medium to 
promote US culture and values or dissuade foreign publics from Communism.64 In the case 
of Iran, Streibert had authorised the withdrawal of funds from the USIS budgets for Iraq, 
Turkey and Greece to give to the agency’s staff in Tehran. The extra financial support was 
given to cover the costs for equipment, technical assistance and staff training for Radio 
Tehran, which Streibert deemed crucial to protecting the fledgling Iranian ruling regime. With 
more funding and technical support, he was confident that the broadcaster would be able to 
broadcast all day, act as a ‘government spokesman’ as well as provide entertainment and 
news.65 
It was only with Moinian and Zolfghari’s blessing, though, that the Information 
Council focused specifically on improving Iranian radio. Both figures were in complete 
agreement with Payne and the USIA’s views on this issue. Despite facing considerable 
pressure from within the DPB to focus on cultivating Iran’s television capabilities, they 
deemed the medium as being of the ‘lowest priority.’ Moinian and Zolfghari viewed the 
product as a ‘luxury item’ for Iranian people. Focusing on television, they argued, would only 
exacerbate the widening gap between the rich and poor in Iran. To combat this, it was only 
logical to sort out other, ‘more basic forms of communication’ such as radio, telegraph and 
telephone first. By widening access to these older, more affordable means of 
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telecommunication, people residing in more impoverished parts of the country would be able 
to interact with prosperous regions, perhaps resulting in an improvement in living standards. 
It is only when this has been achieved, especially when television sets became more 
affordable, that the DPB should focus on this medium.66 
One of the Information Council’s first campaigns was to use Radio Tehran’s news 
broadcasts to promote the Baghdad Pact. In a May 1956 meeting, Zolfghari claimed to USIS 
officials that ‘people do not know enough about this defence pact.’ Exploiting the popular 
and elite gaps in Iranian knowledge, Tudeh posters and leaflets claimed that being part of 
this arrangement made Iran a subordinate NATO member and US puppet.67 Compounding 
this was the emerging Iran-Soviet détente. In June 1956, the Shah visited Moscow as a 
guest of the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. In discussions with the Iranian monarch, the 
USSR’s leader had pledged not to infringe on Iran’s territorial sovereignty.68 Both the USIS 
in Iran and Zolfghari were concerned by these developments. They feared that, if publicised, 
this pact would evoke Soviet sympathies among the Iranian public. Not only would this undo 
all their hard work in highlighting the perils of Communism, but it may also lead to a backlash 
against Western led arrangements such as the Baghdad Pact.69 The advisory group 
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accordingly took advantage of the Shah’s 21-26 May 1956 state visit to Turkey, a fellow 
member of the agreement. They authorised Radio Tehran to broadcast a 45-minute 
recording on its 27 May 1957 morning news bulletin. Its content elucidated the highlights of 
this state visit, stressed Irano-Turkic political and cultural unity and emphasised the need to 
preserve this harmony from external threats.70 
Moreover, the Information Council strove to limit and alleviate any popular backlash 
in Iran against Western powers caused by the Suez Crisis. The incident began in October 
1956, when British French and Israeli soldiers seized the shipping route. This had been in 
response to Nasser’s decision to nationalise the Suez Canal. The US, Soviet Union and the 
UN all collectively opposed this seizure. Diplomatic pressure stemming from all three actors 
forced, the UK, France and Israel to withdraw their military forces one month later.71 US 
officials were opposed to this Anglo-French-Israeli intervention in Egypt. They feared that it 
would have repercussions for popular perceptions of the US and its allies across the Arab 
world and the Middle East as a whole. There had already been significant popular disquiet in 
Iran regarding Britain, France and Israel’s intervention in Suez. In a November 1956 
audience with the Shah, the Iranian monarch asked the American Ambassador, Selden 
Chapin, and his British counterpart, Sir Roger Stevens, what they could do to alleviate the 
Iranian people’s uneasiness towards the military intervention. The Shah claimed that his 
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advisors had been informing him daily of popular opposition towards unfolding events in 
Egypt.72 
To deal with these increasingly unfavourable views of Western powers, the USIS 
worked with the Information Council to deal with the Suez Canal issue. In the advisory 
group’s meetings, DPB and USIS representatives agreed to wage a propaganda campaign 
discrediting Nasser’s approach to the incident. In particular, the Information Council focused 
on countering popular emotional support for the Egyptian leader. They authorised the 
production and dissemination of publications, posters and Radio Tehran broadcasts that 
suggested that Nasser was a Soviet stooge. More broadly, the Information Council 
emphasised the negative consequences of the Suez Canal’s nationalisation on Iran’s 
economy. With the events of 1951-53 in mind, DPB and USIS officials suspected that many 
Iranians sympathised with Nasser taking back control of an Egyptian asset from a Western 
power. Broadcasts on Radio Tehran’s morning programme talked about how Iran relied on 
the shipping route for roughly three quarters of its imports and exports. Should Egypt decide 
to levy tariffs or intermittently block the Suez Canal, it could result in food shortages, spikes 
in the unemployment rate and declining productivity. With regards to the issue as a whole, 
news programmes on Radio Tehran emphasised that there was right and wrong on both 
sides. They conceded that British and French forces should not have forcibly taken the 
shipping route, but maintained that Nasser should not have nationalised the Suez Canal 
without first discussing this with the UK government first. The undiplomatic approach 
displayed by the Egyptians here would make the rest of the world distrust Middle Eastern 
leaders and would discourage others from collaborating with the region’s governments 
economically and politically.73 
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The Information Council’s most considerable work, though, were its schemes to 
improve Radio Tehran’s programming and signal. Key to this was the building of a new 
medium wave transmitter and studio to improve the broadcaster’s reach. USIS officials in 
Iran regarded these projects as being of the utmost priority. The station’s signal was very 
weak, almost inaudible, in most provincial areas of the country, particularly in northern and 
Western regions where Communist sympathies, and Soviet radio jamming, was strongest. A 
modern studio was also required as, according to Payne, Radio Tehran’s facilities were 
‘archaic and unfit for purpose.’74 The building of the medium wave transmitter and the studio 
had been initiatives the USIS and the Information Council had inherited. In January 1953, 
UNESCO sent officials to Iran as part of their project to improve Iranian telecommunications. 
The agency regarded rectifying this issue part of their broader remit to resolve socio-
economic problems around the globe. With regards to Iran, the agency sought to narrow the 
income and wealth disparities between Tehran’s more prosperous citizens and the 
impoverished majority residing in rural areas and provincial cities.75 Despite Moinian 
bequeathing offices to these UNESCO officials, the DPB was largely uncooperative. Figures 
from the Iranian government department deemed their schemes to be unjustifiably 
expensive, especially as they would do little to showcase Iran to the world. They instead 
vetoed all UNESCO suggestions, demoralising the agency’s officials until their February 
1954 departure.76 It was only at the USIS’ behest, as well as a fear of Soviet-style 
                                               
74 USIS (Tehran) to USIA (Washington), 2 August 1954, NAII, USIA papers, Iran, Telegram Messages 
(1952-1961). 
75 Minutes of Radio Committee meeting, 18 October 1955, NAII, US State Department papers, Iran, 
US-Iran Cultural Relations (1955-1960). 
76 Minutes of Radio Committee meeting, 18 October 1955, NAII, US State Department papers, Iran, 
US-Iran Cultural Relations (1955-1960). 
  127 
Communism taking hold in Iran, that persuaded the DPB to implement UNESCO’s 
suggested plans.77 
The Information Council planned to install the medium wave transmitter in Shemiran. 
Firmly ensconced in the Elburz Mountain range, the city, just north of Tehran, was regarded 
by USIS and DPB officials as ideal. By placing the transmitter at a high altitude, Radio 
Tehran’s broadcasts would be much easier for radios across the country to pick up.78 
Initially, the advisory group planned to have the transmitter installed by the end of July 1956. 
There were, however, difficulties in securing the mast. It arrived by freight in May from 
Tangiers, but it had been damaged on the journey. With time, expertise and the right 
equipment needed to repair the mast, the transmitter was only operational by the 25 October 
1956, the day before the Shah’s birthday. As part of his celebrations, the Iranian monarch 
made the transmitter’s maiden broadcast, a speech celebrating the supposed socio-
economic progress Iran had made under his rule.79 From its launch, the new medium wave 
transmitter was an unprecedented success. Radio Tehran’s reception improved 
immeasurably and its signal successfully overpowered Soviet jamming. The station’s 
broadcasts could now be heard clearly in the cities of Isfahan and Abadan, as well as the 
Caspian seaboard, places where Radio Tehran had previously found it difficult to reach.80  
Though the transmitter’s installation was relatively seamless, the building of a studio 
for Radio Tehran was less so. The Information Council envisaged the studio being ready in 
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July 1956; at the same time as the medium wave radio transmitter was scheduled to begin 
broadcasting. Yet the new studio opened nearly a year later, at the end of June 1957. The 
advisory group was unable to construct a studio, as planned, in the DPB’s main office in 
Tehran. The building was not structured or electronically wired correctly for such a facility. 
Construction and restoration work to rectify this proved too costly for both the USIS and the 
DPB. Heated disagreements subsequently occurred within the Information Council. Moinian 
and Zolfghari pushed Payne to use USIS funds to purchase and secure a suitable building 
for Radio Tehran, something the agency’s PAO rejected on budgetary grounds. The 
impasse was only resolved when the American agency acquiesced to Moinian and 
Zolfghari’s demands. Not only did they fear that this disagreement would result in the 
Information Council’s disintegration, but the USIS also realised that they needed similar 
facilities of their own. The American agency purchased a cheap plot of land in southern 
Tehran, constructing a studio that it shared with the DPB and the broadcaster.81 
To operate the studio and radio transmitter, the USIS, with the Information Council’s 
assistance and blessing, selected two employees, Pasha Sameli and Nasser Shirzad, to be 
sent for an intensive training course in the US. Lasting six months, sessions took place at 
both the VOA’s headquarters in Washington, as well as the University of Boston. David 
Nalle, one of the producers for the VOA’s foreign language broadcasts, instructed the 
trainees. Between 1951 and 1954, Nalle had been stationed in the Iranian city of Mashhad 
as the State Department’s consular representative for eastern Iran. A keen advocate of 
information dissemination and cultural diplomacy, Nalle was unimpressed with the US’ 
broader attempts to combat Soviet propaganda in this region. In telegrams to the State 
Department, he had expressed his frustration at the lack of finance and personnel needed to 
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bolster Iranian communication and radio capabilities, especially in helping Iranians with how 
to approach this.82  
With his new role with the VOA in Washington, Nalle set about rectifying this issue. 
Through providing training sessions to Sameli and Shirzad with the USIS’ support, he hoped 
to influence and shape Radio Tehran’s content. In telegrams to USIA figures, he claimed 
that this would provide the American agency with figures in the Iranian media that would 
effectively answer to and seek assistance from Payne and other USIS officials in Iran.83 
Lasting six months, the course content stressed the need for trainees, whether in a 
presenting or producing capacity, to provide an anti-Communist perspective on news and 
current affairs. Complementing this, sessions recommended to Radio Tehran trainees that 
they needed to play more classical music broadcasts to appeal to highbrow, intellectual 
audiences who tended to display a greater affinity towards the Soviet Union. In particular, 
they recommended the works of composers such as the American Henry Cowell. In the 
process, Shirzad and Sameli were given crash courses on listener habits, likes and dislikes, 
as well as advanced English language reading, writing and speaking.84 
On their September 1956 return from the United States, Moinian promoted Sameli 
and Shirzad to the roles of Chief Radio Officer and Director of Radio Tehran respectively. 
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Their training in America, according to the DPB head, had given them a ‘solid grounding in 
radio and communication.’ Sameli and Shirzad, therefore, possessed the knowledge and 
competencies to further modernise and improve Iran’s capabilities in this field.85 Through 
their newly gained roles, which provided them with effective control over Iranian radio, 
Sameli and Shirzad exploited their links with the USIS. Both figures were successful in 
getting the American agency to loan them two staff members to help with the running of 
Radio Tehran’s new studio and the medium wave transmitter on a part-time basis. USIS 
assistance with the latter was crucial. Sameli and Shirzad argued that the Iranian 
broadcaster’s staff ‘lacked the training and motivation’ to run the transmitter. Low pay and 
poor working conditions meant that the station’s workers were apathetic, and USIS 
overseers were accordingly required to do the bulk of the work.86 As well as this, Sameli and 
Shirzad asked the USIS if these staff members could instruct and train staff from Radio 
Tehran’s provincial satellite stations. Their aim was to provide these broadcasters with help 
in peddling anti-Communist propaganda and to also deliver assistance in programme 
direction and studio engineering. In return for this, Sameli and Shirzad gave the USIS 
freedom to place their own programming on Radio Tehran for two hours per day.87 
 
USIS and Iranian government collaboration beyond the Information Council 
 
The Soviet Union’s response to the Information Council’s initiatives was to redouble its 
efforts in jamming Radio Tehran’s signal from early 1958 onwards. Such developments 
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angered the Shah, who regarded this as an affront to Iran’s territorial sovereignty. In an 
August 1958 communiqué to the State Department, the Iranian monarch called on the 
American government to provide more anti-jamming equipment, arguing that ‘radio 
requirements were even more vital than military aid.’88 Despite initially expressing 
ambivalence towards its functions, the Shah was taking an increasing interest in the 
Information Council’s activities by the end of the 1950s. As well as witnessing the 
exponential growth and reach of Radio Tehran in a short space of time, the Iranian monarch 
was increasingly aware of Soviet and Arab nationalist attempts to destabilise his regime 
through radio broadcasts. He was particularly concerned with the growth and reach of two 
Nasserite radio stations, the Voice of Arabs and Radio Cairo. In light of these developments, 
the Shah was increasingly keen to move beyond relying on the Information Council to 
combat Soviet propaganda. He instead called for US assistance in establishing an 
American-backed radio station in Iran that would broadcast to the whole Middle East. In 
discussions with the US Embassy in Tehran, the Iranian monarch claimed that, as Iran was 
an Islamic country, it was far better placed than the United States to dissuade people in 
neighbouring nations away from Communism. Moreover, he envisaged that such an 
enterprise would heighten US trust in the Iranian government, compelling them to provide 
more military and economic aid to Iran in the medium to long term.89 
Zolfghari supported the Shah here. Since helping to establish the Information 
Council, the Iranian Deputy Prime Minister’s influence had increased immeasurably. Due to 
disagreements over governmental policy, the Iranian monarch had dismissed two prime 
ministers in the five years since August 1953. Zahedi’s refusal to question the Shah on his 
meddling in Iranian political affairs meant that he had been left in place. This had resulted in 
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Iran’s Deputy Prime Minister developing a significant power base within Iranian politics, 
buoyed by a direct line to the USIS through the Information Council. In tandem with the 
Shah’s demands, Zolfghari sought to expand Radio Tehran’s activities beyond the level 
encouraged by the advisory group. In meetings with US Embassy and USIS officials, Iran’s 
Deputy Prime Minister requested American financial support, as well as technical assistance 
from VOA officials, to enable Radio Tehran to broadcast in Arabic and Turkish. Zolfghari 
modelled this as ‘an unprecedented opportunity’ to draw away listeners in geopolitical 
sensitive regions in the north and east of Iran from hostile external broadcasts.90 
The USIS, in conjunction with their USIA superiors in Washington, agreed with the 
Shah and Zolfghari’s demands. Soviet blocking of Iranian radio, they argued, was preventing 
Radio Tehran from reaching ‘geographically sensitive areas’ such as the Caspian seaboard 
and the northeast of Iran. Initially seeking to rectify this issue had been the USIS’ primary 
motive in working extensively with the broadcaster through the Information Council. Refusing 
to resolve the Soviets’ renewed efforts in this field, therefore, would have meant that the 
advisory group’s exertions would have all been in vain.91 The impetus for the American 
agency’s views here came from the very top of the organisation. Replacing Theodore 
Streibert in 1957, George Allen, the new USIA Director, was a keen advocate of the Shah 
and Zolfghari’s policy suggestions. Between 1946 and 1948, Allen had been the US 
Ambassador for Iran, presiding over this role during the Azerbaijan Crisis. As such, he was 
keenly aware of Iran’s geopolitical importance, proximity and vulnerability to Soviet 
penetration and subversion. Due to the region’s occupation by Soviet forces in 1946, Allen 
paid particular attention to proceedings in the northeastern Iranian city of Tabriz. With Soviet 
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radio jamming affecting Radio Tehran’s reception in this region, the new USIA Director 
accordingly pushed the US government to further assist their Iranian counterparts in the 
fields of radio and communication.92 
The Iranian Embassy in Tehran and the State Department, in comparison, were 
opposed to the Shah and Zolfghari’s proposals. The former were particularly horrified by the 
idea of further combating of Soviet jamming and of an Iranian radio station broadcasting 
anti-Communist propaganda to the whole Middle East. They feared it would destabilise the 
whole region, increasingly volatile with the rise of Arab nationalist regimes in Iraq, Egypt and 
Syria, antagonising the Soviet Union in the process. USSR officials would easily uncover the 
US’ involvement in this enterprise and, due to America’s previous criticism of similar Soviet 
actions, would publicly highlight the US’ hypocrisy.93 The State Department, similarly, were 
concerned by the cost of these endeavours. Not only was a high American financial outlay 
required, but it would also take a considerable amount of time to launch, promote and gather 
listeners for a new radio station. Moreover, the State Department were concerned that they 
were doing too much to support the Shah’s government. By the end of the 1950s, the Iranian 
monarch’s demands for military and economic aid had outstripped what the State 
Department was willing to provide. In particular, the Shah had requested large-scale 
weaponry and military hardware to deter neighbouring nations from attacking Iran. State 
Department officials were convinced that such equipment was unnecessary, angering other 
countries in the region. They claimed that the Iranian monarch would be better served with 
more rudimentary military accessories needed to quell domestic opposition.94 
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The Eisenhower administration, however, overruled the State Department and the 
American Embassy in Tehran. In a June 1958 state visit to Washington, the Shah, in 
discussions in the Oval Office, called on the American President to do more to combat 
Soviet jamming of Radio Tehran. The monarch also demanded US support for the Iranian 
government’s initiatives to broadcast audio content in Kurdish and Arabic to appeal to those 
residing in Iran’s border areas.95 Acceding to these requests, Eisenhower pushed both of 
these initiatives through, ignoring protestations from the State Department and the American 
Embassy in Tehran. Within six months of these talks between the Shah and the US 
President, two Iranian radio stations were established with extensive American financial and 
technical support. Both broadcasters sought to counter the Farsi, Kurdish and Arabic 
language transmissions from, among others, Radio Cairo and Radio Moscow that sought to 
undermine the Iranian regime. Appealing to the Iranian population as a whole, one station 
transmitted in Farsi, while the other broadcast programmes either in Arabic, Turkish or 
Kurdish.96 
The USIS’ success in bolstering Iran’s radio and communication capabilities also 
encouraged the agency’s officials in Iran to work extensively with the Iranian army. 
Cooperation between both countries on defence matters was already significant. Since 
1953, the Department of Defense had supplied military advisors to train the Iranian army. 
They instructed Iran’s soldiers in, among other things, the use of advanced weaponry and 
tactics, ensuring that the Iranian army would be a first line of defence should a war with the 
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Soviets break out in the Middle East. Domestically, moreover, US military figures relied on 
Iran’s military forces to combat domestic opposition to the Shah, particularly from the Tudeh 
Party’s paramilitary wing. The Iranian government had assigned them, rather than the police 
or gendarmerie, with this responsibility.97 USIS officials in Iran, though, only took a greater 
interest in the Iranian army in the aftermath of the December 1954 to February 1955 Iranian 
military spy trials. Eager to rid the army of Mossagdeh loyalists and Communist 
sympathisers, the Shah and his acolytes spent the 18 months after the August 1953 coup 
purging the army’s higher echelons. They arrested and executed 22 colonels, 69 majors, 
100 captains and 193 lieutenants.98 The sheer number of military officers tried and found 
guilty alarmed the USIS. The agency’s officials in Iran had previously assumed that much of 
the public support for the Tudeh and Mossagdeh was among white-collar workers, 
intellectuals and the middle classes. They did not expect government officials, let alone 
military figures, to possess Communist or nationalist sympathies.99 
To prevent the spread of pro-Soviet and Mossagdeh thinking in the Iranian military, 
Payne approached the pro-American and vocal anti-Communist Chief of Staff for the Iranian 
army, Qolam Mahmoud Baharmast. The American offered the USIS’ services in propaganda 
production and dissemination to combat Communist thinking in Iran’s armed forces, as well 
as to boost morale among soldiers.100 Before approaching Baharmast, the USIS assessed 
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that the Iranian military’s information activities was very rudimentary and limited, centring 
solely on anti-Soviet press releases.101 The USIS envisioned expanding and bolstering the 
methods employed by the Iranian army to produce and disseminate propaganda. Officials 
from the American agency aimed to persuade Iranian military figures to use posters, radio 
bulletins and establish ties with Iran’s press. They also sought to instruct Baharmast and his 
colleagues in the military press office in the most efficient ways to distribute pro-military 
propaganda across Iran.102 
Key Iranian military public information drives orchestrated by the USIS included the 
campaign around the 1956 Azerbaijani Republic Day. Celebrated annually by Iranian Azeris 
on the 28 May, the public holiday commemorates the founding of the Azerbaijan Democratic 
Republic in 1918. The vast majority of Iranian Azeris resided in the northeast of Iran, in the 
vicinity of the nation of Azerbaijan before it was conquered by the Soviet Union in 1920. 
Much of the USIS and Iranian military’s publicity campaign accordingly concentrated on this 
region. Newsreels were distributed to cinemas in Tabriz and other surrounding towns by the 
American agency illustrating how the military governor in the region was protecting individual 
rights from Tudeh dissidents. According to the newsreels, those with pro-Soviet tendencies 
had little respect for Azeri culture and sovereignty, seeking submission to the USSR.103 
Radio adverts on Radio Tabriz, likewise, stressed the importance of conscripts to Iranian 
society. National service, supposedly, helps develop individuals, while also maintaining 
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military strength to ensure regions like Iranian Azerbaijan are protected from potential Soviet 
conquest.104 
The USIS’ work with the Iranian military marked the limit of their extensive work with 
institutions within the Iranian state to contain the spread of Communism in Iran. As the 
1950s had progressed, the American agency had radically overhauled its strategy, moving 
away from the publication and dissemination of anti-Communist publications. Increasingly, 
the USIS had concentrated their efforts on radio and newsreels, working with Iranian 
government figures to do so. Their collaborative efforts, however, with, among others, the 
DPB and aspects of Iran’s military were not just down to their anti-Communist views. They 
rather formed part of much wider attempts to make the Iranian government more self-
sufficient, strengthening and developing their abilities to contain the spread of Communism 
in Iran. The USIS’ anti-Soviet initiatives here, though, comprised only half of their overall soft 
power strategy in Iran after 1953. Moving beyond Cold War considerations, the agency’s 
officials also sought to promote American norms, values, ideas, and cultures to Iranian 
people. The following chapter will analyse the rationale behind this, as well as the initiatives 
employed.  
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Chapter III – Education and Socio-Economic Development: 
Promoting the American Way of Life in Iran 
 
‘Americans are dedicated to the improvement of the international climate in which we live. 
Though militarily we in America devote huge sums to make certain of the security of 
ourselves and to assist our allies, we do not forget that - in the long term - military strength 
alone will not bring about peace with justice. The spiritual and economic health of the free 
world must be likewise strengthened.’1 
 
Since President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s November 1952 election, US-Iran relations had 
changed considerably. The country was now one of America’s most prominent partners in 
the Middle East, with the US providing considerable military and economic aid. Iran was now 
regarded as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, a barrier against Communist incursions in 
the Middle East and Asia. It was also an example of what could be achieved with American 
support and assistance.2 In a 14 December 1959 speech to the lower chamber of the Iranian 
parliament (Majlis), the former military general reflected on his administration’s foreign policy 
achievements in Iran and the wider region. The address formed a key part of the US 
President’s winter tour of the Middle East, North Africa and Southern Europe during the 
latter months of his presidency. He not only discussed the vast amount of military aid and 
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technical support he had provided to American allies such as the Shah of Iran, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi, but also of the need to foster Iran’s socio-economic development. The then 
US President proceeded to underline the importance of bolstering Iran’s resistance to 
Communism and of the need to expose the Iranian public to American cultures and values.3  
The previous chapter covered how the US had gone to great lengths to counter 
Soviet propaganda in Iran as well as to protect and bolster the Shah’s regime. Presided over 
by the United States Information Agency (USIA) in Washington, the United States 
Information Service (USIS) undertook numerous initiatives to achieve these aims. The 
American agency established links with Iran’s media, while also translating American books 
into Farsi. Most crucially, though, the USIS established links with prominent figures in the 
state-run broadcaster Radio Tehran, as well as the Department of Press and Broadcasting 
(DPB), the government department that ran the radio station. Together with these individuals 
the USIS established the Information Council. The committee distributed anti-Communist 
propaganda across Iran, working together to improve the reach and quality of Radio Tehran 
broadcasts. The Information Council was responsible for building a new transmitter, enabling 
Iranians in towns and cities outside of Iran’s capital city to listen to the radio station’s 
broadcasts. The committee also helped in the construction of a new studio, with the USIS 
providing technical assistance and guidance to Radio Tehran to improve the quality of its 
content. 
Outside of combating Communism and protecting the Shah’s regime, the other key 
tenet of US cultural diplomacy in Iran was the promotion of the American way of life. By 
extolling the norms, values and culture of the United States, USIS officials in Iran aimed to 
promote positive perceptions of America among Iranian people, foster a mutual 
understanding between both countries and improve bilateral ties. This chapter accordingly 
examines how the USIS promoted the American way of life in Iran. It explains the rationale 
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behind this aim, while also delineating the agency’s key policies in this field. The chapter 
begins by outlining the State Department, Embassy and USIA’s desire to promote the 
American way of life in Iran and the USIS’ initial refusal to comply with their wishes. It 
proceeds to discuss how a turnover of staff resulted in the agency instead seeking to 
advocate American culture, values and ideas through the Iranian education system. The 
chapter finally analyses the USIS’ work in publicising and promoting Iranian socio-economic 
development programmes. It underlines how the US sought to convey their determination to 
help modernise Iran to everyday people.  
The American Embassy in Tehran was the initial exponent of the need to promote 
the American way of life in Iran. Its officials were convinced that US foreign policy in Iran 
should go beyond the containment of Communism. Enough work had already been 
undertaken in this area and many Iranians, due to the events of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis, 
now held an unfavourable view of the United States. For close social, political and economic 
ties to continue between both countries in the future, this issue needed to be rectified. Initial 
attempts to push for policies promoting the American way of life in Iran were at first rebuffed 
by USIS officials working in the country. The PAO, Edward Wells, took a limited interest in 
pursuing such initiatives, dedicating more time to Soviet counter-subversion. Deeming the 
latter more crucial due to Iran’s geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, he also judged 
promoting the American way of life an unnecessary, expensive exercise. It was only after 
Wells’ January 1955 replacement, Robert Payne, was appointed that the USIS began to 
take a greater interest in promoting American cultures, norms and ideas to the Iranian 
people. Having witnessed the 1952 Egyptian Revolution first-hand, Payne was determined 
to ensure there would be no repeat in Iran. He dedicated a significant proportion of the USIS’ 
resources to promoting the American way of life through Iran’s education system. In so 
doing, Payne hoped to influence the country’s impressionable young while also shaping its 
pedagogical norms and practices from afar. To achieve this, the USIS worked extensively 
with the University of Tehran, collaborating with its senior management to modernise the 
institution and bolster its global reputation.  
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Concurrently, the USIS also sought to promote the Iranian government’s own socio-
economic programmes. From the 1950s onwards, the Shah had wished to modernise his 
country, creating the Plan Organisation to achieve this. The agency undertook projects to 
improve Iran’s infrastructure and living standards, yet needed considerable assistance with 
its public relations activities. The Embassy and State Department were only too happy to 
provide such assistance. They envisaged that close ties with the Plan Organisation would 
convince the Iranian people that the American government was keen to modernise Iran. The 
USIS, though, were initially unwilling to extensively assist the Plan Organisation. The agency 
had already endured mixed results in the promotion of the US’ own Point Four socio-
economic programmes in Iran and were convinced that any contribution from them would 
result in a popular backlash. Many Iranians, they reckoned, would be convinced that the US, 
not Iran, was funding and implementing these initiatives as a means to deter individuals and 
businesses from dealing with the Soviet Union. However, pressure from the State 
Department - combined with the Plan Organisation’s bureaucratic deficiencies - compelled 
USIS figures to relent and help the agency with its public relations operations.  
 
The USIS’ Rationale for Promoting American Norms, Values and Ideas in Iran 
 
Officials from the US Embassy in Tehran sought to move US cultural diplomacy in Iran 
beyond the containment and combating of Communism. With the USIS planning to rely on 
Radio Tehran as a vehicle to counter Soviet subversive activities, there was no need to 
devise and implement more anti-Communist propaganda initiatives. These could run the risk 
of over-saturating the Iranian population with content critical of the Soviets, negating its 
impact in the process.4 Embassy officials, instead, regarded cultural policies as a means to 
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bolster America’s standing in the country. The United States’ involvement in the August 
1953 coup had angered many of Iran’s citizens. Many were opposed to the US’ decision to 
help overthrow the former Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossagdeh, deeming the supposed 
issues with his premiership and the oil crisis as domestic matters. The Iranian public also 
suspected the American government of using the Shah as a stooge, providing military and 
economic assistance to bolster his regime to ensure that the Iranian monarch did the United 
States’ bidding.5  
Indeed, the country’s citizens now viewed the US as an imperialist power, willing and 
eager to exert its power and influence without any consideration of the consequences. In 
telegrams to the State Department in Washington, Roy Melbourne, the First Secretary of the 
Embassy, outlined how this ‘anti-Americanism’ was manifesting itself in Iran. He discussed a 
series of attacks on American people and property in the Iranian cities of Tehran, Esfahan 
and Shiraz during and after the oil crisis. Arguing that American prestige had ‘suffered 
because of the events of August 1953, Melbourne proceeded to outline the origins and 
implications of the term ‘Yankee go home.’ Starting off as an Iranian left-wing rallying cry, 
this phrase had caught the public’s imagination. American diplomats and business figures 
had reported hearing ‘Yankee go home’ in most of the country’s regions and from a wide 
variety of Iranian people. Melbourne feared that if attempts were not made to prevent this 
term becoming part of Iran’s popular vernacular then the US would not be able to sustain a 
long-term presence in the country.6 
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In the eighteen months after the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis’ resolution, the US’ 
promotion of the American way of life in Iran was limited. It was initially confined to the 
template for an overseas ideological programme devised by the USIA in Washington. This 
stressed the use of libraries, exhibits and English language teaching as a means of 
promoting America.7 As such, cultural initiatives were not tailored for Iran or to appeal to 
certain sections of Iranian society; their aim was to merely engage with as broad an 
audience as possible. The limited, generalised nature of the cultural programme can be 
attributed to the strong views of the USIS’ first PAO in Iran, Edward Wells. From the Second 
World War’s outbreak up until this appointment, Wells had been working in the American 
Embassy in Tehran. As a liaison between US diplomats, businesses and the Iranian 
government, he had witnessed the November 1942 Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, as well as 
the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis. Having experienced these events, Wells was much more 
concerned with combating Communism and bolstering the Shah’s regime. He claimed that 
implementing initiatives to promote the American way of life in Iran would antagonise the 
fragile Iranian government and its people.8 
Wells accordingly sought to limit the activities of the Iran-America Society. During his 
tenure as PAO, the agency had roughly 800 members, most of which were government 
officials, landlords and business figures seeking to learn English.9 Its operations were 
confined to one bi-national centre in Tehran. Wells was opposed to the Iran-America 
Society’s expansion beyond the country’s capital city, claiming that Iranian law forbade other 
nations from undertaking cultural and informational activities in Iran’s provincial cities. While 
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this legislation could be circumvented – it was devised during Mohammad Mossagdeh’s 
premiership – Wells feared that doing so would antagonise the Soviets. Should the Iran-
America Society expand its cultural activities and presence beyond Tehran, he feared that 
the USSR and its allies would follow suit. The USIS’ PAO was instead convinced that the 
current arrangement, where vice-consuls in Iran’s cities acted as information officers when 
appropriate, worked perfectly. These officials were well placed and qualified to teach the 
English language to interested citizens, and the fact that there was only one figure in each 
city made it unlikely that their activities would alarm Soviet officials.10 Even in Tehran, the 
Iran-America Society’s activities were limited. With the USIS presiding over the bi-national 
centre’s activities from 1953, Wells confined the organisation to limited English language 
teaching. He refused to expand the Iran-America Society’s remit beyond this, despite greater 
Iranian interest in American lifestyles and culture. In a quarterly review to the USIS in 
Washington, Wells justified his position on the grounds of an absence of well-qualified staff, 
a low budget and that the Iran-America Society’s Tehran office was too small to host cultural 
events.11 
Exhibits, likewise, were few and far between. Rather than using these to promote the 
American way of life in Iran, the limited number of displays organised by the USIS instead 
showcased Iranian history. The aim behind these exhibits was to underline the US’ respect 
for Iran. One of the very few events in this field organised by the USIS was the May 1954 
Avicenna celebration in Tehran and Hamadan, a city 300 miles southwest of Iran’s capital. 
The exhibit was to mark the work and opening of the mausoleum of the Iranian polymath 
Abu Ali Sina. Known as Avicenna in the West, he was a prominent physicist, mathematician 
and theologian of the Islamic Golden Age, an era from the eighth to the fourteenth centuries 
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where great scientific phenomena were discovered, developed and harnessed in the Middle 
East.12 Through the Iran-America Society, USIS figures in Iran organised a week-long 
celebration. Proceedings on the first three days would be held in Tehran, while events would 
be held in Hamadan in the second half of the week. As well as exhibits of his work, the 
American agency produced a short film of the inauguration of Avicenna’s mausoleum in 
Hamadan, distributing it to cinemas in Tehran and beyond. In a telegram to the USIA in 
Washington, Wells estimated that over 500,000 Iranians would view this newsreel. 8000 
posters were also placed around Tehran and other cities showing pictures of the Avicenna 
collection at the Library of Congress.13 
For the most part, though, Wells confined the USIS’ cultural activities to looking at 
ways to encourage improvements in Iranian quality of life. In particular, he focused on 
fostering a library culture in Iran. Not only could libraries be stocked with books and 
magazines critical of Communism, but these facilities could also be made into pillars of 
Iranian community life. These would be places where people could borrow books, and also 
where they could attend meetings and talks. Unlike in Europe and North America, Iran’s 
libraries tended not to offer lending services to their members. They were, instead, more 
commonly used as places for people to acquire information. More pressing to USIS officials, 
though, was that there were very few libraries in Iran open to the public. Most of the existing 
facilities were located in prestigious schools and universities, open only to staff and 
students. The few libraries open to the public tended to be in large cities, under-stocked, 
neglected and staffed by untrained employees.14 
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To resolve this issue, the USIS strove to enhance their own library in Tehran, an 
annexe off the US Embassy, as well as open up facilities in Esfahan and Shiraz. In so doing, 
they aimed to make their libraries a model which others in Iran could emulate. While the 
USIS’ Tehran Library had been open since 1950, the number of publications it stocked was 
limited and very few functions had been organised. Between 1954 and 1955, though, the 
USIS made a concerted effort to improve and enhance the services provided by this facility. 
Figures from the agency organised a series of panel workshops throughout 1954. Each 
event focused on a particular theme, with the USIS inviting Iranian specialists to give talks 
and answer questions. Panels were organised for one afternoon a month, focusing on topics 
that underlined the work the US government was doing to help modernise Iran. These 
included rural development, pedagogical approaches, healthcare systems, farming practices 
and home economics. Invited by USIS officials, audiences were composed of other experts 
and enthusiasts in a particular field with the aim of ‘swaying them away from the Soviet 
Union.’15 
Beyond working to improve their own facilities, USIS officials in Iran strove to 
modernise and improve public libraries. They regularly supplied libraries with international 
editions of Time, Life and Newsweek, right-leaning publications supportive of US diplomacy 
and critical of Soviet-Communism. At the same time, the USIS agreed to provide furniture 
and training courses for public library employees. They paid significant attention to Mashhad 
Municipal Library. According to David Nalle, the sole PAO responsible for the city from 1954-
1956, the facility had great potential. Iranian schoolteachers from the region already used 
the library for a monthly workshop where they discussed pedagogical styles and 
approaches. Due to its place in the local community, the facility could be used as a platform 
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from which to combat Communism in Mashhad. Located in north-east Iran, the city was 
along the country’s eastern border with the Soviet Union. Prior to the USIS’ involvement, the 
library was under-stocked, unfurnished and small, with amateur, volunteer staff unaware 
with how libraries should function and be ordered. To give the facility a modern feel, the 
USIS donated 1,050 books, 30 mats, 4 colouring sets and 10 wall charts. Nalle also 
provided the librarians with training in charging, filling and shelving routines, encouraging 
staff to order books according to the Dewey Decimal system.16 
Wells’ approach to promoting the American way of life in Iran was met with 
resistance from the USIA in Washington and the State Department’s Office of Greek, 
Turkish and Iranian Affairs. In a joint message to the USIS office in Tehran, they pressurised 
the agency to undertake more cultural activities. In particular, they requested that the office 
‘encourage and assist’ more American performers to tour Iran. The State Department and 
the USIA pledged to provide considerable funding to musicians, drama groups and dance 
troupes willing to visit the country.17 With regards to the teaching of English, moreover, the 
USIA and the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs pushed the USIS to take ‘full 
advantage’ of the Iranian people’s desire to learn the language. The agency’s officials in Iran 
should aim to do more than just instruct willing citizens. They should instead use English 
teaching as a means to immerse Iranians in the American way of life and to shape Iran’s 
education system. To achieve this, the USIS should establish close ties with the Ministry of 
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Education, as well as Iranian teachers of the English language.18 Wells and his subordinates 
should also look to promote American culture and life through drama productions. As well as 
organising lectures, displays and play readings, the USIS should work with playwrights and 
theatres to obtain rights to productions so amateur shows could be performed. The most 
appropriate plays were those that had been adapted into Hollywood films, as they would be 
most recognisable to the Iranian public. Such titles include Maxwell Anderson’s The Eve of 
St Mark, Truman Capote’s The Grass Harp, as well as George Abbott and John Hamm’s 
Three Men on a Horse.19 
The American Embassy in Iran, correspondingly, agreed with the Office of Greek, 
Turkish and Iranian Affairs and the USIA’s views. Dismayed with Wells’ reluctance to try and 
promote the American way of life in Iran, they petitioned the USIS’ PAO to alter his 
approach. They called on Wells to stop relying too much on the USIA’s generalised 
programme, which they regarded as not only irrelevant to Iran but something that placed too 
great an emphasis on the containment of Communism. In particular, underlining the 
dichotomy between the ideology and the concept of freedom – a key tenet of the USIA’s 
worldwide ideological programme – was something that would not resonate with the Iranian 
people. The notion of freedom peddled by the USIA was too broad for audiences in Iran, 
especially as the country was ruled by an authoritarian monarch and there were no free and 
fair democratic elections.20  
As such, the USIS needed to do more than just protect the Shah’s regime from 
external and internal threats, instead using cultural policies to promote American norms, 
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values and lifestyles in Iran. In persuading Iranian people to embrace the American way of 
life, USIS figures in Iran should ‘present these principles as solutions to their problems.’ 
Unlike in other countries, the US’ cultural initiatives should not ‘talk down to the general 
public.’ Iran had already made considerable progress in this field. The country’s leaders, as 
well as much of its middle-to-upper classes, were already immersed in the Western way of 
life due to spending their formative years being educated in France, Switzerland, Germany 
or the UK. With this varied exposure to numerous European cultures, though, a ‘unified, 
dogmatic doctrine of free society’ did not exist in Iran. This was where the Embassy believed 
that the USIS could be at its most effective. In proffering the American alternative – 
something most Iranians had little prior contact with – the American agency could provide a 
cultural and moral model that many in Iran could adhere to and emulate. It would also be 
used to underline the ways in which the American way of life was supposedly superior to 
European cultures and lifestyles.21 
The Embassy suggested to Wells that the USIS in Iran should focus on a small 
number of ‘quality projects’ rather than a large quantity of initiatives. Due to shortages in 
funds, facilities and personnel, the latter approach would overstretch USIS officials working 
the country. An effective way of engaging with Iranians would be through interacting with 
certain target audiences rather than the population at large. The Embassy doubted whether 
certain Iranian societal groups would be receptive to US cultural diplomacy. Those residing 
in rural areas, for example, ‘possess an unsophisticated concept of life and living’, while the 
Islamic clergy were very anti-US, opposed to greater American involvement in Iran. It would 
be pointless, likewise, to focus on engaging government officials. Thanks to the Shah’s 
attempted socio-economic reforms to the agricultural and industrial sectors, they were 
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confident that democracy would develop in the country over time.22 The US Embassy in 
Tehran instead recommended that their USIS counterparts engage with Iranian youths and 
the education system. Such tactics would enable the US to shape the Iranian education 
system among American lines, fostering pro-US feelings among Iran’s impressionable youth 
in the process. They called on the USIS to engage in particular with universities, appealing 
to their students through radio, motion pictures, magazines, schoolbooks and cultural 
exchanges. An increasing number of Iranians were studying in France, Germany or the UK 
already. While this had a ‘somewhat similar influence on them as learning in the United 
States’, it was not effective in promoting American cultures and lifestyles. Greater US-Iran 
student and scholar exchanges would rectify this issue, while also enhancing US-Iran 
cohesion and mutual understanding.23 
USIS Iran’s shift towards promoting the American way of life in Iran occurred after 
Wells’ January 1955 departure from Iran. Robert Payne, an official from the American 
agency who had previously been the PAO for Egypt, replaced him. While in this role, Payne 
had witnessed the Egyptian Revolution first-hand. In July 1952, the senior military officers 
Gamal Abdel Nasser and Muhammad Naguib instigated a coup against Egypt’s ruler, King 
Farouk. The monarch had been regarded as a pro-Western puppet. Presiding over the 
British occupation of his country, he had sympathised with the Germans and Italians in the 
Second World War, only declaring war on both nations at Britain’s behest. His increasing 
unpopularity, coupled with the emergence of the anti-Western ideology of Arab nationalism, 
led to the coup that toppled him.24 Egypt’s supposed rejection of American and European 
values here shocked Payne. Having previously paid little attention to this aspect of US 
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cultural diplomacy, he now regarded the promotion of the American way of life as crucial to 
the role of a PAO. Payne’s new position in Iran was a means to amend his past errors.25 
 
Expansion of USIS Activities in Iran 
 
Payne’s first task was to expand the USIS’ cultural activities beyond Tehran. The agency’s 
new PAO, however, was constrained by national restrictions to cultural and information 
activities. In a conversation, for example, with Abbas Aram, the Director General of Political 
Affairs for the Iranian government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he expressed his frustration 
at how little the USIS could do to promote American values through media publications. 
While the agency’s Tehran library could stock the latest copies of the New York Times, Time 
and Newsweek, vendors and shops were only allowed to sell international editions, which 
were considerably less Americanised. Even though Aram maintained that this law was in 
place to restrict Communist activities in Iran, he claimed that they could not overlook the US’ 
flouting of these rules. It would increase Iran-Soviet tensions and there would be reprisals.26 
Payne accordingly circumnavigated these rules. Rather than maintain a permanent 
provincial presence, the new USIS PAO for Iran devised a series of touring exhibits. These 
would visit Iranian cities via the country’s railways, with people boarding the train at each 
station to view the displays. These aimed to showcase high-brow American culture. Art 
works from Jackson Pollock, one of the leading figures of the then emerging abstract 
expressionist movement, were on permanent display. Neighbouring this exhibit, there were a 
number of biographies of former US Presidents such as Abraham Lincoln and Franklin 
                                               
25 William Weathersby interviewed by Jack O’Brien, 1 August 1989, Arlington, Virginia, The 
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 
https://www.adst.org/OHTOCs/Weathersby,WilliamHenry.toc.pdf (accessed 15 August 2018).  
26 USIS (Tehran) to USIA (Washington), 28 June 1956, NAII, USIA papers, Iran, Telegram Messages 
(1952-1961). 
  152 
Delano Roosevelt. The enterprise was a joint effort with Iran’s Ministry of Railways. The 
government department donated train carriages and were responsible for transporting the 
exhibits to and from each city. USIS officials, in turn, furnished the interiors and paid 
employees to maintain the carriages.27 There were seven train units in all. To ‘iron out any 
bugs’, the first began operating in January 1957, with the six other units running from April 
1957. The carriages visited some of Iran’s main cities, including Esfahan, Shiraz, Abadan, 
Ahwaz, Mashhad and Rasht.28 
By the time the USIS’ railway initiative had commenced, the Iranian government had 
lifted the restrictions on cultural activities by foreign actors outside Tehran. Buoyed by this 
development, the Iran-America Society immediately drew up plans to open bi-national 
centres in Esfahan and Shiraz.29 John Healy, the American Vice-Consul for the former city, 
had played a pivotal role in ensuring that the Iran-America Society’s first provincial offices 
would open in these two cities. Since his 1954 appointment, Healy had argued that the US 
was not doing enough to provide English language teaching to Iranians residing in Iran’s two 
main cultural centres outside Tehran. According to the Vice-Consul, due to both cities’ 
historical and cultural heritage, Iranians paid particular attention to developing trends in 
Esfahan and Shiraz. If people in these cities began to learn English en masse, then Iranians 
in other regions would be compelled to follow suit. More specifically, Healy claimed that 
those residing in Esfahan and Shiraz were too sophisticated to be persuaded by high-
pressure propaganda. The cultural approach offered by the Iran-America Society, in 
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contrast, extolled the virtues of American thinking and way of life to a public who largely did 
not come into contact with foreigners, let alone anyone from the US.30 
To ensure that the first Iran-America Society branch outside Tehran would open in 
Esfahan, Healy drew up a petition. The signatories were mostly composed of influential 
politicians, business figures and teachers residing in and around the city. The Vice-Consul 
presented the petition to Payne in a September 1956 meeting in Tehran. The USIS’ PAO for 
Iran used this appeal as a justification to get the State Department and the Embassy to 
approve the expansion of the agency’s activities in the city. In January 1957, Payne 
appointed Laurence ‘Larry’ Sharpe as the agency’s PAO for Esfahan. Having previously 
worked to devise and distribute anti-Soviet propaganda in Tehran, Sharpe was aware of the 
USIS’ broader activities in Iran, as well as the importance the agency placed on its activities 
in the country. While he sought to distribute newsreels and publications in Esfahan, Sharpe 
helped make the Iran-America Society an ‘accepted part of the social and cultural life in the 
city.’ As well as English language teaching, Sharpe aimed to use the centre to host concerts, 
lectures and exhibitions. He strove to make the branch unique, a place Iranians would be 
compelled to use, as there were no other alternatives in the vicinity. The library, for example, 
was the only public lending institution in the city, while the centre provided a much-needed 
meeting place and social club for Esfahan’s intellectuals and youth.31 
While Payne worked to expand the USIS’ presence and activities in Iran, arguably 
his biggest achievement was his steering of the agency’s work into the fields of youth and 
education. The broad approach stemmed from the recommendations of William Baxter, 
head of Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs and chair of the OCB’s Iran Working 
Group. As one of the individuals most responsible for steering the State Department’s 
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approach to the country, Baxter had frequently advocated for the US government to work 
with the Shah to modernise Iran’s economy. With regards to the USIS, he recommended to 
Payne that the agency’s figures should work closely with the University of Tehran. He called 
on the agency to modernise the institution, working with its senior staff to, among other 
things, boost the exchange programme between the university and US colleges, as well as 
expand humanities teaching.32 The institution was one of the most prestigious in the country, 
renowned across the Islamic World as a centre of learning. The US, though, currently only 
had a ‘slender influence’ at the university, with the USIS offering two American scholarships 
that went largely unfilled. The institution had instead been more influenced by the French 
educational system, with most of the academic staff having studied in France.33  
Payne was initially reluctant to heed Baxter’s recommendations. In discussions with 
the OCB’s Iran Working Group, Payne outlined two key concerns he had with working with 
the University of Tehran. First, he did not think the institution was run professionally. Most 
academics, administrators and management figures held political positions. Chancellor 
Manoucher Eqbal, for example, was a Cabinet member and had previously combined his 
role in the institution with a governorship of the Azerbaijan province. Similarly, Lotfali 
Suratgar and Reza Shafaq, professors in literature and history respectively, combined their 
academic positions with seats in the Majlis. The political roles these individuals enjoyed 
meant they had a tendency to treating teaching and research as side jobs or hobbies. They 
paid little attention to developments in their fields of study, delivered the same lectures for 
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decades and had little contact with their students.34 Second, Payne was particularly 
concerned with the ever-increasing tensions between the institution’s staff and students. As 
the university was taking on more undergraduates, classrooms had become over-crowded 
and there were shortages in accommodation, with many students forced to commute from 
their family homes. Such issues had compelled undergraduates to express their ‘frustration 
and disgruntlement’ towards their poor living, studying and teaching conditions. Not only 
were they unhappy about university life, but students were also ‘bitter, disillusioned and 
resentful’ due to low employment prospects and a society based on patronage and 
privilege.35 As a result of this disquiet, many of the institute’s students had vociferously 
proclaimed anti-establishment views and publicly demonstrated against the Iranian 
government.36 
It was only when the University of Tehran and Iran’s Ministry of Education indicated a 
willingness to modernise the institution that Payne became keen to work with it. In 
September 1956, Suratgar and Shafaq, with Education Ministry backing, devised and 
forwarded a parliamentary bill on university reform passed by the Majlis. To encourage 
university staff to focus more on their research and teaching, they constructed a law that 
would double the salaries of academics provided they did not have a second job. To try and 
alter the institution’s culture from within, moreover, both figures had pressurised 
management figures to permit the lending of books from the University of Tehran library.37 
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Suratgar and Sadiq’s determination to modernise the institution stemmed from their 
formative experiences of French higher education. Both figures had been undergraduate 
and PhD students at the Sorbonne University in Paris. They accordingly wished to replicate 
their quality and standard of the teaching they received at these old, prestigious European 
universities at the University of Tehran.38 
Buoyed by the willingness of figures within the University of Tehran to modernise the 
institution, Payne adhered to Baxter’s recommendations. In a telegram to the USIA in 
Washington, the PAO for Iran outlined the USIS’ intended approach towards engaging with 
the institution. He aimed for the agency to help detach the university and its staff from the 
Iranian political system, promoting academic freedom; professionalise the institution to 
placate students as well as to ensure their advancement; and to Americanise the university’s 
culture.39 To achieve these aims, Payne envisaged that the USIS would work closely with 
the University of Tehran’s Chancellor, Manoucher Eqbal. Born in 1909 to a wealthy 
Francophile family, he had studied medicine at Dar ul-Funun in Tehran, the first higher 
education institution in Iran. Eqbal combined his expertise in medicine with his political 
astuteness and connections, taking on Cabinet positions while also teaching in various 
French and Iranian universities. By 1954, Eqbal had risen to become Chancellor of the 
University of Tehran, as well as a close aide of the Shah. Such was his meteoric rise that 
political commentators and Embassy officials had all tipped Eqbal to be a future Prime 
Minister of Iran, a role he would be appointed to in 1957.40 In working with such a prominent, 
                                               
38 USIS (Tehran) to USIA (Washington), 2 September 1956, NAII, USIA papers, Iran, Telegram 
Messages (1952-1961). 
39 USIS (Tehran) to USIA (Washington), 2 September 1956, NAII, USIA papers, Iran, Telegram 
Messages (1952-1961). 
40 USIS (Tehran) to USIA (Washington), 2 September 1956, NAII, USIA papers, Iran, Telegram 
Messages (1952-1961). 
  157 
influential figure, the USIS in Iran would not only be able to successfully steer Iranian higher 
education, but also enjoy privileged access to the Shah and his acolytes.41 
In a bid to inject American ideas into the University of Tehran, the USIS made great 
use of the exchange programme between the United States and Iran. It was something that 
was increasingly becoming a crucial aspect of the US’ cultural policy towards the country, 
with the OCB and the NSC making the expansion of this programme a stated foreign policy 
objective. Both bodies aimed to capitalise on the favourable attitude of the Iranian 
government towards the US, expanding the programme to further introduce American 
attitudes to the country.42 In February 1957, for example, Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles had granted an extra 250,000 dollars funding for the next three years towards the 
exchange programme. Likewise, in view of how big the programme would be, the US 
Embassy in Tehran had established an eight-person board comprised of USIS and Embassy 
figures to approve and accept grantees from either nation.43 The US-Iran exchange 
programme was typical of America’s arrangements with other countries it shared close 
relations with. Often in the fields of science and medicine, there were also ‘leader grants’, 
where government officials from both countries go on exchange. As the USIS in Iran 
presided over the programme, Payne aimed to use exchanges as a means to shape the 
University of Tehran’s running and functions. Implementing this from the top-down, Payne 
organised with the State Department for Eqbal and Suratgar to go on exchange to America, 
                                               
41 Memorandum from the OCB’s Ideological Working Group to William Baxter (Office of Greek, 
Turkish and Iranian Affairs, Chair of the OCB’s Iran Working Group), 15 December 1954, DDEL, 
White House Office, OCB Series. 
42 Progress Report on NSC 5402, United States Policy Towards Iran, 29 March 1954, DDEL, White 
House Office, NSC Series; Operational Guidance with Respect to Iran in Implementation of NSC 
5703/1, 22 May 1957, DDEL, White House Office, OCB Series. 
43 State Department to the American Embassy (Tehran), 24 July 1957, NAII, US State Department 
papers, Iran, US-Iran Cultural Relations (1955-1960). 
  158 
formally inviting both figures in March 1955.44 Taking place between December 1955 and 
March 1956, Eqbal and Suratgar sampled America’s higher education scene. They were 
taken on tours of various institutions, sat in on classes and were given an insight into the 
bureaucracy and administration of US universities. Payne hoped that Eqbal and Suratgar 
would use their observations of proceedings at US universities to improve Iranian higher 
education.45 
The success of this initial exchange resulted in the foundation of a teacher education 
programme. From Eqbal and Suratgar’s return, a selection of University of Tehran lecturers, 
as well as Ministry of Education officials, were invited to the US. The initiative first took place 
in 1956, with sessions held for Iranian education figures held annually. Grantees were 
invited to participate in a 100-day course involving 12-15 participants. The first two weeks 
were spent in Washington DC. Initial sessions focused on orientating grantees and planning 
their tailored programmes. After this, those on exchange were sent to an area of the United 
States to be immersed in the fundamentals of American education. As well as meetings with 
US officials to exchange pedagogical ideas, grantees had to attend 9-10 weeks’ worth of 
seminars, each focusing on a specific area of education. Between all of this, they were also 
expected to visit universities in the vicinity to where they were staying, as well as participate 
in non-academic activities. In the final week, grantees were sent to the State Department to 
evaluate the pros and cons of American and Iranian education systems with its staff.46 
Moreover, to ensure that education grantees delivered on their observations and 
experiences in the US, the USIS implemented a returnee programme. These figures, Payne 
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claimed in a telegram to the USIA in Washington, had seen how things work in the US and 
were now in a position to be able to implement US-style reforms in Iran. Initiatives should 
include lectures, field trips and demonstrations.47 The need to implement a returnee 
programme was not just a desire confined to Payne and USIS officials. In a meeting 
between the PAO for Iran and Hassan Jaffari, the then Minister for Education, the latter 
indicated that many returnees were frustrated. Having learnt so much in the US, their 
ambitions to improve things in Iran were being thwarted by an inability to circumnavigate the 
Iranian political system and the vested interests within it.48 In light of this conversation, both 
Payne and Jaffari agreed to co-operate to establish a joint USIS-Ministry of Education 
section dedicated to guiding grantees prior to their departure and on their return.49 
USIS and Ministry of Education figures therefore worked together to establish a 
returnee programme. Payne and Jaffari organised a series of meetings with one another to 
discuss what sort of assistance both bodies would provide to Iranians on exchange returning 
from the US.50 As the specifics of this arrangement were being sorted out, the USIS worked 
with Suratgar and his fellow literature lecturer Ali-Akbar Siassi, who had also been on 
exchange in the US, to establish a new course at the University of Tehran. The first module 
to be ever taught in English at the institution, it served as a means to heighten the University 
of Tehran’s global reach and prestige. Not only was the course aimed at attracting American 
exchange students – most of whom had previously not visited Iran or were aware of its 
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higher education institutions as they tended to not speak Farsi – but also at Iranians 
themselves. After encountering foreign students on their travels in the US, Suratgar and 
Siassi thought that most Iranian students lacked the English language capabilities to study 
or live in America.51  
The module accordingly served to try and resolve these issues through teaching 
Iranian history and culture. Pitched at a high school level, the module was a nine-month 
course with two hours teaching per week. Topics covered included the history of Iran, the 
workings of Iranian political institutions, the Farsi language and Persian literature. USIS 
officials provided Suratgar and Siassi with a template of how the course should be structured 
and assessed, something that the Iranian academics wholly adhered to. Not only were there 
numerous assignments and midterm examinations, but also students were informed that 
they had to attend all classes, something that was not usually deemed mandatory in the 
Iranian education system of the 1950s. The USIS also played a pivotal role in promoting the 
course, devising brochures and posters. The agency’s officials were instrumental in ensuring 
that only lecturers who demonstrated pro-US tendencies – and had been on exchange to 
America – were allowed to teach on the module. As well as Suratgar and Siassi, Hafez 
Farman, a professor of history, was permitted to run classes.52 
The University of Tehran was further Americanised by the USIS through the agency 
organising for many US lecturers to be sent to Iran on exchange. From 1955 to 1958, 
numerous American academics visited the institution to teach in, among other areas, 
medicine, science, public health and the humanities. In so doing, USIS officials hoped to 
modernise the institution, while also encouraging wider socio-economic development in the 
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country.53 Before the USIS could pursue this policy, though, the agency realised that the 
University of Tehran required considerable American expertise and assistance in 
administrative matters. In a March 1956 communiqué with the State Department in 
Washington, Payne argued that the institution’s bureaucracy was ‘chaotic to non-existent.’ It 
was only when this was resolved that the university could progress. The PAO for Iran 
consequently called for the State Department to provide financial incentives to university 
staff specialising in management and administration to work at the institution for short 
periods.54 Acquiescing to Payne’s requests, the government department recruited Rufus 
Fitzgerald, Chancellor Emeritus at the University of Pittsburgh, and Sterling McMurrin, Dean 
of the University of Utah. Both figures visited Iran between January and March 1957 and 
February to June 1958 respectively. Fitzgerald worked with the administrative staff to 
provide guidance on how to construct an effective, efficient bureaucratic structure. McMurrin, 
on the other hand, focused on pastoral care. Per his recommendations, the University of 
Tehran created an Office of Students, appointing Dr Ali Kani, who had advised McMurrin 
during his visit, as its head. The body aimed to provide counselling and guidance to 
undergraduates facing personal or academic problems.55 
Once these bureaucratic failings were in the process of being resolved, the USIS 
strove to assist the University of Tehran in academic matters. A key area in which the 
agency assisted the institution was to enhance its provision and teaching of arts and 
humanities subjects. Reports from US science and engineering academics on secondment 
indicated that the university lecturers’ pedagogical practices were largely similar to those at 
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their home institutions. It was in the arts and humanities, however, where teaching provision 
and standards differed. As the University of Tehran’s hierarchy deemed these subjects to be 
intellectually inferior with no relevance to wider society, they had previously granted them 
little attention or funding.56 The USIS consequently helped establish a School of Journalism 
at the University of Tehran. As well as offering courses related to the press and media, the 
USIS envisaged that it would have close ties with a counterpart American journalism school. 
Fostering such links with a ‘top-flight’ US academic department would not only underline the 
School of Journalism’s prestige, but also enable the US to influence the attitudes and 
composition of the Iranian media in the long term.57  
To achieve this, the USIS persuaded Quintus Wilson of the University of Minnesota’s 
School of Journalism to go to Iran to help set up a similar school for the University of Tehran 
and plan a curriculum for Iranians teachers to follow after he departs. Between January and 
June 1957 he helped establish an Institute of Journalism in the Faculty of Social Sciences. 
Wilson’s initial courses investigated theory and practice in journalism, as well as ethics.58 
Beyond his academic responsibilities, Wilson also toured other Iranian cities, including 
Shiraz, Mashhad and Abadan, providing crash courses to journalists in these regions on US-
style journalism.59 Through encouraging Iranian media figures to be more vocal about the 
teaching of their subject, Wilson persuaded many Iranian journalists to push their 
government to provide more opportunities for students to study journalism and related 
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disciplines. Media pressure compelled the Ministry of Education to force various higher 
education institutions, notably the universities of Shiraz and Tabriz, to provide more history, 
literature and media courses. These were usually undergraduate classes open to those with 
advanced English-speaking capabilities. There were roughly 15-20 students per class, 
taught for four hours weekly.60 
Moreover, the USIS helped expand the University of Tehran’s provision of courses in 
the arts by enhancing the institution’s drama teaching capabilities. Through the State 
Department’s financial incentives, the USIS helped organise the secondment of Frank 
Davidson, a lecturer from City College in New York, for a five-month trip. Commencing his 
secondment in January 1956, his remit was to enhance the teaching of drama in the 
University of Tehran and beyond. Davidson’s lectures, usually focused on acting, producing 
and directing, were undertaken in English with a Farsi interpreter relaying his teachings to 
students. The City College lecturer’s key achievements were the founding of a Department 
of Dramatic Art at the University of Tehran, as well as a drama workshop at the Iran-America 
Society branch in the city. The latter involved 60 hours of contact over a ten-week period for 
students in acting, lighting and directing.61 
Building on Davidson’s achievements, George Quinby, a lecturer in dramatic art at 
Bowdoin College in Maine, came to Iran on exchange between September 1956 and August 
1957. With Iranian staff in the institution now delivering his predecessor’s classes, Quinby 
focused on his lectures on his specialist area, the writing and set design of American drama. 
Students analysed some of the instructor’s favourite Arthur Miller plays, in particular The 
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Crucible, View from a Bridge and All my Sons, with 27 copies of each script to the University 
of Tehran’s library.62 Alongside his teaching, Quinby also acted as an architectural 
consultant for the building of the University of Tehran’s first theatre. He presided over the 
construction of modern stages at other auditoriums in Iran’s capital city. In a bid to promote 
US culture beyond Tehran, Quinby devised productions of American plays involving 
University of Tehran students. He presented one such production, Tennessee Williams’ The 
Glass Menagerie, to the Iran-America Society branch in Esfahan.63 
Indeed, the USIS looked to move beyond promoting the American way of life at the 
University of Tehran, merely using the higher education institute as a platform to do this on a 
wider scale. Moving beyond Baxter’s recommendations, Payne placed a great emphasis on 
engaging with Iran’s youth. In particular, he aimed to achieve this through boosting the 
involvement of the Iranian young in extra-curricular activities. Through these initiatives, 
usually taking place after school, the PAO for Iran aimed to make Iran’s youth a key aspect 
of Iranian modernisation, while also fostering positive impressions of America.64 According to 
USIS surveys, many of Iran’s young had negative perceptions of US education system. Due 
to the UK and Russia’s historic involvement in Iranian affairs, both countries had previously 
helped set up schools and shape Iran’s education system from afar. Many of the country’s 
young, therefore, had a more positive view of British and Soviet schooling. As both systems 
placed a far greater emphasis on science, maths and engineering, young Iranians deemed 
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their education systems as more intellectually rigourous. The USIS, accordingly, aimed to 
counter this perception. They wished to underline to Iran’s young, as well as its society at 
large, that while the US system did not concentrate as much on STEM subjects, it produced 
individuals that were much more well-rounded, socially aware and worldly.65 
Payne correspondingly helped organise a youth activities seminar, held in Tehran in 
May 1957. The event brought together government figures and willing volunteers. It was a 
means to foster a hitherto unseen culture of extra-curricular activities Iran’s youth, while also 
familiarising politicians with young people’s needs and recruiting volunteers to run 
activities.66 To generate Iranian government interest in extra-curricular activities for 
schoolchildren, Payne called on delegates, especially government officials that were 
present, to understand the views of young people. This was a formative period in people’s 
lives, where their social and political views were shaped. More broadly, he argued that 
dealing more with Iran’s young provides a fresh perspective on matters. According to Payne, 
the best way to foster ties with Iran’s young was through after school clubs and activities. 
The nature of these can be steered so that they can provide what the country needs for its 
socio-economic development. Funds, facilities and volunteers, though, were required for 
activities to run.67 
Hossein Ala, the then Iranian Prime Minister, attended the seminar and was 
impressed by Payne’s speech. In a letter to the USIS’ PAO, he agreed with his arguments, 
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pledging to expand the extra-curricular programme for Iranian youths.68 What Payne and Ala 
had overlooked, however, was that Iran’s Ministry of Education was already working to 
improve the provision of extra-curricular activities for Iranian youths. In August 1955, its 
officials had decided to legally set aside three hours a week for all children between the 
ages of 11 and 13 and one hour weekly for youths over 13 for such activities. That same 
month, the Education Ministry had also invited selected school teachers to receive 30 hours 
training in running scout groups and girl guides, as well as sports clubs.69 These crash 
courses culminated in some teachers petitioning the Shah to form a nationwide organisation 
for Iran’s young women to join. It was at this point that the USIS realised the extent to which 
the Ministry of Education was working to improve the provision of youth activities and began 
collaborating with the government department. The agency expressed its concern at the lack 
of recreational facilities for women, as well their ‘subservient status in Iranian society.’ 
Justifying its new position, the USIS claimed in telegrams to the USIA in Washington that 
many in and outside of Iran had shied away from interacting with Iranian women specifically. 
As there would be no competing influences, USIS figures envisaged that Iran’s female 
population would be much more easily swayed towards adopting American norms and 
values.70 
Pressure from both the USIS and Iran’s Ministry of Education culminated in the Shah 
donating land for a campsite outside the town of Ramsar, on the Caspian coast.71 The girls 
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from the first camp to take place at this site in 1955 helped form the Soraya Club. 
Established in 1956 - and named after the Shah’s then wife Soraya Esfandiary-Bakhtiary – 
the organisation offered training and guidance for Iran’s young females. The organisation 
was based along the lines of the US-based Young Women’s Christian Association. Through 
clubs scattered across Iran, the Soraya Club’s programmes and initiatives encouraged its 
members to become ‘good wives’ along American lines. Writing in the Etellat newspaper, 
founding member Latifeh Alvieh claimed that the Soraya Club helps prepare girls to be 
‘mothers of the future.’ It complemented the work done by schools in this field but tackled it 
via different means.72 Sessions were held on sewing and cooking, as well as the 
management of a modern household. USIS figures in Iran assisted the organisation in an 
informal capacity, providing supplementary materials, subsidising residential trips and 
recommending initiatives. Helping the Soraya Club to flourish and expand, USIS officials 
supplied advisors, voluntary workers and provided grants for some of Iran’s youth leaders to 
undertake courses in the US. These sessions familiarised workers with the problems facing 
Iran’s young female population, as well as offering suggestions as to how to engage with 
them.73 The Soraya Club started with 16 members, rising to 389 by 1960, with a 150-strong 
university affiliated club, and branches in other major Iranian cities.74 
 
The USIA and the Plan Organisation 
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Complementing work in youth and education fields, the USIS under Payne also sought to 
promote programmes that encouraged Iran’s socio-economic development. The PAO for 
Iran regarded such initiatives as pivotal in the struggle to promote the American way of life in 
the country. If, as Payne claimed in a telegram to his USIA superiors in Washington, we can 
convince the Iranian people that the US is interested in improving Iran, then they will be 
much more positive towards America.75 Much of this public relations campaign centred on 
the Plan Organisation, an Iranian government backed agency established by the Shah in 
1948. Its aim was to both provide funding and undertake socio-economic projects to improve 
living standards, working conditions and productivity. Heading this organisation was one of 
the Iranian monarch’s close allies, Abolhassan Ebtehaj. Born in 1899 to a wealthy family in 
Gilan, a province in the north of Iran on the Caspian coast, Ebtehaj was educated in Beirut 
and Paris. On returning to Iran, he initially pursued a career at UK government-backed 
Imperial Bank of Persia. Resentment, however, at the fact that only British citizens were 
permitted to be senior managers in the organisation compelled Ebtehaj to resign in 1935 and 
join the civil service. It was in this role that Ebtehaj excelled as an economic planner. By 
1938 he had risen to be the Governor of Bank Melli, Iran’s central bank. After 13 years in 
this role, Ebtehaj was appointed as the Managing Director of the Plan Organisation due to 
his prior experience in central planning and his ties with Western nations. Despite his 
Francophilia - a legacy of his Parisian youth - Ebtehaj was ardently pro-American, deeming 
close ties between Iran and the US government as pivotal to his country’s socio-economic 
progress.76 
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The USIS were convinced that a comprehensive and sustained public relations 
programme needed to be implemented to counter popular dissatisfaction towards the Plan 
Organisation’s initiatives. Many Iranians, crucially, were unaware of what its projects were 
meant to achieve. While schemes sought to improve Iran’s infrastructure in the long run, 
there were no tangible short-term benefits. The disruption of construction work to everyday 
life, therefore, was something that the public did not appreciate or understand.77 The USIS’ 
concerns were supported by the views of Soliman Assadi, the director in charge of allocating 
and running projects for the Plan Organisation. In a March 1956 letter to Payne, he had 
commented on the views of the ‘man on the street in Tehran’ and how the Plan 
Organisation’s activities can alter this. Payne deemed the arguments in the letter valid, as it 
illustrated the importance the USIS must place on publicising the Plan Organisation’s 
activities. According to Assadi, the ‘man on the street’ was ‘very pessimistic.’ For most 
Iranians, there was little job security, a high cost of living and an even wider gap between 
the richest and poorest in society. More broadly, many were bitter at interventions of recent 
history, sceptical of power politics. They regarded most of the political class as corrupt, its 
membership composed of a small number of elites. The exclusionary, unethical nature of 
Iranian politics made the country a fertile ground for anti-Americanism. As a result, American 
officials should try and encourage the implementation of socio-economic reforms to bolster 
Iran’s independence and integrity. If the US government were seen to be behind these 
improvements then there would not only be greater pro-Americanism, but also political 
stability. The Plan Organisation’s work could rectify these issues. Its projects would provide 
improved facilities; create more jobs; and foster greater economic efficiency, ensuring Iran 
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‘moves out of the economic doldrums.’ Not enough, however, had been done to inform the 
public about this.78 
The Iranian government possessed similar views on the plight of the Plan 
Organisation’s information activities. Ebtehaj, in particular, was aware of the need for more 
public relations initiatives to counter increasing popular criticism. Since boosting their cultural 
and propaganda activities in Iran since 1953, Ebtehaj had frequently called publicly on the 
USIS to do more to promote its initiatives. On numerous occasions he had requested that 
the American agency provide him with a qualified expert to preside over the Plan 
Organisation’s Information Department.79 It was only by January 1957 that the USIS heeded 
Ebtehaj’s calls. Their acquiescence to his requests stemmed from the demands placed on 
them by the USIA and the State Department. Both organisations had been taking a greater 
interest in the need for an information programme for the Plan Organisation. In meetings 
with White House officials to discuss NSC 5504, the updated US policy document on Iran, 
they successfully managed to make this a key stated foreign policy goal. Both bodies noted 
that the Plan Organisation’s current public relations campaigns were non-existent. Officials 
within the Iranian organisation did not see the point of countering popular and media 
criticism of their activities, convinced that the latter could be countenanced through bribes to 
journalists.80 
With regards to promoting technical assistance programmes, the USIS had 
previously focused on stimulating support for American initiatives in this field. Since 1949, 
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the US Embassy, as well as the USIS from 1953 onwards, had sought to inform the Iranian 
public and foster popular support for Point Four programmes in Iran. As part of his 1949 
inaugural address, President Harry Truman had pledged considerable technical and 
economic support to ‘developing countries’ as a key foreign policy objective. Through the 
Point Four scheme, nations such as Iran would sign bilateral agreements with the US, 
permitting American officials to visit the country and identify potential projects to improve 
rural amenities and economic output.81 The Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) before 
1955, and the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) after, ran numerous Point Four 
projects in Iran. These included projects to improve access to water and sanitation in rural 
communities, as well as the building of recreation centres for factory workers in Esfahan, 
Ahwaz and Shiraz.82  
The USIS worked to publicise FOA and ICA activities. In a January 1956 meeting 
with Nalle, Healy and the other provincial PAOs in Tehran, Payne remarked on the 
breakdown of the USIS’ operations in the country. He claimed that 50% of publications, 60% 
of exhibits, 50% of radio broadcasts, and 60% of newsreel content centred on promoting 
Point Four in Iran.83 Chuck Waters, a USIS official who liaised with the FOA and ICA, 
gathered all the information on Point Four projects, passing this to Payne in Tehran. The 
USIS’ PAO subsequently disseminated information on these projects via the press, Radio 
Tehran or the USIS Library in Tehran. Payne hoped to demonstrate to Iranians that Point 
Four programmes were achieving results and that the US and Iran can work together for the 
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country’s benefit. In particular, though, he sought to alleviate the so-called ‘Tehran 
resentment’ sweeping the country. According to reports from provincial PAOs, those residing 
in rural communities and provincial cities increasingly felt as if their counterparts living in the 
capital were paid more and had greater access to amenities. USIS publicity of Point Four 
aimed to alter this perception, ‘tying this country together more as a unit.’84  
Most Point Four programmes were promoted by the USIS at a regional level. In 
Mashhad, for example, Nalle used local publications to promote its initiatives to literate, 
prominent figures residing in the city and its surroundings. Monthly bulletins on Point Four 
programmes were sent to 500 business people, teachers and medical professionals. 
According to Nalle, it was the upper echelons of Mashhad society that were most ignorant 
about US technical assistance activities in the area. He also hoped that they would use their 
influence to distribute and discuss Point Four activities with others.85 To promote American 
technical assistance in rural communities, likewise, USIS officials in Iran devised, published 
and distributed Land and People magazine. With a circulation of roughly 25,000, new 
editions of the publication were released bi-monthly with information on US-backed socio-
economic programmes. Articles focused on Point Four work in the agricultural sector. 
Specifically, they explored how the US government aimed to modernise and improve rural 
living and working conditions in Iran, bringing them to the same level as that enjoyed by 
American people.86 Land and People was distributed in provincial cities through third parties. 
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According to Larry Sharpe, the USIS official in charge of its distribution, copies of the 
magazine were sent free of charge to teahouses, barbershops and newsvendors in Tehran, 
Tabriz and beyond.87 
As the period progressed, however, the USIS began to minimise the promotion of 
Point Four initiatives. With figures in both the Iranian and American governments presiding 
over projects, there were too many misunderstandings, disagreements and no clear aims. 
Schemes were continuously reworked and delayed, with FOA and ICA figures in 
Washington suspicious that their Iranian counterparts were accepting bribes.88 As such, 
public opinion in Iran and the wider Middle East towards Point Four was unfavourable. The 
adverse reaction towards its projects was illustrated in a July 1956 seminar on the USIS’ 
activities in the wider region, involving representatives from the Iran, Near East, Maghreb, 
Greece and Turkey. Held at the American University of Beirut, involving the institution’s 
faculty and students, participants labelled Point Four as a failed enterprise, arguing that 
there were ‘too many promises and not enough achievements.’89 Attempts to rectify this had 
proved unsuccessful. The USIS launched a campaign through Radio Tehran, using 
programmes to promote projects on low-cost housing, rural teacher training and Tehran’s 
new reservoirs. The American agency also arranged for Kayhan and Ettelat journalists to be 
taken on tours of Point Four projects. Both initiatives, however, did little to reverse the 
unfavourable Iranian popular opinion towards American technical assistance programmes.90 
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Fearful that the Iranian public would associate Plan Organisation projects with the 
doomed Point Four initiatives, the USIS in Iran initially sought to influence its public relations 
operations from afar. They provided the Plan Organisation with a series of suggested 
recommendations. In an August 1957 letter to Ebtehaj, Payne recommended that signs and 
plaques be framed in the vicinity of each project demonstrating the Plan Organisation’s 
contribution. To assess progress and keep abreast of projects, moreover, Payne 
recommended that Ebtehaj obtain progress reports from each project, with accompanying 
photographs. These would be drip-fed to media outlets, released on different days for 
maximum impact. Reports, Payne claimed, should be detailed, but in non-technical terms 
with a conversational touch.’ They should highlight achievements, not aims, as it is the latter 
that resonates with the public. The constant flow of articles would not only foster local pride, 
but also demonstrate progress, highlighting Plan Organisation successes to the Iranian 
people on a regular basis. Such endeavours, Payne argued, were integral to the Plan 
Organisation’s successes. Many of these projects would take a long time to build, let alone 
yield improvements in living standards. Unless spelt out to Iranians, many would become 
disillusioned with the Plan Organisation.91  
Impressed with their guidance, Ebtehaj now pushed for the USIS to provide an 
American public relations expert to direct the Plan Organisation’s information section. He 
used his close relations with the US Ambassador, Selden Chapin, to try and persuade the 
Embassy to coerce the USIA and USIS to agree to this. Meeting with the American official, 
Ebtehaj argued that no one in the country has the required experience to undertake this role. 
Besides, appointing another Iranian would require parliamentary and cabinet approval by 
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law. Not only would this be embarrassing, providing Ebtehaj’s rivals, such as the Minister of 
Interior, Asadollah Alam, ammunition to discredit him, but it would also take considerable 
time. It would not be necessary to publicly identify the USIS officer, and no need to deny 
their existence either. They would be required to be in post for two years, officially as 
Ebtehaj’s advisor. In this role they would be able to visit all projects, devise an information 
programme and liaise with the media.92 
USIS figures were resistant to providing an officer to the Plan Organisation. Despite 
Embassy and State Department protests, they maintained that such an arrangement would 
be counterproductive. Once they became aware of American involvement in the Plan 
Organisation, USIS officials argued that many Iranians would regard its projects as a 
successor to Point Four.93 It was only when the agency became aware of the bureaucratic 
chaos within the Plan Organisation that USIS figures were forced to relent. To placate and 
circumvent Ebtehaj’s requests, USIS Tehran had initially asked the Plan Organisation to 
provide them with a list of on-going projects, which they would then publicise on their behalf. 
Ebtehaj gave the USIS a list of eight ventures underway. The American agency, though, 
could only find three. There were also seven extra projects that its officials uncovered 
independently. When approached, the Plan Organisation’s director blamed his USIS liaison 
officers for incompetence. Within the space of several months, Ebtehaj went through three in 
quick succession. The ‘revolving door approach’ here annoyed USIS figures, persuading 
them that they had to take a more direct role in the Plan Organisation’s public relations 
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activities. While Payne claimed that all three lacked experience in information production 
and dissemination, they displayed considerable enthusiasm to learn and develop.94 
From December 1957, the USIA seconded Herbert Linnemann to USIS Iran to act as 
the Plan Organisation’s public relations expert. Linneman had previously spent most of his 
career at the State Department. Prior to taking on this role, he had been a senior figure in 
the department’s Security Division, investigating and checking backgrounds and political 
affiliations of government staff. This section of the State Department had expanded 
exponentially in the 1950s, thanks to the accusations of Senator Joseph McCarthy. On 9 
February 1950, the Republican representative for Wisconsin made a speech in West Virginia 
accusing the State Department of being populated with Communists. McCarthy’s allegations 
caused a huge public outcry, with Linnemann and his contemporaries tasked with flushing 
out possible Soviet sympathisers. The hysteria surrounding McCarthy’s claims formed a 
significant chunk of the Second Red Scare. In the 1940s and 1950s, at the Cold War’s 
outset, a fear of Communism pervaded American society and politics.95 With McCarthy’s 
declining credibility and the abating of hysteria surrounding the prospect of domestic 
Communist dissidents from 1953 onwards, Linneman’s role was redundant. Working for the 
USIS on secondment to the Plan Organisation provided not only a job opportunity, but also a 
chance to distance himself from his association with McCarthyism and the Second Red 
Scare. Linneman’s objectives in his new role were to improve the Plan Organisation’s public 
relations while also developing an information programme to use as a template.96 
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In his monthly reports to Payne, Linneman indicated that he disapproved of the Plan 
Organisation’s public relations activities. He complained that its officials did not know how, 
when and where it was appropriate to make public announcements. More pressingly, 
Linneman was desperate to stop Ebtehaj making ‘gratuitous public statements.’ He claimed 
that these utterances fanned expectations unnecessarily and upset others in the process. 
One example of this was during a December 1957 tour of the University of Tehran to 
demonstrate the Plan Organisation’s work in modernising the institution’s buildings. In 
discussions with Kayhan and Ettelat journalists, Ebtehaj claimed that the Plan Organisation 
was working with the university to expand science and engineering facilities by shutting 
down the School of Law. The inaccurate remarks upset senior university figures, as well as 
staff and students in the Faculty of Law.97 Such incidents had persuaded Linneman that 
Ebtehaj was ill suited to his leadership role in the Plan Organisation. The American claimed 
that his Iranian counterpart ‘did not understand the basic fundamentals of public relations.’ It 
was only because other senior figures, due to their ambitions and reverence of Ebtehaj, 
refusal to go against him that this had not been highlighted before.98 
Despite his reservations towards Ebtehaj, Linneman was able to professionalise 
certain aspects of the Plan Organisation’s activities. He managed to persuade Ebtehaj to 
brief and give tours of two Plan Organisation projects in Tehran that looked at providing 
recreational facilities for young women. Attendees included Kayhan and Ettelat journalists, 
as well as members of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs. The press figures took 
photos and pledged to produce articles based on what they had seen. Such endeavours 
were not something that Ebtehaj had previously undertaken. He had usually confined 
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himself to making announcements and not getting involved in daily goings on of Plan 
Organisation projects.99 However, Linneman maintained that it would take many months 
before the Plan Organisation ‘has anything resembling a conventional public relations 
strategy.’ Its public relations initiatives were confined only to limited, erratic activities for a 
considerable period due to a lack of professional staff members and an absence of an 
overall plan. A special magazine commemorating two years of Plan Organisation activities, 
for example, was full of spelling, grammatical and factual errors. Likewise, Linneman was 
unable to persuade project chiefs to send him progress reports. He tried to get Ebtehaj to 
force them to do this, but to no avail.100 
Linneman’s desperation to persuade Ebtehaj to modernise the Plan Organisation’s 
bureaucracy and activities underlined the importance US officials placed on the promotion of 
US-style socio-economic development in Iran. Their efforts here formed part of much 
broader efforts to persuade and attract Iranian people towards American norms, values and 
ideas. This chapter has highlighted the various means by which USIS figures sought to 
achieve this aim. Initiatives included increasing the size and scope of the US-Iran exchange 
programme, the attempted Americanisation of certain Iranian higher education institutions 
and fostering a culture of extra-curricular activities among Iranian youths. The next section 
moves beyond US soft power and cultural diplomacy in Iran. It instead considers the British 
attempts to reassert their policies and programmes in this field in light of the USIS’ widescale 
and comprehensive initiatives. 
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Chapter IV – Containing Communism and Maintaining Britain’s 
Position in Iran: The Information Research Department, SAVAK and 
Anti-Soviet Propaganda 
 
‘Britain’s role and influence in Iran is a fraction of what it was in the past.’1 
 
The above quote encapsulated the key issue that constrained British foreign policy in Iran 
after 1953. It is an excerpt from a June 1957 letter from Roger Stevens, the then British 
Ambassador to Iran, to Selwyn Lloyd, the UK’s Foreign Secretary. A diplomat for most of his 
career, Stevens had worked in many countries, including Argentina, France and the United 
States, before becoming the UK Ambassador to Sweden in 1951. It was his next position in 
Iran, though, a role he held between 1954 and 1958, which proved the most formative. 
During his stint in the country, Stevens fell in love with its art, culture, food and architecture. 
His interest was such that, after leaving Iran for a position at the Foreign Office in 1958, he 
wrote two books, The Land of the Great Sophy in 1962 and First View of Persia in 1964. The 
former was a record of the sights and cities of Iran, including many of Stevens’ personal 
photographs from his travels. The latter was written from the perspective of seventeenth-
century European travellers visiting the country for the first time.2 Stevens’ passion for 
Iranian culture had made him determined to try and strengthen Anglo-Iranian relations. 
Having experienced a way of life so radically different to his own upper middle-class English 
private school upbringing, Stevens was convinced the UK had much to learn from the 
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country. While in Tehran, Stevens wrote several letters to Lloyd and the Foreign Office. 
Each outlined Iran’s importance to British diplomatic goals, bemoaning Britain’s diminished 
role and influence in the country compared to what it had enjoyed historically.3 
While triumphant, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis had considerably weakened Britain’s 
position in Iran. The events of 1951-1953 marked a watershed as the end of the UK’s 
dominance over Iranian affairs. Since the eighteenth century, British officials had been able 
to intervene unopposed in the country’s governmental affairs. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis 
demonstrated that this was no longer the case. It highlighted how the US had taken Britain’s 
place in Iran. Diplomatic discussions to resolve the dispute highlighted the UK’s inability to 
achieve its aims in Iran without US support. A probable American backlash meant that the 
UK did not respond to this challenge to their economic interests in Iran with military force. It 
was only with US backing that Britain was able to wrestle control of the Iranian oil industry 
away from Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossagdeh.4 In the dispute’s aftermath, moreover, 
the AIOC – now renamed BP - was forced to surrender their monopoly over Iran’s oil 
industry. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, as well as his Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles, pressured the UK firm into sharing Iranian oilfields with the other major petroleum 
companies through a holding organisation. As well as BP, this included Gulf Oil, Standard 
Oil of California, Texaco, Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Standard Oil of 
New York.5 
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Compounding this was the Iranian public’s increasing distrust towards the British 
government. Since the August 1953 Anglo-American backed coup that toppled Mossagdeh, 
the image of ‘perfidious Albion’ had cemented itself in the Iranian popular consciousness. 
Due to the British government’s historic meddling in Iran’s political affairs, the notion that 
Britain was to blame for all unfortunate incidents to befall the country had been oft cited 
before the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis. The events of August 1953, though, had made this more 
prevalent, transforming it into a popular Iranian stereotype of the UK. Writing to the 
Information Research Department (IRD) in 1957, officials from the British Embassy in 
Tehran’s press section underlined the considerable anti-UK feeling in Iran. They noted how 
numerous articles in mainstream Iranian newspapers were urging their readers to be vigilant 
towards British political and economic overtures. Such reports, Embassy officials continued, 
were detrimental to Britain’s interest in Iran. These articles would jeopardise future Anglo-
Iranian collaborative efforts, culminating in Britain being sidelined in the Middle Eastern 
country.6 
The British government’s initial attempts to reassert their presence in Iran proved 
unsuccessful. In 1954, the UK Treasury and Foreign Office loaned £100 million to the 
Iranian government. Not only was this aimed at boosting an economy near collapse after a 
two-year British-imposed embargo, but also at repairing Anglo-Iranian diplomatic ties.7 
Britain’s offer of financial assistance, however, paled in comparison to the backing provided 
by the United States, whose standing in the country had been enhanced substantially. The 
CIA’s role in ousting Mosaddegh, combined with the White House and State Department’s 
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public backing of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, tied the US and Iran even closer 
together.8 As well as considerable military and economic aid, the US had implemented a 
series of soft power initiatives in Iran. Chapter II highlighted the various means by which 
American diplomats and officials worked with their Iranian counterparts to produce anti-
Soviet audio-visual propaganda. Through working extensively with Radio Tehran, the United 
States Information Service, hoped to underline to Iranians the supposed perils of 
Communism. Chapter III, likewise, explored the various ways in which the USIS sought to 
promote American cultures, norms, values and way of life in Iran. Initiatives included the 
expanding the US-Iran exchange programme and the encouraging of Iranian youths to 
partake in extra-curricular activities.9 
The aim of this chapter is to examine how the British government sought to retain its 
position in Iran as the dominant Western power. It explores how the UK Foreign Office’s IRD 
worked with SAVAK, the Iranian secret and intelligence service, to combat Soviet subversion 
in the country. The chapter charts how the IRD and SAVAK initially worked closely with one 
another through the Baghdad Pact’s institutional apparatus. Agreed in 1955, signatories 
included the UK, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. These nations pledged to share 
intelligence, collaborate on projects to improve regional infrastructure and promised to 
support one another if any signatory was attacked by an external force. It proceeds to outline 
how the February 1958 Iraqi Revolution, which resulted in the country’s departure from the 
non-aggression pact, compelled IRD and SAVAK officials to instead work together 
bilaterally. Their collaborative efforts here culminated in the arrangement becoming a key 
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cornerstone of Anglo-Iranian relations in the 1950s. Established in 1948, the IRD strove to 
combat Communist propaganda, discredit the Soviet Union and promote British values 
domestically and overseas. Its officials sought to achieve these aims by working with 
prominent individuals and organisations at home and abroad who shared their concern 
towards Communism.10 SAVAK, the Iranian secret and intelligence service, was one such 
agency. Established in 1957 at the Shah’s behest, SAVAK dealt with external intelligence 
threats and monitored domestic dissidents.11 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first explores how and why the UK 
Foreign Office fostered the Baghdad Pact’s creation. It specifically explores the British 
government department’s deliberations and rationale for using the organisation’s apparatus 
to work closely with the Iranians in the field of counter-subversion. The second part 
examines the IRD and SAVAK’s initial collaborative efforts through the Baghdad Pact. The 
third section, on the other hand, analyses how both bodies increasingly worked bilaterally in 
the February 1958 Iraqi Revolution’s aftermath, circumventing the Baghdad Pact in the 
process. It proceeds to outline how, with the non-aggression pact no longer being the main 
conduit for British attempts to combat Soviet subversion in Iran and the wider region, the 
Americans sought to collaborate with their UK counterparts in this field.  
Fears that Arab nationalist and Communist powers sought to envelop and subvert 
the region compelled UK Foreign Office officials to encourage their Middle Eastern allies to 
sign the Baghdad Pact. A key foundation of the organisation’s functions were its sub-
committees that specialised in a certain aspect of the organisation’s remit, most notably the 
Counter-Subversion Committee (CSC). Encompassing military and intelligence figures from 
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all Baghdad Pact states, as well as IRD officials, it would meet every three months to decide 
the organisation’s wider strategy for combating Soviet propaganda. From its inception, the 
CSC became a key vehicle that UK Foreign Office and IRD officials relied upon to bolster 
Anglo-Iranian relations. Through the Counter-Subversion Office (CSO) – which had been 
established to implement initiatives agreed upon by the CSC – IRD figures worked with their 
SAVAK counterparts to combat and counter Soviet subversive activities in Iran. As well as 
helping supply positive news stories about the Shah’s government and his socio-economic 
reforms, the IRD sought to modernise SAVAK’s information and propaganda capabilities. 
They seconded an official to the UK Embassy in Tehran, who would act as an advisor to the 
Iranian secret and intelligence service. IRD officials hoped that this would make SAVAK’s 
anti-Soviet literature and campaigns much more far-reaching and effective. They envisaged 
transforming the institution into one not too dissimilar to their own agency. The February 
1958 Iraqi Revolution, and Iraq’s subsequent departure from the Baghdad Pact, encouraged 
the IRD to change tack. Instead of dealing with SAVAK through the institution’s apparatus, 
they increasingly worked with the Iranian agency bilaterally. Joint initiatives included the 
translation of popular European works of fiction, notably Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago, 
for the Iranian market. Now that they were free of the Baghdad Pact, which the US were not 
full members of, IRD officials also cooperated with their American counterparts in the 
production and dissemination of anti-Soviet propaganda.  
 
Britain, Iran and the Baghdad Pact 
 
After the August 1953 coup, the British Embassy in Tehran pressurised the UK Foreign 
Office to restore its presence in Iran to the level it was before the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis. 
The Ambassador Roger Stevens, along with his successor in 1958, Geoffrey Harrison, were 
instrumental in persuading the government department here. The latter was a career 
diplomat, who had worked his way up the Foreign Office ranks. Having been involved in 
implementing Britain’s policy of appeasement towards Germany in the 1930s, followed by a 
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stint in Whitehall during the Second World War, Harrison had come to see the importance of 
the British government playing a prominent role on the world stage. In July 1945, for 
example, he helped author Article XII of the Potsdam Agreement. It stated that all ethnic 
Germans in Central and Eastern Europe should be relocated to modern day Germany and 
Austria. Harrison’s first overseas post was as the UK Ambassador to Brazil, a role he held 
between 1956 and 1958, a tumultuous period in Brazilian society and politics. Harrison’s 
time in Brazil coincided with the inauguration of Juscelino Kubitschek as President. Before 
the former medical doctor had taken office, the country had experienced a series of 
Presidents, each ruling for a short term with limited political and popular support. 
Kubitschek’s position of strength and his reformist zeal underlined to Harrison the need for 
countries in the global south to be ruled by leaders with a strong personality and a 
determination to modernise the countries they ruled.12 
Harrison, accordingly, pressed the UK Foreign Office to provide considerable 
backing and support to the Shah. Stevens concurred with Harrison, though he was 
motivated less by an admiration of Iran’s monarch and more by his interest in Iranian society 
and culture. During their respective stints as Britain’s Ambassadors to Iran, both figures 
played on three key regional developments to persuade the UK Foreign Office to pay greater 
attention to the country. First, they exploited the government department’s fear of Soviet 
expansionism, in particular the Communist power’s supposed designs on Iran. In telegrams 
to the then Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, Stevens and Harrison discussed the 
implications of Iran’s shift away from Cold War neutrality after 1953. Both ambassadors 
noted how the Soviet Union had responded to this development by increasingly encroaching 
on Iranian sovereignty. The Politburo in Moscow was allegedly encouraging separatist and 
nationalist movements in Iranian Azerbaijan, Khuzestan and Kurdistan. All three regions 
were home to large Azeri, Arab and Kurdish populations respectively that outnumbered the 
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ethnic Iranian populace. The Azerbaijan and Kurdistan regions, moreover, neighboured the 
USSR on Iran’s northeast border, while Khuzestan in the southwest of the country was a 
vital oil source. In fostering resentment towards the Iranian government in these parts, the 
Soviet Union aimed to destabilise and endanger the Shah’s ruling regime.13 
Second, and linked to the first point, Stevens and Harrison noted to the Foreign 
Office how the Soviet Union had developed ties with Iran’s neighbours as a means to isolate 
the country regionally. Their letters to Selwyn Lloyd made reference to the 1954 agreement 
between the USSR and Afghanistan’s Prime Minister, Mohammed Daoud Khan. Eager to 
modernise his country’s infrastructure, the Premier had agreed to a series of joint USSR-
Afghan development projects. He also proceeded to permit the Afghan armed forces to visit 
the Soviet Union for extensive military training and educational courses on the merits of 
Communism. Both ambassadors, though, were seemingly more concerned with proceedings 
in Syria. Between 1945 and 1956, numerous presidents and governing regimes had ruled 
the country, each of which had been toppled by a popular or military coup. USSR officials, 
claimed Stevens and Harrison, exploited Syria’s political instability by establishing strong ties 
with left-leaning figures in the Ba’ath Party, who enjoyed a considerable parliamentary 
majority and dominated the Syrian cabinet. By November 1956, USSR-Syria ties were so 
strong that the Arab country permitted Soviet naval vessels to be stationed in ports across 
its eastern Mediterranean seaboard. A failure to address this, Stevens and Harrison warned, 
would result in Soviet-style Communism spreading into Iran, ‘infecting the Iranian people.’ 
Fearful that this would culminate in his dismissal, the Shah would subsequently seek to 
improve Irano-Soviet relations. The monarch would sign, amongst other things, non-
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aggression treaties with the Communist power, as well as remove all British and Western 
interests from the country.14 
Third, both Stevens and Harrison discussed the nature and extent of the threat 
posed by the Arab nationalist movement that had emerged, grown and taken hold in some of 
Iran’s neighbours. Its adherents called for pan-Arabism, as well as political and cultural unity 
among Arab peoples residing in the Near East and Maghreb. The movement rejected 
Western – especially British – involvement in the region’s affairs, perceiving the UK’s interest 
and involvement as a form of colonial imperialism. Originating in the 19th Century, the 
movement grew exponentially with the introduction of democratic elections across the 
Middle East by the 1950s. In 1952, the prominent Arab nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser was 
elected Egyptian Prime Minister, rising to President in 1956. In 1954, the Syrian electorate 
had also opted for an Arab nationalist government.15 As Stevens and Harrison noted, both 
countries’ governments were opposed to the Iranian monarchy. They called for the Shah’s 
removal due to his historic ties with the British government and his reliance on American 
political and economic aid. As such, they were willing to provide support to Iranian 
nationalists loyal to the deposed Prime Minister Mohammad Mossagdeh and a ‘marriage of 
convenience’ with the USSR. With Soviet support, Arab nationalists had sought to foster 
unrest in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, with Iran ‘next in line.’16 
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Stevens and Harrison’s assertions concerned officials in the Foreign Office’s Eastern 
Department. To these London-based figures, Iran was not just a vital oil source, but 
geopolitically important, too. As the country bordered the Arab world and the Soviet Union, 
they envisioned relying on the Shah and his government to act as a regional buffer against 
Communism and Arab nationalism. Iran’s role as a bulwark against these anti-British threats 
was further bolstered by that fact that its population was culturally distinct from its 
neighbours. As most of its citizens were not Arabs, its leadership was unlikely to be 
overhauled and replaced by a government supportive of Nasserite ideology. Since his 1953 
restoration, moreover, the Shah had taken a tough stance against the Soviet and Egyptian 
governments, particularly towards their designs on the Middle East. Fearful that the 
authorities in both countries sought to undermine his rule, the Iranian monarch had 
displayed increasing willingness to receive UK and US economic and military support. The 
Shah regarded this as pivotal to not just the modernisation of Iran’s infrastructure, but also 
as a means for the country he ruled to become a prominent power in the Middle East.17 
The Shah’s desire for British military and economic support, combined with Iran’s 
importance to UK Foreign Office diplomatic objectives for the Middle East, culminated in the 
country joining the Baghdad Pact in November 1955. The agreement here built upon a 
previous treaty signed by Turkey and Iraq, at the UK government’s behest, in February of 
that year. With this treaty, both countries agreed to cooperate with one another in military, 
economic and intelligence fields, pledging to defend one another if attacked by Egypt or the 
Soviet Union.18 Iran’s November 1955 ascension, followed by Pakistan’s a few months later, 
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fostered a collective consensus to transform the agreement from a treaty into an 
organisation modelled on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). While encouraging 
this development, the UK Foreign Office’s Eastern Department were hesitant to fully involve 
Iran in this organisation. In an unauthored telegram to the UK Embassy in Tehran, a senior 
official within the department warned that the Shah would merely regard the Baghdad Pact 
as a forum in which he could obtain military and economic aid for Iran. The country’s 
representatives in meetings would, therefore, contribute little to discussions and minimise 
their involvement in collaborative projects. In spite of these reservations, the telegram 
concluded that there was little the UK Foreign Office, or the Embassy, could do to 
discourage their approach. Not only had the Iranian government displayed considerable 
willingness to join the Baghdad Pact, but its presence, as an emerging political and 
economic power, provided the organisation with greater credibility, fostering a greater sense 
of collective security.19 
From the outset, the Baghdad Pact sought to present itself as a defensive line to 
discourage further Soviet encroachments into the Arab world, Persian Gulf and the Indian 
Subcontinent. The organisation’s strategy and functions were decided at bi-annual summits, 
involving British, Iranian, Iraqi, Pakistani and Turkish governing elites. The majority of the 
Baghdad Pact’s activities centred on the sharing of intelligence, collaborative socio-
economic projects and the countering of Soviet and Arab nationalist propaganda. To ensure 
the smooth running of these activities, a series of sub-committees were established under 
the Baghdad Pact’s institutional apparatus. These were the Liaison, Economic and Counter-
Subversion committees. The latter was particularly crucial, focusing on refuting Soviet 
propaganda and the dissemination of material that aimed to discourage support for 
Communist principles among the populace in Baghdad Pact countries. The CSC was 
comprised of senior intelligence figures from Baghdad Pact member countries. Chaired by 
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senior members of the UK Foreign Office’s IRD, they would meet in a separate venue at the 
same time as the main Baghdad Pact summits to coordinate their activities.20 
Through discussions and collaborative projects organised via the CSC, the UK 
Foreign Office’s Eastern Department hoped to develop and strengthen the UK’s ties to 
Baghdad Pact members. Anglo-Iranian relations, though, were something that figures from 
the government department placed a greater emphasis on, considering the US’ greater 
involvement in the country. Since 1953, American support for the Shah had been a key tenet 
of the Eisenhower administration’s policy towards dealing with the Cold War in Asia. Due to 
its comparative lack of resources, the UK was unable to match the US’ economic and 
military backing of Iran, as well as the United States Information Agency’s (USIA) 
comprehensive cultural diplomacy programme. Projects organised through the Baghdad 
Pact’s institutional apparatus, then, were one of the only ways the Foreign Office could 
retain a significant presence in a country that had traditionally come under Britain’s sphere of 
influence.21  
Indeed, the UK Foreign Office’s attempts to use the Baghdad Pact in other ways to 
strengthen Anglo-Iranian relations had been unsuccessful. The British diplomats and 
officials, for example, who presided over the Socio-Economic sub-committee had seen all 
their proposed policies undermined by both Whitehall figures. Senior Treasury and Foreign 
Office officials had refused to finance a telecommunications project which would connect 
Tehran with its fellow Baghdad Pact members. They maintained that, due to Britain’s 
diminished financial means post-1945, they could only justify funding socio-economic 
projects in Commonwealth countries. These were nations that had formerly been part of the 
British Empire and where the Treasury and Foreign Office were confident the UK’s global 
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presence could be best maintained. Britain’s refusal to fund this project resulted in the US 
State Department hijacking the initiative, undertaking it outside the Baghdad Pact and 
funding it themselves.22 
Working closely with Iran in the field of counter-subversion, consequently, would 
provide the organisation with greater credibility. The US’ refusal to join, despite the State 
Department’s involvement in the negotiations, had made Turkish, Iraqi and Pakistani officials 
unsure of the Baghdad Pact’s viability. Foreign Office figures reckoned that America’s 
refusal here was, in part, due to the Eisenhower administration’s fear that this decision 
would not gain Congressional approval, particularly among the influential group of pro-Israeli 
Senators. Their counterparts in the UK Embassy in Tehran, though, attributed America’s 
reluctance to full Baghdad Pact membership to the US State Department’s differing 
strategies and priorities to the British in Middle East. American diplomats and officials feared 
antagonising Nasser, presuming that any aggressive actions or uncompromising rhetoric on 
their part would push the Egyptians and the Soviets closer together. The UK Foreign Office, 
on the other hand, reckoned that the best way to combat the Arab nationalist threat was to 
confront it, relying on regional governments opposed to Nasser to do so.23 To allay the fears 
of Baghdad Pact members, while also highlighting the benefits of working with Britain, 
Harrison urged the UK Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, to make Iran the organisation’s 
‘central link.’ If it could be demonstrated that there was space for sustained UK involvement 
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in a country receiving unprecedented American support, it would compel other nations to 
make more of an effort with the Baghdad Pact and not lament the US’ refusal to sign.24 
Helping the UK Foreign Office with their objectives here was the Iranian 
government’s willingness to cooperate with the British in counter-subversive activities. While 
ideologically much more pro-American, Iran’s Deputy Prime Minister, Nasser Zolfghari, was 
willing to engage with the British on limited lines to combat the supposed Communist threat 
to Iran. He envisaged the collaborative efforts with the UK Foreign Office as supplementing 
the United States Information Agency’s (USIA) work with Radio Tehran. In a January 1956 
meeting with Roger Stevens, Zolfghari claimed that the Iranian government wanted to 
‘respond aggressively’ to Soviet propaganda. A ‘dignified silence’, he argued, would only 
encourage the USSR further. Initiatives, though, should move beyond just ‘refuting 
nonsense from Moscow.’ Literature and radio broadcasts should promote the Baghdad 
Pact’s benefits, particularly how this had assisted Iran’s socio-economic development. 
Coordinated through the organisation, material should be distributed through media outlets, 
such as the BBC and the Iranian newspaper Kayhan, with an ‘information centre’ 
coordinating these efforts on behalf of member states.25 
Iran’s representatives on the CSC, likewise, were also keen to work closely with the 
IRD and the Foreign Office in the creation and distribution of anti-Communist propaganda. 
The two Iranian delegates in this sub-committee were Teymur Bakhtiar and Hassan 
Pakravan, the Director and Deputy-Director respectively of SAVAK, the combined Iranian 
secret police and intelligence service. Bakhtiar and Pakravan hailed from prominent Iranian 
families, with links to the Shah’s family and Iranian aristocracy. They were educated in 
France, before pursuing military careers. As an ardent Francophile and anti-Communist, 
Bakhtiar was charged with rounding up Mossagdeh loyalists and known members of the 
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Tudeh, Iran’s Communist party, after the events of August 1953. His efficacy in this role 
resulted in the Shah asking him to establish and head SAVAK, with the appointment of 
Pakravan as his deputy.26 Engaging with prominent Iranian figures and institutions like this 
was a pivotal tenet of the IRD’s approach towards Iran. In forging ties with these ‘opinion 
makers and shapers’, the Foreign Office department hoped to create a ‘trickle down’ effect. 
Shaped by IRD propaganda, influential academics, media personalities and political elites 
would in turn seek to affect the views of others. Such tactics were a key aspect of broader 
British foreign policy in Iran and the wider Middle East in this period. To dissuade foreign 
publics from turning towards Soviet inspired Communism, British policymakers would 
engage with local elites, encouraging them to foster favourable views of the UK to their 
subjects. The motives behind this strategy lay in Britain’s lack of resources compared to the 
United States. The superior financial capabilities of the Americans meant they had the 
means to engage extensively with the Iranian public, something the Foreign Office lacked.27 
From their appointment, Bakhtiar and Pakravan immediately sought to use the CSC 
as a forum in which to secure IRD assistance with the production of effective propaganda 
and guidance on other ways to combat Soviet subversive activities in Iran. Having already 
received CIA, SIS and MOSSAD training in surveillance and interrogation techniques, 
counter-subversion was the one area SAVAK had received little instruction on. In meetings 
with officials from the British Embassy in Tehran, Pakravan pushed for SAVAK to receive 
IRD guidance. Convinced that the production and distribution of propaganda should be a key 
tenet of SAVAK’s operations, he argued that it would be mutually beneficial and would 
strengthen Anglo-Iranian relations. From viewing the IRD’s operations from afar, Pakravan 
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was confident that the department’s collaborative efforts with SAVAK would be a success.28 
Since its January 1948 inception, the IRD had been instrumental in coordinating anti-
Communist propaganda campaigns in the UK and overseas. To achieve this, the IRD had 
established links with political elites, as well as influential cultural figures, that had displayed 
anti-Soviet tendencies. IRD officials had even worked with their counterparts in the US State 
Department to counter Communist propaganda in Europe, Asia and North Africa.29 To Paul 
Grey, a senior IRD figure in London, Bakhtiar and Pakravan’s requests provided the UK 
government with a ‘unique opportunity’ to strengthen Anglo-Iranian ties. While they lacked 
an understanding of propaganda techniques, both SAVAK officials displayed considerable 
potential and a willingness to learn. They would, therefore, ‘rely heavily on the IRD in the 
future’, enabling the agency to exercise considerable influence ‘behind the scenes.’ Both 
figures were also of a ‘high standing’ in the Iranian government. Their influential position 
meant they could peddle positive views of Britain to other senior officials.30  
Stevens, however, did not share the Eastern Department’s enthusiasm with these 
developments. Conceding to the Foreign Office that close relations with a senior government 
figure like Zolfghari was a coup for Britain, the UK Ambassador to Iran noted how he was 
new to the Deputy Prime Minister role. While he was a well-intentioned figure amenable to 
Britain, Zolfghari was young and inexperienced, having only been appointed in the wake of 
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the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis.31 More broadly, the UK Ambassador to Iran was opposed to 
greater IRD involvement in the country. From his 1954 appointment, Stevens had sought to 
minimise the Foreign Office department’s Iranian activities. In a letter to Paul Grey, Stevens 
questioned the suitability of using the IRD to work with the Iranian government in the field of 
counter-subversion. The clandestine nature of its activities would encourage the popular 
perception in Iran that Britain sought to manipulate internal affairs, proving counter-
productive to Anglo-Iranian relations in the long run. Equally, while most of its governing 
elites were vehemently anti-Communist, the Iranians ‘would not utilise IRD material in the 
way that we would like.’ They would be reluctant to antagonise their Soviet neighbours, while 
also disliking the ‘indigestible jargon’ and verbose language evident in IRD literature. In the 
case of Iran, Stevens claimed that the UK Foreign Office should provide the UK Embassy in 
Tehran’s Information Department with the money to publish ‘constructive publicity material.’ 
This would highlight the UK’s role in Iran’s political and economic progress since 1945 ‘in a 
clear-cut and easily understandable way.’ Such literature would inform the Iranian public of 
the ‘Communist world’s shortcomings’ and the benefits of allying with Britain.32 
Stevens’ conviction, though, that the IRD should play a minimal role in Iran was a 
minority view within the UK Embassy in Tehran. Other senior officials, most notably the First 
Secretary Denis Wright, were keen for the IRD to work closely with the Iranian government 
to produce and disseminate anti-Communist propaganda. Having had no prior exposure to 
Iran or the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis, the Foreign Office had sent Wright to the country in 
September 1953 to reopen the British Embassy. The close affinity he developed towards the 
country and his people compelled senior figures in the government department to appoint 
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him the Ambassador to Iran in 1963, a post he held until 1971.33 Writing a report on 
Communist propaganda activities in Iran to the IRD in July 1955, Wright talked of the 
country’s ‘first-hand experience’ of Soviet subversion. According to the First Secretary, the 
Soviets were using Farsi-language Radio Moscow news bulletins, as well as covert support 
for the Tudeh, to undermine the Shah’s regime. Wright paid particular attention to the Iranian 
Communist party’s publication, Mardom (People), a one-page leaflet produced underground 
that was printed weekly or monthly depending on the Tudeh’s finances. Despite the arrest of 
many of its contributors and distributors, as well as the seizure of most of its clandestine 
printing presses, Mardom was still being published widely, appealing to more than just 
Tudeh loyalists. Much of Iran’s youth, Wright claimed, were reading the publication, 
concurring with its attacks on the Shah’s supposed un-Islamic behaviour and of the Anglo-
American colonialism of Iran by stealth.34 
Wright was supported by his Embassy colleagues and by senior Foreign Office 
figures in Whitehall. His contemporary, Hugh Carless, proved a useful ally in the struggle to 
overcome Stevens’ anti-IRD views. With a Farsi-speaking father in the British-Indian Civil 
Service, Carless was immersed in Iran’s history and culture from a young age. As a junior 
diplomat in the Second World War, he sought to emulate his father, studying Farsi at the 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. Following the end of the conflict, 
Carless enrolled at the University of Cambridge before embarking on his first Foreign Office 
overseas post in Afghanistan. While there, he spent much of his spare time hiking and 
travelling around Turkey and Iran, acting as a guide, translator and companion for travel 
writer Eric Newby’s debut novel, the bestselling A Short Walk in the Hindu Kush. After the 
events of August 1953, Carless became convinced that the Foreign Office should pay 
                                               
33 Denis Wright (British Embassy, Tehran) to Paul Gore-Booth (Foreign Office, London), 30 May 
1968, TNA, FCO 8/56. 
34 Denis Wright (British Embassy, Tehran) to John Rennie (IRD, Foreign Office), 6 July 1955, TNA, 
FO 1110/791. 
  197 
greater attention to bolstering the Shah’s regime. His lobbying of senior officials resulted in 
him being posted from Brazil to Iran in 1956 to help with this. He pushed for Iranian 
adherence to Baghdad Pact, especially the CSC, and joined the IRD in 1958 to act as the 
UK representative in these sub-committee meetings.35 More importantly, though, Wright had 
the support of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the most 
senior civil servant in the Foreign Office, Ivone Kirkpatrick. In a meeting with the then Iranian 
Ambassador to the UK, Ali Soheili, he claimed that officials in Moscow regarded Iran as the 
‘big prize.’ If Soviet subversive activities in the country were left uncontested, then no military 
or economic endeavours, UK, US or otherwise, would protect the Shah’s regime.36 
Kirkpatrick’s conviction that the UK Embassy in Tehran and the Foreign Office should 
prioritise the countering of Soviet subversive activities in Iran stemmed from his formative 
experiences during the Second World War. In April 1940, he was appointed as the Director 
for the Ministry of Information’s Foreign Division, followed by a stint as Controller for the 
BBC’s European Services. These roles underlined to Kirkpatrick the importance of shaping 
popular opinion, something he stressed in a memo to Stevens. As he pointed out to the UK 
Ambassador in Iran, work needed to be done to strengthen the Iranian resolve, ensuring the 
country remained pro-Western and did not shift to Cold War neutrality. While joining the 
Baghdad Pact was the Shah’s decision, there was considerable domestic opposition to 
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Iran’s membership. Due to their ‘deep-seated hankering’ for neutrality, most Iranian people 
were convinced that the Shah’s agreement here exacerbated regional tensions.37  
The views of such a high-ranking Foreign Office figure, complemented by the 
arguments posited by the UK Ambassador’s staff, meant that Stevens’ arguments for 
minimal IRD involvement in Iran were dismissed. Two developments in Iran and the wider 
region, though, made it more imperative to British diplomats and officials that the IRD 
collaborate with SAVAK through the Baghdad Pact. The first was the supposed Irano-Soviet 
rapprochement. In January 1956, the Soviet Union’s First Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, 
invited the Shah and his wife to Moscow for a one-week audience. Scheduled for June of 
that year, Embassy and Eastern Department figures feared that Khrushchev would persuade 
the Shah to sign a non-aggression treaty, negating the Baghdad Pact and pledging Iran to 
effective Cold War neutrality. These developments, however, did not come to fruition; the 
Shah and Khrushchev reportedly clashed over the amount of military support the US was 
providing Iran. Yet the fact that these supposed sworn enemies met for informal talks alerted 
Foreign Office figures to the possibility that the Iranians could turn to the Soviets in the Cold 
War unless Britain worked extensively to prevent this.38 
The second development that unnerved Foreign Office figures was the Suez Crisis. 
In October 1956, British soldiers seized the Suez Canal in response to Nasser’s decision to 
nationalise this vital shipping route. Just one month later, and after encountering significant 
diplomatic pressure from the United States, Soviet Union and the United Nations, the UK 
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was forced to withdraw its military force.39 The Suez Crisis harmed elite and popular 
perceptions of the British in Iran and the Arab world. It cemented the idea that Britain was an 
imperialist power, willing to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states to achieve its 
diplomatic goals. The incident strengthened the Soviet Union’s position in the region and 
vindicated the anti-imperialist arguments posited by Arab nationalists. The Iranian public and 
press were particularly critical. Writing to the IRD in 1957, officials from the British Embassy 
in Tehran’s press section underlined the considerable anti-UK feeling in Iran. They noted 
how numerous articles in mainstream Iranian newspapers were urging their readers to be 
vigilant towards British political and economic overtures. Such reports, Embassy officials 
continued, were detrimental to Britain’s interests in Iran. These articles would jeopardise 
future Anglo-Iranian collaborative efforts, culminating in Britain being sidelined in the Middle 
Eastern country.40 At an elite level, in contrast, the Suez Crisis inadvertently brought the UK 
and Iran closer together, necessitating the need to strengthen Anglo-Iranian relations. From 
the Suez Canal’s seizure, the other Baghdad Pact nations had taken a tougher stance 
towards Britain. In November 1956, the four other members held an emergency meeting in 
Tehran, excluding the UK at the request of the Iraqi and Pakistani delegations. From the 
furore caused by this decision, Eastern Department officials realised that, as Iran was not an 
Arab nation, the country was less vulnerable to the lure of the nationalist ideals espoused by 
Nasser. While adhering to Britain’s exclusion, the Iranian delegation did not encourage it, 
and kept the Foreign Office informed of the meeting’s discussions.41  
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Before the establishing of the Baghdad Pact’s institutional apparatus, the IRD’s activities in 
Iran were minimal. Due to Stevens’ assertions that its activities would hinder, rather than 
help, Anglo-Iranian relations, the department’s initiatives were confined to basic outputs that 
were distributed through UK embassies worldwide. Transmitted to Tehran in monthly 
intervals were three publications, The Asian Analyst; Communism and Underdeveloped 
Countries; and Facts About Communist Front Organisations. They would usually be 
distributed to vendors, academics and government officials as basic papers or booklets, 
outlining ‘facts about Communism in dispassionate language.’ Articles would, accordingly, 
appear considered, neutral and factual. Writings would focus on, among other things, the 
use of forced labour in the USSR, Communist agriculture, the plight of Soviet youth and the 
perils of neutralism. Complementing these pamphlets was The Interpreter. Aimed at the ‘the 
more informed reader’, this explored Soviet foreign policy in more detail, examining its 
supposedly expansionist nature and the implications for the stability of the global system.42 
It was only from the CSC’s April 1956 founding that the IRD was able to play a more 
pronounced role in the containment of Communism in Iran. At the first meeting in Tehran, 
the Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian and Pakistani representatives agreed to collective action to combat 
Soviet subversion. They pledged to monitor the broadcasts of Communist countries, 
distributing this data with other Baghdad Pact signatories; promote programmes and 
initiatives concerning the culture and economy of member organisations; share audience 
research; distribute anti-Communist publications; and provide technical assistance to one 
another. To monitor the extent to which they were working towards these objectives, the 
                                               
42 A note for the guidance of information officers, January 1953, TNA, FO 1110/676; IRD (Foreign 
Office, London) to Roger Stevens (British Ambassador, Iran), 11 August 1954, TNA, FO 1110/676; 
Report on IRD material sent to Iran, 11 July 1955, TNA FO 1110/791.  
  201 
CSC agreed to meet once every three months.43 At the insistence of Denis Wright and Hugh 
Carless, who represented the UK’s interests in these discussions, the other members 
agreed to establish the CSO. Situated in Baghdad with a full-time staff, this would manage, 
implement and coordinate the initiatives agreed upon in CSC meetings. In creating the CSO, 
Wright and Carless claimed the organisation’s activities would enjoy a greater degree of 
autonomy and secrecy, outside the Baghdad Pact’s auspices. Not only would the 
organisation’s Secretary General be unable to intervene in its activities, but the media and 
the public would also be unware of its existence. If the CSO’s functions became widely 
known, they were convinced that this would undermine the production and dissemination of 
anti-Communist propaganda.44 
Enthused with the use of the CSC and the CSO as a vehicle to ensure geopolitical 
stability in Iran and the wider Middle East, the UK Foreign Office gave this arrangement their 
‘full support.’ Officials in its Eastern Department envisaged that they could use the 
committee and organisation respectively to coordinate the countering of ‘hostile Soviet 
propaganda’ in the region. The arrangement here also allowed Eastern Department figures 
to utilise the IRD and its material more in Iran and its neighbours. To demonstrate to the 
Baghdad Pact members that ‘we mean business’, they recommended the secondment of an 
IRD official to sit in on CSC meetings and coordinate all CSO activities.45 The agency and 
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the Foreign Office, though, found it difficult to choose whom to send to represent British 
interests. The Eastern Department wanted to send Phillip Adams, who headed the Regional 
Information Office in Beirut. As his role was to coordinate UK-led propaganda and publicity 
campaigns in the Arab world, the Eastern Department were convinced he was the best 
candidate for the job. As the other CSC representatives were security officers and policemen 
from authoritarian nations, many would possess ‘a dictatorial and physical view of counter-
subversion.’ With his experience, then, Adams would be able to sway these figures from this 
type of thinking, fostering a more nuanced approach to the countering of Soviet 
propaganda.46 The IRD, however, disagreed, arguing that, as Adams’ brief was already 
considerable, he would not have the time or energy to fully dedicate himself to the CSC and 
CSO. The department’s officials eventually compromised, agreeing to the secondment of 
Adams’ deputy, Leonard Figg, to sit in on the sub-committee meetings and run the office 
from Baghdad.47 
The CSC and the CSO sought to combat Soviet subversion in all Baghdad Pact 
member countries. At the March, June and September meetings of the former, Figg 
encouraged the other representatives to propose initiatives and assess their feasibility. As 
well as the establishing of networks between the CSC and domestic intelligence agencies, 
the delegations considered how to use audio and visual media to highlight the Soviet 
Union’s harmful activities. They commissioned a report on the use of the printed press, radio 
stations and films ‘in a necessary and desirable way.’ The CSC’s June 1956 report 
concluded that the sub-committee should monitor Soviet and Eastern Bloc broadcasts to the 
Middle East, while also using their own television and radio outlets to promote the Baghdad 
Pact. It proceeded to urge the CSO’s staff to develop links with Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian and 
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Pakistani journalists, supplying them with stories critical of the Soviet Union and highlighting 
‘tangible examples of underhand Communist penetration.’48 Examples of stories and 
campaigns implemented by the CSC and CSO here include the distribution of stories to the 
press in Iraq, Turkey and Iran of the 40th anniversary of the 1917 Russian Revolution, as well 
as radio programmes documenting the October 1956 Hungarian Uprising.49 
Despite the CSC’s meetings covering the countering of Soviet subversion in all 
Baghdad Pact member states, Iran’s geopolitical importance meant that much of the CSO’s 
work focused on this country in particular. Most of its initial activities saw the organisation act 
as a conduit for collaborative projects undertaken by the IRD and SAVAK. These initiatives 
concentrated on the combating of Soviet criticism of the Iranian regime. In discussions 
between Figg and Bakhtiar and Pakravan, the IRD official reinforced to Iranian officials the 
importance of countering Communist propaganda through ‘positive means.’ Instead of 
criticising the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR, it was important to use newspaper 
reports to promote positive aspects of the Shah’s regime. Such reports would make the 
Iranian public more optimistic about Iran’s future prospects and less inclined towards 
adopting a more pro-Soviet stance on domestic and foreign affairs.50 With these aims in 
mind, Figg and Bakhtiar launched a joint publicity campaign. Exploiting the latter’s close ties 
with the editors of the state-run Ettelat, they drip-fed various stories into the Iranian press. 
Some articles, for example, extolled the virtues of the Shah’s socio-economic reforms, 
complementing the work undertaken by the USIA and the Iran government-backed Plan 
Organisation in this field. Reports highlighted the Shah’s determination to combat the inferior 
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living standards of those in rural areas compared to their urban-dwelling counterparts. They 
discussed the allocation of considerable sums of money to the modernisation of Iran’s 
agricultural sector, the building of schools and the provision of local amenities in villages 
across the country. Articles would also underline the Shah’s concerns for his subjects and 
his determination to see them progress. They demonstrated how these initiatives would 
benefit, not simply those in the countryside, but also future generations and Iran as a 
whole.51 
Articles on the Shah’s socio-economic reforms, however, were produced by the IRD 
in London. According to the UK Embassy in Tehran, SAVAK would be unable to undertake 
these activities without substantial British monitoring and support. The propaganda they 
produced in-house was ‘poor and ineffectual.’ There was no coordination between writers, 
distributors and senior SAVAK figures, with little understanding of effective information 
techniques.52 Eager to overcome these issues, Figg and the CSO dedicated most of their 
energies between 1956 and 1958 to improving SAVAK’s propaganda peddling capabilities. 
At an August 1957 CSC summit in Damascus, the Figg urged Bakhtiar and Pakravan to 
establish a second CSC office in Tehran under their remit. Not only would this reflect the 
importance of Anglo-Iranian counter-subversion to the wider operations of the CSC, but also 
encourage the Iranian agency to be more organised. In improving its bureaucratic 
capabilities, SAVAK would be regarded as more reliable, more adept and in a position to 
‘fulfil its potential as the next IRD.’53 To help with this aim, Figg persuaded the UK Foreign 
Office to send George Bozman, an IRD official, to Tehran. Situated in the British Embassy 
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between October and December 1957, his role was to liaise with Bakhtiar and Pakravan on 
all propaganda and information work matters. Figg hoped that Bozman’s presence in an 
advisory capacity here would oblige SAVAK to rely heavily on the IRD official’s expertise, 
resulting in an institution organised and run on British lines that produced propaganda that 
tied in to UK foreign policy interests.54  
From his October 1957 secondment, Bozman found dealing with SAVAK a 
‘frustrating experience.’ From the literature and material used by the Iranian agency as anti-
Communist propaganda, it was difficult to ‘discern any consistent thought.’ Bozman 
struggled to persuade SAVAK to streamline their operations and focus their efforts on 
certain stock themes and messages. According to the IRD official, the Iranian agency would 
be better placed producing literature highlighting the Soviet Union’s supposed hostility 
towards Islam, as well as how agents of the USSR were allegedly shaping the views of 
Iran’s students and intellectuals. SAVAK’s ‘inadequate and incompetent staff’, combined 
with a chaotic bureaucracy and filing system, meant that Bozman’s recommendations did 
not resound with Bakhtiar and Pakravan.55 Once his secondment came to an end, 
regardless, SAVAK’s two senior officials pushed the UK Embassy in Tehran to send a 
permanent replacement for Bozman. Bakhtiar and Pakravan argued that only the 
foundational work had been completed and much more was needed to instruct the Iranians 
in their shortcomings in this field. Despite Bozman’s assertions to the contrary, they claimed 
that many of his recommendations had been implemented ‘in theory’ and that the IRD’s work 
here was a ‘great measure of security’ against Soviet propaganda in Iran. They finished by 
claiming that this was ‘an exceptional opportunity’ to strengthen Anglo-Iranian relations.’56 
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The Expansion of British Propaganda Activities in Iran 
 
Before the UK Foreign Office and the IRD could decide how to proceed with Bakhtiar and 
Pakravan’s recommendations, events in the Middle East weakened the Baghdad Pact. In 
July 1958, Iraqi military figures loyal to the Arab nationalist cause toppled the monarchy in a 
popular coup. They executed the pro-British King, Faisal I, and his anglophile Prime 
Minister, Nuri Al-Said. In its place now stood a new Iraqi government closely aligned with 
Nasser’s Arab nationalist regime in Egypt.57 Adopting a neutral stance towards the Cold War 
in the Middle East, the ruling Baath Party in Iraq withdrew itself from the Baghdad Pact. 
Their removal destabilised the fledgling organisation. Al-Said had previously been one of its 
most prominent advocates. He had devised and advocated projects such as the construction 
of a Middle Eastern railway line, which sought to foster political, social and economic ties 
between member states.58  
Having lost a key supporter, the Foreign Office no longer regarded the Baghdad Pact 
as an effective regional buffer against Soviet Middle Eastern incursions. Renaming the 
organisation, the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), its members continued to interact 
with one another. Their initiatives from the late 1950s, however, were inconsequential, 
undertaken with little enthusiasm from all parties involved. In telegrams to the Foreign Office 
in London, officials in the IRD’s new regional office in Ankara argued that any future 
initiatives in the Middle East should be undertaken on a bilateral basis. The instability of 
governments in the region meant that regimes were prone to change. As this would likely 
lead to their withdrawal, the commitment of Middle Eastern nations to organisations such as 
the Baghdad Pact could not be relied on. By working with states bilaterally, the IRD would 
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have more room to manoeuvre. Officials would not be hamstrung by institutional norms and 
conventions and could withdraw from collaborative projects with ease.59 
Compounding this, was Bakhtiar and Pakravan’s increasing dislike towards how the 
CSO operated. At the March 1959 CENTO summit in Karachi, where the CSC reconvened 
to reactivate and decide its future activities, the Iranian delegates bemoaned the direction 
the organisation had taken. They claimed its meetings were an ‘inconsequential talking-
shop’, which paid too much attention to administrative matters. Consequently, no ‘positive 
proposals’ to combat Soviet subversive activities had been mooted, with discussions quickly 
turning into disagreements. As the representatives from each member country operated in 
various roles, they all had different experiences and perspectives. Bakhtiar and Pakravan 
instead suggested that the CSC ‘should be rationalised’, with one professional intelligence 
officer from each country. Only then could the committee ‘understand the problems of 
subversion’ and come up with solutions. Possible initiatives they suggested included the 
production and dissemination of topical, high-brow news articles; fiction and factual book 
translations; and anti-Soviet teaching material so that teachers could persuade their 
students away from Communist ideals.60  
IRD and Eastern Department officials conceded that there was ‘some truth’ to these 
criticisms. Carless suggested turning the CSC and the CSO into a counter-propaganda 
‘research office’ staffed by experienced IRD personnel. The Eastern Department, while not 
dismissing Carless’ proposal outright, recommended that they needed to do more to 
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demonstrate to the Iranians that they were determined to combat Soviet subversion in Iran.61 
The UK Embassy in Tehran, was more defensive. While they admitted that the CSO’s 
achievements in the three years since it was established ‘have not been great’, they claimed 
that this was not the fault of its staff. The majority of these personnel were good at their jobs 
but had received no adequate direction. Many of their superiors, in the Foreign Office and 
the IRD, possessed little understanding of the Soviet Union’s aims for Iran and the wider 
region. As the CSO did not and were unable to understand this, then it was unsurprising that 
CSC delegates like Bakhtiar and Pakravan were critical of its operations.62  
Accordingly, the IRD moved away from using the Baghdad Pact’s institutional 
apparatus as the main forum for collaborating with SAVAK. Renamed the CENTO Counter 
Subversion Office (CENTO CSO), with a new headquarters in Ankara, Turkey, the 
committee still advised and sponsored member states’ propaganda initiatives. To IRD and 
SAVAK officials, though, the CENTO CSO’s activities were of a lower priority. SAVAK, in 
particular, were especially receptive to the IRD’s greater willingness to bilaterally assist in 
the production and dissemination of propaganda. The use of the Baghdad Pact as the main 
forum of these activities was something that ‘genuinely frustrated’ Bakhtiar. While the output 
had been of a far superior quality than what SAVAK could have produced by itself, the then 
Director was convinced that the propaganda could be even better. Moreover, a bilateral 
arrangement would give the Iranian agency greater control over the type and nature of the 
propaganda produced and disseminated.63  
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Key to this was the joint IRD-SAVAK book translation programme. Taking Bakhtiar 
and Pakravan’s recommendation on board, Carless persuaded his IRD superiors to 
authorise the allocation of funds to publish renowned Western fiction and non-fiction 
serialised stories in the Iranian press. Even if the plots of these books were not directly anti-
Communist, it would demonstrate Britain’s supposed superior cultural traditions to that of the 
Soviet Union.64 The first success here was the November 1958 publication of the Soviet-
national Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago across 17 days in Ettelat. The Farsi translation 
that appeared in the newspaper was based on a daily serial of the novel that had appeared 
in the Liverpool Daily Echo. The IRD, through the Foreign Office, paid the latter for the rights 
to this, ordering officials in the UK Embassy in Iran to do the translating for them. Ettelat’s 
increasing sales across these 17 days, compelled Carless to authorise the translation and 
publication of 25,000 copies of an abridged version of Doctor Zhivago for the Iranian market. 
This edition of the celebrated novel contained a foreword detailing Pasternak’s plight. Set 
between the 1905 Russian Revolution and the Second World War, his book was not wholly 
enthusiastic about Communism and Soviet rule, leading USSR officials to bar its publication 
domestically. Its subsequent success across North America and Europe, though, ultimately 
led to Pasternak being award the Nobel Prize for Literature, which he was forced to turn 
down by Soviet authorities.65 
With the success of the Farsi edition of Dr Zhivago, Carless and the IRD quickly 
moved to translate popular works of fiction in the West. Publications selected by the agency 
included Bernard Newman’s The Blue Ants and Tibor Déry’s The Enemy. The former novel’s 
plot had an anti-Communist message, while the author of the latter had been incarcerated 
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for speaking out in support of the October 1956 Hungarian Uprising.66 At the same time as 
they were working with SAVAK to translate these novels, the IRD were increasingly working 
with their USIA counterparts. As the American government had refused to become full 
members of the Baghdad Pact, the US State Department had minimal involvement in the 
organisation’s activities. In the case of the CSC, a delegation from the State Department 
merely sat in on meetings, contributing little to the discussions. Now that the UK Foreign 
Office’s activities to counter Soviet propaganda in Iran were no longer undertaken through 
the Baghdad Pact, the USIA indicated a greater willingness to work with their British 
counterparts here. Much of their collaborative efforts, though, were minimal, occurring only 
when it was in their mutual interests to do so. The USIA, additionally, was reluctant to work 
with the IRD. In meetings with British Embassy officials, figures from the United States 
Information Service (USIS), who undertook the USIA’s work in Iran, criticised the IRD. They 
claimed its presence in the country would be counterproductive in the long term, fanning 
popular speculation that the US and the UK sought to covertly steer Iran from afar.67 
Anglo-American collaboration, therefore, centred on counteracting Soviet efforts to 
highlight divergent US-UK interests and policies. In promoting this united front, the USIS 
worked with the UK Embassy’s Information Department to emphasise the importance of the 
‘special relationship’ in propaganda broadcasts and publications. In November 1955 for 
example, Edward Wells, the USIS’ Public Affairs Officer in Iran, agreed with Reginald 
Burrows, his counterpart in the UK Embassy’s Information Department, to stress in daily 
press releases that the Baghdad Pact was an Anglo-American collaborative project, despite 
America not signing the agreement. The USIS, in return, pledged to minimise coverage of 
Iran’s claims to Bahrain.68 While it had agreed to attend meetings and contribute to 
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discussions, the US had rejected formal membership as they were convinced a defence pact 
would destabilise the region. State Department figures also deemed the arrangement a 
means by which the British government could reassert its imperial dominance in the Middle 
East.69 Bahrain, on the other hand, had belonged to Iran from the days of the Persian 
Empire through to 1792, when a British-backed local uprising forced the Iranians off the 
island. Since it had become a British protectorate in 1820, successive monarchs had called 
on the UK government to cede Bahrain back to Iran.70 
Moreover, USIS officials deemed it imperative that they cooperate with their British 
counterparts to combat Communism in Iran. As figures from the American agency were 
desperate to prevent the ideology from taking hold in the country, they approved of any 
foreign state-led initiative to counteract Soviet activities in Iran.71 Supplementing this was the 
UK’s unwillingness to compete with USIS figures in this field. Short-staffed, ineffectual and 
distrusted by most Iranians, the British Embassy in Tehran’s Information Department was 
confined to producing and distributing anti-Communist daily press releases. Its ‘discreet’ 
undertakings, accordingly, did not clash with the USIS’ activities.72 Much of the American 
agency’s efforts in working with the British to disseminate anti-Communist propaganda in 
Iran centred on the supplying of material to the BBC Persian Service. According to USIS 
                                               
69 For more on this, please consult: Nigel Ashton, ‘The Hijacking of a Pact: The Formation of the 
Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955-58’, Review of International 
Studies 19 (1993), 123-125. 
70 For more on Iran’s territorial claims to Bahrain, please consult: Steve Smith, Britain’s Revival and 
Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain and the Trucial States, 1950-1971 (Abingdon, 2013) and Roham 
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71 Memo from Edward Wells (PAO, USIS Tehran) to USIS (Tehran), 11 January 1954, NAII, USIA 
papers, Iran, Telegram Messages (1952-1961).  
72 American Embassy (Tehran) to USIA (Washington), 14 December 1954, NAII, USIA papers, Iran, 
Telegram Messages (1952-1961). 
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figures, the British broadcaster was of ‘insurmountable value.’ It was perfectly placed to 
counter Radio Moscow and Radio Cairo transmissions. Broadcasts from the latter two 
stations did not differentiate between the United States and Britain, arguing that both 
Western powers sought to undermine the Iranian regime and territorial sovereignty for their 
own interests. Farsi transmissions from both Radio Moscow and Radio Cairo referred to the 
Shah as a US-UK puppet and the country a de facto Anglo-American colony.73 As its news 
content was so popular among Iranians, USIS figures in Iran relied on the BBC Persian 
Service to refute these assertions. They deemed it unnecessary for the US to fund a similar 
Farsi language radio station of its own, claiming that this would dilute both broadcasters’ 
listening figures and the impact of their messages. They therefore supplied the BBC Persian 
Service with anti-Communist propaganda to disseminate across the airwaves.74 
These collaborative efforts, however, marked the limit of joint Anglo-American efforts 
to contain Communism in Iran. The bulk of the UK Foreign Office’s work in this field 
remained the IRD’s collaboration with SAVAK. Beginning in the mid-1950s, with the fledgling 
Baghdad Pact’s institutional apparatus acting as the main conduit, both agencies aimed to 
use audio-visual media to move Iranians away from Communist ideals. The 1958 Iraqi 
Revolution, though, diminished the Baghdad Pact’s credibility, compelling the IRD and 
SAVAK to increasingly work together bilaterally. Officials from both agencies built on their 
pre-1958 proposals to produce and distribute anti-Soviet films, leaflets and radio broadcasts. 
They devised, in particular, a book translation programme that provided Iranians with Farsi 
editions of popular Western and anti-Communist publications. In approving the 
implementation of such initiatives, UK Foreign Office figures hoped that they would help 
reassert Britain’s place as the dominant Western power in Iran. These policies, however, 
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only composed a fraction of the Foreign Office’s attempts to achieve this objective. Even 
more significant was the work of the British Council. From their 1955 return to the country, 
they relied on English language teaching to persuade and attract Iranians towards Britain’s 
norms, values, cultures and ideas, as the following chapter explores. 
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Chapter V – Anglicising Iranian Society and Culture Through 
Education: The UK Foreign Office and the British Council 
 
‘I can’t emphasise enough the importance we attach to our relations with Persia at this 
significant moment and our disappointment on political grounds at being prevented from 
starting operations there without delay.’1 
 
After the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis, British cultural diplomacy in Iran considerably diminished. 
Anthony Haigh, the head of the UK Foreign Office’s Cultural Relations Department from 
1952 to 1962, frequently bemoaned these developments. In an October 1954 letter to the 
then British Ambassador to Iran, Roger Stevens, Haigh called on the UK Embassy in Tehran 
to do more to promote Britain’s culture and values to Iranian people. With the Foreign Office 
and British government’s inability to sustain a cultural diplomacy programme in the country, 
Haigh was convinced it was up to Stevens and his subordinates to fill the gap, something he 
underlined in the above quote. Before the August 1953 US-UK sanctioned coup that toppled 
Prime Minister Mohammad Mossagdeh, the British Council and the BBC Persian Service 
were chiefly responsible for Britain’s cultural diplomacy in the country. With Foreign Office 
funding and support, the former had operated in major Iranian cities since 1934, organising 
exhibitions and providing English language teaching to school and university students. The 
latter was also answerable to the UK government department, forming a constituent part of 
the BBC foreign language services. Catering for Farsi speakers in Iran and Afghanistan, the 
Persian Service was broadcast twice daily, once between 7.30-8am and again from 10-
                                               
1 Anthony Haigh (Foreign Office, Cultural Relations Department) to Roger Stevens (British 
Ambassador, Iran), 2 October 1954, Kew, Richmond, The National Archives, BW 49/24 (hereafter 
document, date, TNA, file reference).  
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10.30pm. Its content was predominantly news and current affairs, yet a significant chunk of 
its programming was dedicated to talks on art and culture, as well as the educational English 
by Radio.2  
The 1951-1953 Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis, however, hampered both the BBC Persian 
Service and the British Council’s operations. The UK government’s refusal to accept 
Mossagdeh’s nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry resulted in a marked increase in 
Anglophobia among Iran’s populace. The Persian Service, previously renowned for its 
supposed impartial reporting of world news, was increasingly discredited by Mossagdeh and 
his allies as a UK government propaganda tool. The radio broadcaster was also facing 
Foreign Office pressure to criticise Mossagdeh in news reports and praise Britain’s handling 
of the diplomatic dispute.3 The British Council’s offices, likewise, were being increasingly 
vandalised by Iranian protestors, and the number of students signing up for their English 
language teaching courses had radically plummeted. Both of these issues culminated in the 
British Council leaving Iran in November 1952.4 
As the Anglo-Iranian Crisis had been resolved, with a consortium of Western 
petroleum companies taking control of Iran’s oil industry from the UK government backed 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), Haigh was determined to restore Britain’s cultural 
diplomacy programme in Iran. He was keenly aware of the country’s geostrategic 
importance in the Cold War, neighbouring the Soviet Union and straddling the Arab world, 
Persian Gulf and Indian Subcontinent. Haigh had also been made aware by the UK 
Embassy in Tehran of the growing anti-British popular sentiment and of America’s growing 
                                               
2 Minute on the History of the BBC Persian Service, undated, Caversham, Reading, BBC Written 
Archives Centre, E 40/272/1 (hereafter document, date, BBC WAC, file reference).  
3 Survey of the BBC Persian Service’s output in Iran, 17 December 1963, BBC WAC, E/3/182/1. 
4 Paul Wakelin (British Council, Iran) to British Council Head Office (London), 26 October 1952, TNA, 
BW 49/14.  
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role in Iran, a nation previously regarded as being in Britain’s sphere of influence.5 More 
broadly, Haigh was determined to ensure that the UK retained its prominent position on the 
world stage. Before becoming head of the Foreign Office’s Cultural Relations Department, 
he had served as a diplomat in the Belgian, Brazilian and Japanese embassies. These 
formative positions in radically different places had made Haigh aware of Britain’s global 
reach and influence, particularly in economic and cultural fields.6 
The previous chapter covered how the UK Foreign Office had responded to the 
above developments by working with SAVAK, the Iranian secret and intelligence service, to 
disseminate anti-Communist propaganda across Iran. Through the efforts of the UK 
Embassy and the Information Research Department (IRD), Foreign Office figures hoped to 
reassert Britain’s place as the dominant Western power in Iran. To help achieve this 
objective, the government department concurrently aimed to promote British culture and way 
of life to Iranian people. UK diplomats and officials hoped to combat the negative perception 
of Britain as an imperialist, meddling power that had festered during the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Crisis. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to examine how the UK Foreign Office sought to 
promote Britain’s values and way of life in Iran, while also fostering social progress and 
development along British lines. It explores how the government department largely relied 
on the British Council to achieve these aims, proceeding to outline how the US State 
Department and USIS responded to the UK’s cultural diplomacy programme. The chapter is 
divided into three sections. The first part examines how and why the Foreign Office relied on 
the British Council to foster Anglo-Iranian cultural ties. The second analyses the UK 
                                               
5 Anthony Haigh (Foreign Office, Cultural Relations Department) to Roger Stevens (British 
Ambassador, Iran), 2 October 1954, TNA, BW 49/24; American Embassy (Tehran) to USIA 
(Washington), 14 December 1954, College Park, Maryland, National Archives II (hereafter document, 
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institution’s initiatives. The third section discusses how and why the State Department and 
the USIS sought to undermine the British Council’s activities in Iran. 
Figures in the UK Embassy in Tehran and the Foreign Office’s Cultural Relations 
Department in London instantly realised that they could not compete with the USIS’ 
comprehensive cultural diplomacy programme in Iran. They did not possess adequate 
financial resources or the required number of personnel to match the American agency’s 
promotion of US values and socio-economic development programmes. Initially relying on 
the Persian Service, Embassy and Foreign Office officials realised that its audio 
transmissions were an ineffective means by which to culturally connect with Iranians. The 
Soviet Union intermittently jammed the Persian Service’s frequency, making it difficult for 
many in Iran to pick up the signal. Moreover, while most Iranian listeners appreciated the 
BBC’s news content, they were less keen on its cultural offerings. Many complained about 
the Persian Service’s plays and talks, claiming they were stuffy and high-brow.  
At the Embassy’s behest, the Foreign Office relied on the British Council to foster 
Anglo-Iranian cultural ties. Affiliated to the UK government department, the agency was able 
to have a physical presence in Iran. It engaged with the public daily when it reopened its 
offices in Tehran and other major provincial cities. Thanks to their comparative lack of 
resources, the British Council, through focusing on English language teaching, sought to 
plug the gaps left by US cultural initiatives. The qualifications offered by the agency in this 
field were much more rigorous than their American equivalents, and their courses for Iranian 
teachers of the English language were something the USIS had neglected to do.  
US Embassy and State Department figures were initially unsure how to approach 
British cultural diplomacy in Iran. On a broader level, both countries had similar motives for 
seeking to foster ties with the Iranian public. Both governments were concerned that many in 
the country had a propensity towards Soviet-inspired Communism. In the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Crisis’ wake, moreover, they were also aware that many Iranians possessed unfavourable 
views of the United States and Britain. Yet USIS officials in Iran were aware that the UK 
Foreign Office sought to compete with America, aiming to reassert Britain as the dominant 
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Western cultural power in Iran. They accordingly distanced themselves from the British 
Council, undermining the agency wherever possible, and only dealt with the institution when 
it was overwhelmingly in their interests to do so. 
 
The BBC Persian Service’s Failings and the British Council’s Return to Iran 
 
With the British Council’s November 1952 departure, the Foreign Office initially relied on the 
UK Embassy in Tehran’s Information Department to take over the agency’s cultural 
activities. Composed of three staff members, however, this small team could only undertake 
a fraction of the British Council’s work in Tehran, let alone its operations in other major 
Iranian cities. The Information Department was inundated with requests from parents of 
schoolchildren who sought for their offspring to work or study in the UK. These appeals left 
little time and resources for staff to devise and run English language teaching courses. The 
Information Department’s attempts to move beyond dealing with parental questions and 
queries proved unsuccessful. During 1954 and at the Foreign Office’s behest, staff 
attempted to organise cultural exhibitions that would showcase British literature to the 
Iranian people. However, due to historic British meddling in Iranian affairs, many Iranians, at 
both a popular and elite level, were distrustful of UK political institutions. Suspicious of the 
Embassy’s motives behind these cultural exhibitions, government officials refused to provide 
any assistance in publicising these events or providing a venue. Such uncooperative 
behaviour meant that none of the Information Department’s proposed exhibitions went 
beyond the planning stage.7  
Moreover, while the BBC Persian Service was still broadcasting to Iran, various 
factors undermined its effectiveness as a tool to promote Britain and British values. UK 
                                               
7 Roger Stevens (British Ambassador, Iran) to the UK Foreign Office, 30 November 1954, TNA, BW 
49/13; Roger Stevens (British Ambassador, Iran) to Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Secretary), 1 June 1957, 
TNA, BW 49/13.  
  219 
Foreign Office figures were initially convinced that the absence of a US Farsi language 
broadcaster provided them with a distinct advantage. The Voice of America’s reliance on its 
English language service to connect with Iranians – a policy that remained in place until 
1978 – meant that the BBC could potentially carve out a cultural niche for itself in Iran. Yet 
crucially, both the broadcaster and the Foreign Office found it incredibly difficult to identify 
the Persian Service’s listening figures and the demographics of its audience. They had no 
idea who had tuned in, from where, and what Iranian social groups were more likely to be 
attracted to BBC broadcasts. From his 1942 coronation, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, had outlawed the monitoring of audio and visual transmissions by actors residing 
outside of Iran. The only way that the BBC could discern Iranian listening habits was through 
the letters sent to the broadcaster in London by the country’s citizens. Many of these 
suggested that the Persian Service was incredibly popular in Iran, with correspondents’ 
anecdotes noting their discussion of its programmes with family and friends. Letters also 
praised the Persian Service’s news content, citing its impartiality and balanced reporting. 
One even referred to the broadcaster’s current affairs programming as a ‘fairy godmother’ to 
most Iranians.8  
Letters, however, were not the most accurate way of gathering feedback. As BBC 
Persian Service producers noted in their quarterly reports, they only represented the views 
of those who felt compelled to write in. It was highly unlikely that correspondents’ views were 
representative of the Iranian listeners at large.9 Equally, while many of the letters were 
positive, a significant number were critical of the Persian Service. Writers complained that its 
radio broadcasts promoted Britain too obviously and too much. They bemoaned that many 
of its plays, most notably a production of the nineteenth century British novel Ivanhoe, were 
                                               
8 BBC Persian Service quarterly audience research report, 15 January 1956, BBC WAC, E 3/181/1; 
BBC Persian Service quarterly audience research report, 15 April 1956, BBC WAC, E 3/181/1; BBC 
Persian Service quarterly audience research report, 23 November 1956, BBC WAC, E 3/181/1. 
9 BBC Persian Service quarterly audience research report, 15 January 1956, BBC WAC, E 3/181/1. 
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mundane and boring. British audio, clearly, could not compete with the more supposedly 
progressive American films and magazines, with Iranian correspondents to the BBC instead 
indicated a preference for US culture and fashion. Even aspects of BBC Persian Service’s 
content that listeners liked – news and English by Radio – were for practical reasons. 
Iranians tuned into the Persian Service as they deemed its news content trustworthy, while 
English by Radio was popular with schoolchildren and teachers keen to develop their 
understanding of the English language. Many in Iran regarded the BBC Persian Service as 
serving a functional purpose and did not want to engross themselves in British culture.10  
Equally significant was the Soviet Union’s intermittent jamming of the BBC Persian 
Service’s radio frequency. The unpredictability of this made it difficult for many Iranians to 
regularly tune in. Soviet jamming of the BBC’s broadcasts began in the days after the 
August 1953 coup. It briefly halted in April 1956 after the visit of First Secretary Nikita 
Khrushchev and Premier Nikolai Bulganin’s to the UK, only to restart in October 1956 with 
the onset of the Hungarian and Suez crises. According to a BBC Persian Service report, 
intermittent Soviet jamming has more than likely had a ‘cramming effect’ on listener figures. 
As many Iranians were unable to regularly listen, many were no longer tuning in. The 
potential audience, therefore, ‘could be significantly larger than the present one.’11 The 
Foreign Office were concerned by these developments, calling on the BBC to find solutions 
to circumvent Soviet jamming of the Persian Service.12 Yet there was no clear resolution of 
this issue. The BBC claimed that broadcasting on the more secure medium wave would 
alleviate this problem, but that this was not feasible in practice. It was not in this period 
technologically possible to transmit medium wave signals from the UK to countries such as 
Iran. For Iranian listeners to pick up the Persian Service on this wavelength it would require 
                                               
10 BBC Persian Service quarterly audience research report, 15 January 1956, BBC WAC, E 3/181/1. 
11 Minute on the History of the BBC Persian Service, undated, BBC WAC, E 40/272/1. 
12 Thomas Peters (Foreign Office) to Gordon Wakefield (BBC, Head of Eastern Services), 3 
December 1958, BBC WAC, E 1/2.082/1. 
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the building of transmitters in countries allied to Britain that were closer to Iran, something 
the BBC and Foreign Office deemed unlikely.13 There was also the possibility of 
strengthening the Persian Service’s current signal to overpower the Soviet jamming. This, 
though, could potentially have repercussions for Britain’s other cultural and geostrategic 
objectives in the Middle East and beyond. The BBC’s other foreign language radio stations, 
such as the Arab Service, used the same transmitters. Any improvement to the Persian 
Service’s signal would adversely affect the reception of these other radio stations.14 
More broadly, the BBC had increasingly antagonised the Iranian government. Such 
developments made it increasingly difficult for the Foreign Office to rely on the broadcaster 
to foster Anglo-Iranian cultural ties. The Persian Service frequently referred to the country as 
‘Persia’ and its peoples as ‘Persians.’ Iranians had never used these terms to describe 
themselves or their nation. The Ancient Athenians had applied these phrases in the fifth 
century BC to refer to the peoples residing on the Iranian Plateau. Other subsequent 
European civilisations had, in turn, borrowed these terms to refer to Iran and its peoples. In 
1935, the then Iranian monarch, Reza Khan, requested that other nations to refer to the 
country he ruled as Iran, as this is what its citizens have always called their country.15 The 
BBC’s failure to comply with this demand, despite the Shah’s repeated requests, angered 
the Iranian monarch and his acolytes.16 Cementing the Iranian government’s dislike of the 
BBC was the broadcast of an edition of the current affairs programme Behind the Headlines 
that examined proceedings in Iran. Hosted by television journalist Douglas Stuart, the show 
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looked in-depth at particular issues. Its episode on 11 March 1957 sought to inform UK 
viewers of Iran’s on-going economic modernisation programme. Eager to showcase their 
country to the British public, the Iranian government assisted with the filming and production 
of the programme. Writing to the then BBC Director General, Ian Jacob, in a personal 
capacity, Roger Stevens claimed that the Iranian government was unhappy with the final 
edit. He argued that this episode of Behind the Headlines had ‘adversely affected relations.’ 
There were frequent references to the 1941 deposition of the Shah’s father by the British 
and Soviets, an event that still upset the Iranian monarch. The episode also allegedly 
implied that Iran was a ‘backward and poor country.’17  
With the absence of substantial UK cultural diplomacy programmes in Iran after 
August 1953, the US had become the dominant Western influence in this field. In the British 
Council’s absence, the USIS had become ‘deeply entrenched’ in the Iranian education 
system. The agency’s initiatives had sought to instruct and inform Iranians on, among other 
things, science, technology and the English language.18 As a result of this, there had been a 
shift away from French pedagogical practices in Iran – something that had been engrained 
in the Iranian education system since the early nineteenth century – and a greater 
appreciation of American teaching practices.19 At the same time, the USIS had expanded 
beyond Tehran. Encroaching on what was previously the British Council’s domain, the 
American agency had opened offices in Esfahan, Mashhad, Tabriz, Shiraz and 
Khorramshahr. From afar, British Council officials in London were ashamed that the USIS 
had taken its place in Iran. ‘Visitors, tourists and Iranians themselves relying on the USIS for 
                                               
17 Roger Stevens (British Ambassador, Iran) to Ian Jacob (BBC, Director General), 16 March 1957, 
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information on Western culture… this is embarrassing. We need to fill this lamentable gap 
without delay.’20 
Foreign Office figures, more broadly, had become increasingly concerned at the 
‘undue influence’ the US State Department and Embassy in Tehran possessed over the 
Iranian government and people. This had enabled them to shape and mould proceedings in 
the country to their own vision. Not only would this make it harder for Britain to influence 
Iranian affairs, but it could also lead to many in Iran turning against the US and the West. 
Annoyed that America loomed over their country, Iranian citizens could accuse them of 
distrusting Iran or of seeking to turn their nation into an American colony.21 Foreign Office 
figures were convinced that it was only through forging a British alternative to US cultural 
diplomacy that these events would not occur. UK programmes and initiatives in this field 
would dilute the omnipotence of the American equivalent, alleviating the prospect of a 
popular Iranian backlash.22 However, the Foreign Office and the UK Embassy in Tehran 
were loath to raise these concerns with their American counterparts. Despite the importance 
both countries placed on Iranian geopolitical stability, the US government were contributing 
far more to Iran in terms of finance and personnel than the Foreign Office were capable of 
doing. British officials did not, accordingly, want to appear overly critical or jealous and they 
did not want to be shut out of the shaping of US policy in Iran.23 
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Still, Foreign Office figures remained convinced that the most effective way to 
compete with US cultural diplomacy in Iran was to plug the gaps left by their American 
counterparts. Even with the USIS’ comprehensive educational initiatives, the Foreign Office 
maintained that ‘there was plenty of room for us.’24 Due to Britain’s comparative lack of 
resources, officials in its Cultural Relations Department asserted that this was the only way 
to match the USIS’ comprehensive programmes and initiatives in the country. In adopting 
this approach, the Foreign Office would not be crowded out in Iran by American competition. 
While the Cultural Relations Department’s aims remained the same, the means by which to 
achieve these objectives were adjusted. Its officials shelved the use of the BBC Persian 
Service as a tool to foster UK-Iran cultural ties, leaving the broadcaster to function 
independently with minimal interference. From September 1954, they instead turned to the 
British Council, solely relying on the agency as the main conduit for British cultural 
diplomacy in Iran until the end of the decade.25  
The Cultural Relations Department was not alone in seeing the potential of the British 
Council’s reinstatement in Iran for Anglo-Iranian cultural relations. From January 1954, the 
UK Ambassador in Iran had pushed for the institution’s return. The country, according to 
Stevens, was undergoing a process of socio-economic development. As well as the 
modernisation of Iran’s infrastructure, the Iranian government sought to enhance their 
population’s technical knowledge and critical thinking by widening access to education. The 
USIS had already provided significant assistance with this. Its exchange programme had 
offered educational, commercial and cultural trips to the US for a whole host of Iranian 
business and political figures. Complementing this, the State Department sponsored Point 
Four initiatives sought to educate ordinary Iranians on, among other things, agricultural 
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practices, engineering processes and the running of hospitals. Iran’s government now 
expected the UK to also assist with its modernisation initiatives. A failure to comply could 
potentially anger the Shah and his government, resulting in Britain being ‘cut out’ of Iran 
altogether.26  
Indeed, many in the Iranian government were increasingly willing to engage culturally 
with Britain. The resolution of the 1951-53 Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis enhanced the Shah’s 
position. It granted him the authority to purge his government and civil service of nationalists 
opposed to British involvement in Iranian affairs. The Shah’s allies, in particular figures that 
possessed similar political views to the Iranian monarch, had replaced these individuals. 
They were much more pro-Western, less Anglophobic and therefore more amenable to 
dealings with Britain.27 In telegrams to the Foreign Office in London, Embassy figures in 
Tehran noted how this new generation of Iranian government officials placed a great value 
on the UK’s education system. Despite considerable American involvement in the field of 
English language teaching, there was a ‘widespread preference’ for the British equivalent. 
Many Iranians deemed qualifications from Britain as more academically rigorous and 
prestigious, while those from the US were seen to be more straightforward to obtain.28 
The Foreign Office and the Embassy judged the British Council to be the institution 
best placed to satisfy Iranian demands for British English language teaching and 
qualifications. Convinced that the institution should have returned to Iran in the wake of the 
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Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis’ resolution, Embassy and Foreign Office figures argued that this 
should be a ‘high priority.’29 The provision of English language teaching, crucially, was the 
British Council’s specialist function. Yet Foreign Office and Embassy officials envisaged that 
the agency would use this as a platform to achieve broader British diplomatic goals in Iran. 
Through the teaching of English, the institution’s staff could promote Britain’s culture, values 
and way of life to Iranian students, fostering a greater mutual understanding. Improved 
popular perceptions of the UK in Iran, Embassy officials claimed, would lead to ‘greater 
collaboration in all fields.’ It would prompt Iranian businesses to deal more with their British 
counterparts, while also encouraging more of Iran’s students to attend UK universities.30 
Moreover, in spite of being openly accountable to the Foreign Office, the British Council 
conveyed the impression of being independent and politically neutral. As the Embassy’s 
Information Department’s failed attempts to promote Britain in Iran illustrated, many Iranians 
distrusted cultural initiatives devised and promoted by the UK government. The British 
Council, conversely, would be better placed to promote Britain in Iran. Most Iranians would 
be much more amenable towards its programmes, deeming the institution politically neutral 
and ‘not an instrument of politics and propaganda.’31 
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Concurring with the Foreign Office and the UK Embassy in Tehran, the British 
Council sought to return to Iran as soon as possible. Derek Traversi, the agency’s Chief 
Representative in the country from 1955 to 1958, argued that the British Council could play a 
vital role in Iran’s transition from a neutral state to an Anglo-American Cold War ally. While a 
novice to Iran and the Middle East more generally, Traversi was well travelled by the time he 
arrived in Tehran in 1955. Born to an Italian father and a Welsh mother, he had spent much 
of his youth in Milan, moving with his parents to London in 1922 at the outset of Benito 
Mussolini’s fascist regime. While in the UK, Traversi obtained an English language and 
literature degree from the University of Oxford, where he excelled as a scholar in the works 
of William Shakespeare. A career in academia beckoned, yet Traversi chose a more 
unconventional pathway into the profession. Rather than take a university position, he 
instead obtained posts in the British Institutes in Rome and Madrid, followed by a British 
Council position in Chile.32  
With each posting, Traversi sought to ingratiate himself in local customs and society. 
He had some specific observations about Iran’s people from his time there. Many Iranians, 
he noted, were inclined towards isolationism, wary of engaging with Western powers. They 
were unhappy with Iran’s shift towards the UK and US in the Cold War, suspecting that both 
countries’ governments merely sought to use Iran to further their own interests. By 
immersing the country’s people in Britain’s culture, values and way of life, the British Council 
could challenge these negative perceptions of the UK and its government in Iran.33 Equally 
pressing for the institution was the need to stem the flow of Iranian children boarding at UK 
schools. Convinced of the prestige and value of British public-school education, an 
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increasing number of middle and upper-class Iranian parents were sending their offspring to 
be educated in Britain. This phenomenon, the British Council claimed, was self-defeating. 
Many of these children had unhappy experiences in the UK, suffering from homesickness 
and the shock of living in a country alien to their own. It was only through the British 
Council’s return to Iran that this worrying trend could be reversed. The provision of UK-style 
education and qualifications within their borders would disincline Iranians from sending their 
children to be educated in Britain. They could instead be immersed in British culture and 
values in their home environment.34 
 
The British Council and the Anglo-Iranian Cultural Convention: Promoting UK 
Cultures, Values and Societal Progress in Iran 
 
From their 1955 return, the British Council’s approach to fostering Anglo-Iranian cultural ties 
differed from the tactics they employed prior to their 1952 departure. Previously, the 
institution had ‘tried to satisfy everyone.’ Staff had offered a range of English language 
courses according to students’ abilities and requirements, as well as catering for all social 
demographics. They shifted away from this approach for three reasons. First, the British 
Council lacked the money to effectively pursue this policy. Second, the approach had also 
failed to distinguish between friends and enemies of Britain in Iran. Leading British Council 
figures in both London and the Middle East argued that the institution’s support should be 
used as a reward for supporting and siding with Britain.35 Third, the British Council thought 
their initiatives would be much more effective if they plugged the gaps left by the USIS. They 
paid particular attention to boosting ties with prominent individuals, notably those who had 
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made the ‘biggest contribution’ to Iranian society or who would ‘one day matter.’36 This 
included government officials, cultural figures, business leaders, civil servants and teachers. 
Traversi judged that the best way of engaging with these types of individuals was through 
English language teaching. Many would possess an advanced knowledge of the English 
language anyway, while others would be in occupations where they would require a better 
grasp of the language for professional reasons.37 Complementing this English language 
teaching would be concerts, exhibits, plays and book readings that showcased British 
culture. These figures would subsequently use their privileged position in society to 
disseminate their newfound positive perception of Britain to the wider Iranian populace.38 
The Foreign Office’s Press Section and Cultural Relations Department approved of 
this approach. Aiming for the agency’s Tehran office to reopen in early 1955, they asked the 
Iranian Ministry of Education and the University of Tehran to formally invite the British 
Council back to Iran.39 Concurrently, the Cultural Relations Department and the Press 
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Section also pushed the Treasury to provide significant financial backing to the British 
Council in Iran. Citing Iran’s geostrategic importance to wider UK foreign policy goals, they 
argued that the agency’s Tehran office should have an annual budget of £30,000. Such an 
amount was significantly higher than the funds provided to British Council institutions in 
Turkey and the Arab world.40 While agreeing with the Foreign Office that Iran was integral to 
the UK’s diplomatic goals, the Treasury claimed that they could not provide such a 
significant amount of money to the British Council’s Tehran office. Not only was it financially 
unsustainable, but it could also set a dangerous precedent with other British Council offices 
in geopolitically important countries requesting similar amounts. Circumventing these issues, 
the Treasury agreed to give the British Council in Iran a significant £10,000 per annum.41 To 
avoid accusations of unfavourable treatment, the government department linked this to the 
British Council’s wider expansion in the Middle East. The rising Arab nationalist threat, as 
well as a need to counter the budget cuts of the early 1950s, had compelled the British 
Council to try and bolster its Middle Eastern presence. There had been an increase in 
finance and staff levels allocated to the British Council’s Iraqi and Egyptian offices, as well 
as a rise in the number of scholarships offered to students residing in the Near East and 
Arab world.42 
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The British Council reopened its Tehran office in February 1955. From its return, the 
agency sought to compete with American English language teaching by providing a more 
elitist alternative. Counteracting the UK Foreign Office’s wishes, the British Council focused 
solely on teaching the English language to Iranians, doing little to promote the British way of 
life in the country. Unlike their USIS counterparts, the UK agency did not organise any 
exhibits or establish a sustained, comprehensive exchange programme. Writing in 1962, 
reflecting on his time as head of the British Council’s activities in Iran for most of the 1950s, 
Traversi attempted to justify the agency’s approach. Due to budget and personnel 
shortages, the direct teaching of Iranian students was one of the only effective means by 
which the British Council could promote Britain’s culture and values in Iran. They did not 
possess the resources to compete or match the USIS’ efforts in fostering, among other 
things, a university exchange programme or a culture of extra-curricular activities among 
secondary school students. There was no room, moreover, for the British Council in the 
promotion of Iran’s socio-economic development. According to Traversi, the USIS had left 
no gaps for the agency to fill. There was also no UK government alternative to the Point 
Four programme for the British Council to exploit or promote.43  
English language teaching, then, was one of the few means by which the British 
Council could match or compete with their American counterparts. To ensure it received 
well-connected students, who either possessed an advanced knowledge of English or 
needed to learn the language for professional reasons, the British Council made all 
applicants sit for an admissions exam. They justified the setting of this assessment on the 
unprecedented demand for the agency’s services. On the office’s opening day, a 3000-long 
queue had developed outside the centre, with the police called to maintain order.44 With two 
British Council staff and a £10,000 budget, the agency claimed that they did not have the 
resources to cater for this many Iranians. The initial cohort of 750 students consisted of 
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higher ability pupils. Yet those who were not of the required standard but possessed social 
and familial ties to the Shah and the Iranian government were accepted on to the course.45 
All students were required to sit for the Cambridge Certificate in Advanced English. To make 
their offerings appear more academically rigorous than equivalent American qualifications, 
the syllabus and exams had been set by the University of Cambridge. British Council 
officials envisaged that the prestige of this qualification’s ties to this renowned higher 
education institution would deter prospective students from taking similar USIS courses.46 
Complementing the Cambridge Certificate in Advanced English was the British 
Council in Iran’s cultural activities. These supplemented the agency’s teaching courses. 
They were used to not only improve students’ language skills and aid with their professional 
development, but to also immerse pupils in British culture. The Tehran office showed 
numerous films and documentaries. These were mainly technical, aimed at the British 
Council’s English language students who needed the Cambridge qualification to pursue 
higher education in the UK. As many of these pupils were aspiring medics and engineers, 
films and documentaries were accordingly aimed at these individuals. These included 
showings of programmes that explored the workings of UK hospitals, British engineering 
feats and farming practices.47 Alongside this, British Council officials invited prominent 
figures from the UK to give talks to their students. Many of these lectures aimed to foster a 
greater Anglo-Iranian cultural understanding. Speakers included Valery Hovenden, a 
theatrical actor, director and tutor at the Royal Academy of Dramatic Art, as well as 
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Laurence Lockhart, an Iran expert from the University of Oxford’s Persian Studies 
Department.48 
Within two to three years of reopening their Tehran office, the British Council aimed 
to reassert their presence in other major Iranian cities. Prior to their 1952 departure, the 
agency also had sites in the cities of Esfahan, Mashhad, Tabriz, Shiraz and Rasht.49 As with 
their centre in Iran’s capital, the other offices in the country would focus on English language 
teaching. A year after the British Council’s return, the then Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, 
claimed that he had received written correspondence from the Iranian Education Ministry. 
These letters had urged him to use his ministerial position to compel the British Council to 
reopen its offices in Iran’s provincial cities.50 As the reopening of the agency’s offices outside 
of Tehran had been a long-term goal, both the UK Embassy and the British Council 
exploited this development. They had frequently pushed the Foreign Office to get the 
Treasury’s approval for funds for this, even if the budget could only stretch to one officer 
stationed in each centre.51 Embassy and British Council officials envisioned the agency’s 
activities and officers ‘forming the bulk’ of UK diplomatic representation outside Tehran. 
Khorramshahr, a geopolitically unstable city near the Iraqi border with a large Arab 
population, aside, they did not see the need for UK consulates in Iran’s provincial cities. 
Embassy officials were convinced that British Council centres would be more useful and 
better received by the local population. Consulates, they claimed, would be regarded with 
suspicion, an ‘instrument of the UK state.’ Their presence would therefore not help to 
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improve Anglo-Iranian relations, cultural or otherwise. In contrast, with its English language 
teaching and propensity for organising cultural exhibitions, those residing in Iran’s provinces 
would view the British Council as having ‘something important to offer.’52 
The UK Embassy in Iran prioritised the reopening of the Esfahan, Shiraz and Tabriz 
centres. Its officials were nonplussed about re-establishing the British Council’s presence in 
Rasht and Mashhad. The former was situated in the north, a coastal city on the Caspian Sea 
far removed from the rest of Iran. The latter was a religious city in the east, deemed to 
possess little economic or political value.53 Esfahan, in comparison, was a culturally 
significant city, second only in size to Tehran. Once the country’s capital, the Anglican 
Church had enjoyed a significant presence there since the eighteenth century. British 
Council officials hoped that this would boost the potential and reach of its cultural activities.54 
Shiraz, similarly, was deemed to have an equally strong cultural and historical heritage. As it 
was one of the only Iranian cities outside of Tehran with a university and medical school, 
British Council officials judged it to be ‘much more progressive and advanced’ than Iran’s 
other provincial cities. It was, however, the re-establishing of the British Council centre in 
Tabriz that was the highest priority. The capital of the north-Western Iranian province of 
Azerbaijan, the city was close to the Soviet border. Both Embassy and British Council 
officials argued that the city’s 300,000 population were susceptible to Communist subversion 
and influence. Tabriz was isolated geographically, but also culturally and linguistically. The 
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majority of its people were Azeri, not Iranian, and unlike the rest of Iran, Farsi was not widely 
spoken here. The city was also soon to be a major station on the Istanbul-Karachi railway 
line proposed by Baghdad Pact signatories, with a university on the cusp of expansion.55  
Due to budget constraints, the UK Embassy in Tehran’s initial plan was to approve 
the opening of British Council centres in Tabriz and one of Esfahan and Shiraz. A full-time 
staff member, supported by someone on a part time contract, would operate both these 
centres.56 Yet the Foreign Office’s Political Relations Department deemed it ‘extremely 
important’ that all three British Council centres should open in Iran. To ease the financial 
burden, they successfully pushed for this to occur over several fiscal years. The Tabriz 
centre opened in January 1957, with the Esfahan and Shiraz offices following in February 
1958 and 1959 respectively.57 Figures from the Foreign Office’s Political Relations 
Department argued that not doing this would be ‘highly unsatisfactory.’ The city without an 
office would get upset – not least because of a historical cultural rivalry between Esfahan 
and Shiraz – but it could also potentially hamper Anglo-Iranian relations. Thanks to the 
Baghdad Pact, Iran was now a vital UK ally. With the growing prevalence of the anti-British 
Arab nationalist movement in Egypt, Iraq and Syria, the Shah was one of the only few 
leaders in the region with a friendly stance towards Britain. It was therefore imperative for 
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British diplomats and officials to compensate for this Anglo-Arab rift by ‘redoubling efforts 
with Iran.’58 
Through establishing centres in Tehran and other major Iranian cities, the British 
Council sought to Anglicise Iran’s education system. Ties with the Ministry of Education were 
pivotal here. The agency’s figures invited officials from the Iranian government department, 
as well as schoolteachers deemed supportive of the Shah’s regime, to visit the UK and look 
at the British school system. Impressed with the teaching methods and intellectual rigour of 
the students, Council officials hoped that these individuals would seek to implement similar 
practices and policies on their return to Iran. One such visit involved the Head of the Ministry 
of Education, Ali Mehran. Arriving in the UK for a four-week visit between April and May 
1958, British Council officials in London gave him a tour of various schools and universities. 
Throughout this expedition, figures from the agency invited various senior officials from the 
UK Ministry of Education to provide him with assistance and advice.59  
Moreover, the British Council aimed to make British English, as opposed to the 
American conception peddled by the USIS, Iran’s main second language.60 Seeking to 
achieve this from within the system, the British Council helped organise residential crash 
courses in the summer vacation period for Iranian teachers of the English language. They 
successfully managed to receive support and funding for this from Iran’s Ministry of 
Education. In meetings with their Iranian counterparts, British Council officials justified these 
sessions on the grounds of a shortage of qualified teachers and the supposed low standard 
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of English teaching.61 The first summer school was organised for 20-26 June 1957. Taking 
place in Tehran, it involved 68 teachers from across the country. Daily sessions included a 
four-hour intensive language class, followed by specialist lectures given by British Council 
staff, play-readings and wider class discussions. The aim of the latter was to encourage 
dialogue and debate about the state of English language teaching in Iran. Council officials 
aimed to dissuade teachers from using the ‘direct method’ with their students, teaching 
English by speaking only in this language with no emphasis on spelling and grammar. The 
British Council in Iran were convinced that teaching the more technical aspects of English 
was crucial to students’ understanding of the language. They deemed it imperative that 
spelling and grammar should be a pivotal tenet of the English syllabus in Iran.62  
Further summer schools were held in Esfahan and Shiraz in 1958 and 1959 
respectively. The success of these crash courses compelled Iran’s Ministry of Education to 
collaborate further with the British Council, specifically in the new, emerging field of 
educational television. Capitalising on the apparent success of the BBC Persian Service’s 
English by Radio, the Iranian government department wanted the UK agency to produce a 
similar programme for terrestrial television. In June 1958, the Shah had established TVI, the 
country’s first terrestrial channel. The broadcaster’s newly installed executives had 
immediately petitioned the Ministry of Education for ‘educational yet entertaining 
programmes’ broadcast twice weekly that taught viewers. As television usage had increased 
exponentially in Iran since the beginning of the 1950s, they desired, in particular, a twice-
weekly primetime show that instructed viewers on the English language. Recommending the 
British Council to undertake this activity on their behalf, Education Ministry officials claimed 
that the UK agency had the means, resources and willingness to do this.63 
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British Council officials in Iran concurred with the Ministry of Education’s views. While 
they maintained that such a programme would not be an effective teaching tool, the show 
could be used as a vehicle to showcase and promote the UK in Iran.64 Again, they aimed to 
plug a gap left by the Americans. The use of television as a pedagogical and soft power tool 
was something the USIS had not pursued in Iran. Teaching English by television, British 
Council officials were convinced that they could promote UK accents and spellings, helping 
to ensure that these dominated over American equivalents.65 More broadly, senior British 
Council figures in London argued that the programme provided a ‘unique opportunity’ for the 
agency. It was the first project of its kind for the British Council. Not only did this initiative 
have the potential to build ties between the agency and Iranian television broadcasters, but it 
could also be used as an experiment. Should the programme be a resounding success, its 
programming and production could be amended and rolled out to other countries.66 
With these considerations in mind, British Council officials in both London and 
Tehran proceeded to develop the programme. Entitled English by Television, they aimed for 
it to be broadcast twice a week. Appealing to both adults and children, the first part of the 
programme targeted beginners, with elementary teaching sessions. The second half focused 
on more conversational and fluent speakers. It was often composed of short 12-15-minute 
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films that showcased life in the UK, introducing new vocabulary to viewers in the process.67 
From the outset, British Council officials in Iran were beset with budgetary problems. Prior to 
the transmission of the first episode, staff salaries and the cost of promoting the programme 
had forced the agency to take money away from the British Council’s Turkey offices.68 They 
did not feel that they were in a position to request financial assistance from the Iranian 
government, either. British Council officials suspected that this would antagonise Ministry of 
Education officials, compelling them to turn to the Americans, who could offer a similar 
programme for free.69 Compounding this was the BBC’s unwillingness to assist the agency 
with this television programme. English by Television was not received well by the 
broadcaster, who claimed that the British Council had ‘invaded their territory.’70 With the 
BBC refusing to provide technical advice and assistance, the British Council in Iran were 
forced to rely on their own staff and contacts, many of which had little-to-no prior experience 
of working in television.71 
Yet figures from both the UK Embassy in Tehran and the Foreign Office’s Press 
Section were nonetheless enthusiastic at the prospect of broadcasting an English language-
teaching programme to Iranian viewers. Despite the meagre resources at their disposal, 
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both pledged to assist the British Council in ‘any way they can.’72 The Embassy approached 
officials they deemed best suited to write, produce and present English by Television on the 
British Council’s behalf. Due to his previous experience working on a similar show in West 
Germany, they employed a visiting UK English Literature lecturer at the University of Tehran, 
Allan Grant, to produce the programme. Professor John Mills, likewise, was employed to 
present English by Television and work on devising scripts. He was an English Language 
lecturer about to spend a year at the University of Shiraz.73  
While the Embassy focused on securing staff, the Foreign Office’s Press Section 
paid attention to the content of English by Television episodes. They were determined to 
make this programme ‘as attractive as possible’ despite its comparatively low budget of 
£5000 per annum for a television show. Episodes should emphasise and extol the virtues of 
life in the UK, especially in London, as this is what most Iranians would be most familiar with. 
In this vein, English by Television’s titles and credits should therefore showcase Britain’s 
capital city.74 Both of these displayed stills of Westminster Bridge, the Houses of Parliament, 
Westminster Abbey, Buckingham Palace, a stereotypical London police officer, and a 
London bus driving across Piccadilly Circus.75 
Starting on 4 October 1958, one day after TVI began transmitting to the public, 
English by Television was shown on Saturday and Tuesday evenings from 7.30-8pm.76 The 
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first series ran for 9 months, until June 1959. There was then a three-month hiatus where 
TVI would show reruns of the most popular episodes, followed by the airing of the second 
series from September 1959. The break was used as an opportunity by English by 
Television staff to plan, write and produce more episodes.77 These would usually discuss 
grammatical rules, structure and intricacies of the English language. Programmes would be 
dedicated to tenses, vowels, consonants and the difficult th sound, with diagrams and visual 
cues used to assist viewers with this.78 To showcase British norms, cultures, values and way 
of life, each English by Television would have a particular theme. There were editions 
dedicated to the works and life of both William Shakespeare and Charles Dickens, as well as 
programmes centred on life in Wales and Scotland and Northern Ireland.79 
To cement the British Council’s activities in Iran, the Foreign Office sought to 
formalise Anglo-Iranian cultural relations through the signing of a cultural convention. This 
agreement would pledge both countries to undertake cultural, scientific and educational 
exchanges, as well as organise exhibitions, concerts and shows. Arranging all of this would 
be an Anglo-Iranian ‘special commission.’ Meeting bi-annually – once a year in each country 
- this would be comprised of high-level government and cultural officials.80 The agreement 
was signed at the Iranian Embassy in London on 6 May 1959, during the Shah’s state visit to 
the UK. The signatories included the Iranian monarch, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, 
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Iran’s then Prime Minister Manoucher Eqbal and the then Iranian Ambassador to the UK, 
Hossein Ghods-Nakhai.81 
The impetus to sign such a bilateral cultural convention initially came from the Iranian 
government. Officials from the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially approached their 
counterparts in the UK Foreign Office to request that such an agreement should be devised, 
negotiated and signed. It formed part of their broader efforts to arrange similar pacts with 
other countries. By 1958, Iran had already reached agreements with, among others, India, 
Brazil and Japan. Iranian officials were also in the process of negotiating agreements with 
Sweden and Spain.82 The British Embassy in Iran urged the Foreign Office to agree to the 
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ request. Iran had already signed similar agreements with 
other ‘free world’ nations and as a Baghdad Pact ally it would be ‘politically invidious if 
Britain did not follow suit.’83 Officials from the Foreign Office’s Political Relations and Eastern 
departments, however, were convinced that an Anglo-Iranian Cultural Convention would not 
have any benefits for UK-Iran cultural ties in practice. The British Council played a prominent 
role in Iran anyway and there was no need to formalise this. Such conventions were only 
needed to ratify cultural initiatives that were in the planning stages.84 These agreements 
therefore did little to improve Anglo-Iranian Cultural Relations.’85 
                                               
81 Minute from Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Secretary), 14 May 1959, TNA, FO 924/1235. 
82 Geoffrey Harrison (British Ambassador, Iran) to Anthony Haigh (Foreign Office, Cultural Relations 
Department), 17 November 1958, TNA, FO 924/1235.  
83 George Hillier British Embassy, Tehran) to David West (Foreign Office, Cultural Relations 
Department), 5 September 1958, TNA, FO 924/1235; British Council Overseas Controller B 
(Controller for Asia, Africa and South America) to Greg Warr (Foreign Office, Eastern Department), 11 
November 1958, TNA, FO 924/1235. 
84 Greg Warr (Foreign Office, Eastern Department) to George Hillier (British Embassy, Tehran), 3 
September 1958, TNA, FO 924/1235.  
85 David West (Foreign Office, Cultural Relations Department) to George Hillier (British Embassy, 
Tehran), 3 September 1958, TNA, FO 924/1235.  
  243 
Yet both departments, as well as British Council and Embassy figures in Tehran, 
conceded that an Anglo-Iranian Cultural Convention would be politically beneficial. Since 
1955, the British Council’s presence in Iran had exponentially increased. Such an agreement 
would make it much more difficult for the agency to leave Iran again.86 Likewise, the signing 
of the Anglo-Iranian Cultural Convention would help the British government with their wider 
aim of improving UK-Iran relations at all levels. The commission would bring together high-
ranking political and cultural figures from both countries, boosting elite-level links.87 The 
Convention, in particular, would appease the Shah. Since his 1942 coronation, the monarch 
had placed a great importance on cultural matters as a means of promoting national unity 
and Iran abroad. As well as ‘getting one over the Americans’ – who the Iranians had not 
approached to sign a similar agreement – the proposed pact gave the Foreign Office the 
opportunity to help shape Iranian nationalism. Signing the Anglo-Iranian Cultural Convention 
would make the Iranians feel like ‘partners’ with Britain. This would improve popular 
perceptions of the UK in the country, while also ensuring geopolitical stability, making it less 
likely in the near future that the Shah would accept Soviet support.88 
 
The State Department and the USIS’ Response to British Cultural Diplomacy in Iran 
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From the 1953 expansion of US cultural diplomacy in Iran, the USIS were wary of British 
initiatives in this field. Not only did they fear that they would diminish America’s newly found 
prominent role and influence in Iran, but they could also antagonise the Iranian public and 
destabilise the regime. Many in the country still resented the British government for its 
historical meddling in Iran. Should the UK become an influential force in Iran again, USIS 
figures were convinced that this would compel many Iranians to turn towards Soviet-inspired 
Communism.89 Yet to USIS figures, it was imperative that both countries maintained the 
mirage of a united front to the Iranians and the Soviet Union. If they became aware of any 
Anglo-American divisions, USIS figures suspected that the Shah and his allies would exploit 
these tensions. To exploit the two Western powers, Iran’s elite would play both countries off 
against each other. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, could use the rivalry within the 
‘special relationship’ to drive a wedge between the Cold War allies in the Middle East, 
undermining economic interests and regional stability in tandem. While the UK placed a 
great value on the region as an oil source, the US was more focused on preventing Middle 
Eastern nations from succumbing to Communism.90 
With regards to cultural diplomacy in Iran, therefore, the USIS in Iran sought to 
negate the effect of Britain’s initiatives. From the British Council’s 1955 reopening of its 
Tehran office, figures from the American agency sought to counteract the UK institute’s 
attempts to mould and shape the Iranian education system. In discussions with their USIS 
counterparts, the British Council had claimed that they did not want to compete with them. 
They maintained that their cultural diplomacy efforts in Iran now operated on a similar level 
to those of France and West Germany. While both these European nations had focused on 
the promotion of their respective fashions and music, the British Council, from its 1955 
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return, had confined itself to the teaching of the English language. This paled in comparison 
to their activities from its 1934 arrival to its 1952 departure.91 
Regardless, the USIS still feared that the British Council’s return to Iran was 
motivated by the UK Foreign Office’s determination to supplant American cultural diplomacy 
in the country. Despite claims to the contrary, the USIS suspected the UK agency of seeking 
to encroach on their territory. It was charging the same price as the American institute for 
English language teaching. The British Council was also offering more advanced and 
prestigious qualifications, such as the Cambridge Certificate, that the USIS was unable to 
match and provide. Having seen a reduction in their average class size in Tehran from 90 to 
25 from the British Council’s return, the USIS conceded that the UK agency possessed 
‘excellent personnel with even better ideas.’ Compounding this was their fear of what would 
happen to their English language teaching initiatives when the British Council expanded. As 
well as seeking to reopen its offices in some of Iran’s other main cities, it was also looking to 
develop its Tehran centre, catering for up to 800 students at any one time.92 The British 
Council’s return was ‘unhelpful yet stimulating’ for the USIS in Iran. As illustrated by the 
significant reduction in the average class size, many Iranians would go to the British Council 
instead of the USIS and its affiliate, the Iran-America Society. At the same time, though, the 
American agency welcomed the competition, convinced it would prevent them from 
becoming complacent. Officials were now doubly determined to do their utmost to positively 
promote US values, cultures and lifestyles at the expense of the British equivalent.93  
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Originally, USIS figures in Iran adopted a tentative approach towards dealing with the 
British Council’s return to the country. They began by seeking to discourage the UK agency 
from expanding beyond Tehran. In November 1954, the USIS announced that it would close 
its libraries and reading rooms in the cities of Shiraz, Ahwaz, Kerman, Babolsar and 
Mashhad. The American agency’s decision here stemmed from their determination to 
prevent the British Council from using the presence of these American libraries as a 
precedent to open their own. USIS figures feared that if their UK counterparts re-established 
its activities outside Tehran that it would have a detrimental effect on the activities of the 
Iran-America Society in the provinces. As there was not enough space in many of these 
cities for both UK and US cultural institutions, there was a risk that the American bi-national 
centres would be ‘crowded out.’94 Cementing this further, officials from the US Embassy in 
Tehran, at the USIS’ behest, informed their British counterparts that Iranian laws would 
hinder UK cultural initiatives beyond Iran’s capital. During the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis, 
Mossagdeh had imposed legislation limiting foreign activities beyond Tehran. As these laws 
had supposedly not been repealed, USIS figures claimed that British cultural programmes 
would require tacit local and national government permission, which would take considerable 
time to be granted.95 
Such scaremongering by the USIS, however, proved ineffective. Questioning the 
legality of cultural activities by overseas agents beyond Tehran, officials from the British 
Council in Iran were informed that any such anti-foreign laws imposed by Mossagdeh had 
been repealed.96 These guarantees compelled the UK agency to re-open their Esfahan, 
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Shiraz and Tabriz offices.97 The USIS, accordingly, adopted a tougher stance towards 
dealing with the British Council. They made a concerted effort to nullify the UK agency’s 
attempts to engage with Iran’s older, more advanced students. Seeking to supersede the 
British Council’s efforts to influence the Iranian education system, the USIS sought to 
expand the provision of technical and vocational learning in Iran. The American agency 
focused their efforts on the Abadan Technical College. With a small intake of 110 students, it 
was a place of learning that specialised in engineering and technical drawing courses. The 
college was also in the vicinity of Iran’s oilfields, making it perfectly placed to ensure 
students’ future employment prospects.98 The USIS hoped to expand the institution, 
providing it with the financial means and equipment to cater for 650 pupils per annum. The 
American agency was also relying on the consortium of Western petroleum companies - 
especially the US-based Standard Oil of New Jersey - controlling Iran’s oil industry to 
subsidise the running of the college. In exchange for $500,000 over a five-year period, the 
USIS argued that they would have a steady supply of much-needed Iranian engineers.99 
Cementing the American influence over Abadan Technical College would be a board of 12 
governors appointed by the USIS to run the institution. Its officials aimed to appoint between 
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6 and 8 prominent US educational and cultural figures, along with 4 to 6 pro-Western 
Iranians.100  
The expansion and shaping of Abadan Technical College ‘along American lines’ was 
part of a broader effort to appease the Shah. To combat the shortage of technical skills in 
the country, the Iranian monarch had vociferously petitioned the USIS for an American-style 
college and university in Iran. With US support and assistance, he was confident that the 
institution could quickly gain significant prestige, shaping and influencing how people were 
taught across the whole region. Preceding the Shah’s reign there had been a US 
government endowed institution, Alborz College, in Mashhad. Despite being closed by the 
Iranian monarch’s father, Reza Khan, in 1940, many of the institute’s alumni now occupied 
prominent roles in business, politics and medicine in and around the city. Many of these 
individuals were much more enlightened, pro-Western and keen for Iran to develop, and the 
Shah regarded their US-style education as being the main determinant behind their 
viewpoint.101 Yet USIS officials in Iran also regarded the expansion and moulding of Abadan 
Technical College as a ‘strategic opportunity’ to undermine British cultural diplomacy in Iran. 
The college would act as an instrument of social mobility, empowering Iranians residing in 
Abadan to progress and improve. When the oil industry was under the control of the UK 
government-backed Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, those living in the region were deprived of 
technical and engineering training. British and overseas workers were instead instructed and 
employed in these roles. Many Iranians resented the UK government for this unfavourable 
treatment, arguing that this made them second-class citizens in their own region. Gifting 
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local people what they had been previously deprived of, then, would create considerable 
goodwill towards the US at Britain’s expense.102 
USIS officials in Iran, likewise, sought to counteract the British Council’s activities 
through working more extensively than before with the University of Tehran. Having seen the 
success of the USIS’ efforts to modernise the institution, the UK agency had made initial 
steps to establish links with the higher education institution’s Teacher Training College. It 
had offered to provide instructors and guest lectures to its students, immersing them in the 
British education system and teaching techniques.103 The USIS responded to this by working 
with the UK agency on an ‘informal, friendly, but official basis.’ In so doing, they hoped to get 
themselves in a position where they could peddle negative perceptions of Britain among 
Iranian students. The American agency would then seek to continue engaging with the 
University of Tehran on its own terms, fostering favourable views and goodwill towards the 
US in the process.104 USIS figures in Iran encouraged their British counterparts to provide a 
course on Public Relations and Journalism from 1957 onwards. Aimed at undergraduates, 
the course covered information activities as a whole. Students were expected to study, 
among other things, journalism theory, radio script writing, studio engineering, photography 
and motion pictures. While the USIS said they would assist, pledging to provide four 
teachers over two years, they insisted that the British Council take the lead on employing 
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teachers and shaping the syllabus. The American agency’s support ‘in spirit’ stemmed from 
its desire to dissociate itself from the initiative. The USIS sought to use the course’s blatant 
counter-subversive tone and content as a means of reminding and cementing the notion of 
‘perfidious Albion’ in Iranian peoples’ minds. It wanted to underline to Iran’s citizens that the 
British government still sought to influence and meddle in their country’s political affairs.105 
In promoting Britain’s culture, values and way of life in Iran, the British Council, 
clearly, played a subordinate role to the USIS in Iran. Despite this secondary role, the UK 
agency was successfully able to carve out a distinct space for itself, specifically in the field of 
English language teaching. In so doing, the British Council was able to implement policies 
and initiatives that its vastly better funded American counterpart, the USIS, was unwilling or 
unable to do. Its officials focused on educating proficient Iranian speakers in Tehran and 
other major Iranian cities, instructing Iranian teachers of the English language in modern 
pedagogical practices, and produced a bi-weekly educational programme, English by 
Television. Broadcast on the terrestrial TVI channel, the latter showcased British culture and 
taught viewers the basic fundamentals of the English language. This chapter, as well as 
preceding sections, has highlighted the numerous, vast and comprehensive soft power 
initiatives implemented by American and British policymakers between 1953 and 1960. All of 
these have sought to persuade and attract Iranians away from Communism and more 
towards their respective norms, values, cultures and ways of life. The following chapter will 
bring all of these key themes and arguments together, assessing the impact of these 
initiatives.
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Chapter VI: The Impact of American and British Soft Power in Iran 
 
‘The USIS is by far the largest foreign information programme in Iran, a fact which, in itself, 
constitutes a certain evidence of effectiveness.’1 
 
Roughly once per decade, USIA officials in Washington visited Iran to inspect the USIS’ 
operations in the country. The reviews provided them with the means to assess how 
effective the USIS had been in achieving their wider objectives in Iran, as well as the extent 
to which the agency had engaged with the Iranian government and citizenry at large. The 
quote at the top of the page was an excerpt taken from the USIA’s October 1959 inspection. 
The report was correct in asserting that the USIS was conducting the largest cultural 
diplomacy programme of any foreign power in Iran. Since August 1953, the agency had 
implemented a series of initiatives to contain and combat the Communist threat while also 
promoting the American way of life. 
As demonstrated in chapters II and III of this thesis, USIS officials collaborated 
extensively with their Iranian government counterparts in the Department of Press and 
Broadcasting (DPB) to achieve this goal. Its senior figures were responsible for running the 
state-run broadcaster Radio Tehran. Together with the DPB, the USIS helped form the 
Information Council. Composed of American and Iranian members, the advisory group 
strove to boost Radio Tehran’s capabilities. They approved the secondment of officials from 
the broadcaster to be sent to the US for training; organised the building of a new studio and 
transmitter to improve Radio Tehran’s reach and quality of programmes; and permitted the 
USIS to have a significant editorial say over the broadcaster’s programming. Promoting the 
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American way of life in Iran only emerged as a key USIS objective with the January 1955 
installation of Robert Payne as PAO. From his appointment, the agency worked increasingly 
with the Iranian higher education sector – most notably the University of Tehran – to shape 
the country’s education system. An exchange programme was put in place to encourage 
American and Iranian academics to visit Iran and the US respectively. Such endeavours, the 
USIS hoped, would encourage Iran’s universities to modernise. Beyond higher education, 
figures from the American agency implemented a series of initiatives to foster a culture of 
extra-curricular activities among the Iranian youth, while also promoting US and Iranian 
technical assistance programmes. With regards to the latter, the USIS aimed to showcase 
the United States’ willingness to improve and modernise Iran to the Iranian people. 
Second in size and scope to the USIS’ cultural diplomacy and propaganda initiatives 
in Iran was Britain’s soft power programme. Chapter IV focused specifically on the UK 
Foreign Office’s Information Research Department’s attempts to work with SAVAK, the 
Iranian secret and intelligence service, to produce and disseminate anti-Communist 
propaganda across Iran. Chapter V, on the other hand, highlighted how the British Council 
undertook the bulk of the UK’s cultural diplomacy in the country. After departing Iran in 
November 1952, the organisation reopened its Tehran office in February 1955. Budget 
constraints forced its officials to focus its English language teaching specifically on advanced 
speakers; those with governmental connections; and career people who needed to develop 
their language skills for professional reasons. In a bid to make UK English, as opposed to 
the American equivalent, Iran’s main second language, the British Council opened offices in 
Esfahan, Shiraz and Tabriz. Using their presence in these cities as a springboard, it helped 
organise residential crash courses in the summer vacation period for Iranian teachers of the 
English language. These sessions sought to shape the pedagogical approach taken by 
these educators, recommending modern teaching practices and the need to emphasise 
grammar and sentence structure in lessons. The success of these crash courses compelled 
Iran’s Ministry of Education to collaborate further with the British Council, specifically in the 
new, emerging field of educational television.  
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The aim of this chapter is to assess the impact of American and British soft power 
initiatives in Iran.2 It highlights how British and American diplomats and officials judged 
whether their nations’ respective cultural diplomacy and propaganda programmes were 
successful. In so doing it assesses how these views shaped subsequent UK and US soft 
power initiatives in the country. The chapter is divided into four sections. Tackling their two 
main aims in turn – namely the containment of Communism and the promotion of the 
American way of life - the first two cover the USIS and the USIA’s perceptions of American 
cultural diplomacy in Iran. The third and fourth sections consider the UK Foreign Office and 
British Council views on UK cultural diplomacy in Iran and the extent to which their initiatives 
matched those of their American counterparts. 
Both the USIS and the British Council were convinced that their initiatives had made 
some progress in enhancing their respective countries’ cultural and mutual understanding 
with Iran. While, however, their schemes were largely met well by Iranian government elites, 
it is difficult to decipher the reception they received among the Iranian public. Both agencies 
did not do enough to accurately engage popular views. Not only did the USIS and the British 
Council presume that the government’s perspectives were identical to the public’s, both 
bodies also encountered barriers to uncovering popular views. Crucially, the Shah of Iran, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, had outlawed the monitoring of audio and visual broadcasts by 
foreign powers. This impinged on the feedback the USIS and the British Council were able 
to receive on their work with Radio Tehran and English by Television respectively. Both 
agencies were therefore forced to rely on listener and viewer letters, an unrepresentative, 
self-selecting measure of gauging popular views. 
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The USIS’ initiatives were further constrained by the Iranian government’s actions. 
The Shah and his acolytes were happy to cooperate with the agency to protect the regime 
and contain the Communist threat. Yet they prevented the USIS from operating 
independently to achieve these objectives, suspecting the agency of seeking to destabilise 
the Iranian government. Throughout the 1950s, moreover, USIS activities were limited by its 
budget. As the decade drew to a close, congressional pressure, along with the whims of 
USIA figures in Washington, culminated in the USIS having its budget slashed. These 
austerity measures resulted in the agency’s officials in Iran reducing the scale and scope of 
initiatives that sought to promote the American way of life in Iran. The British Council’s 
activities, similarly, were beset by financial troubles, albeit on a worse scale than the USIS. It 
meant that limited scripts and poor production values plagued their flagship initiative, the 
broadcasting of the bi-weekly English by Television. Senior British Council figures in London 
rejected requests for money by the Tehran office to professionalise the programme and 
employ more staff. They deemed the initiative to not be in the organisation’s broader remit 
and called for the agency to stick to English language teaching and promoting British culture. 
Both of these objectives were also limited by the British Council’s low budget. It meant that 
the UK agency could not compete or match the initiatives undertaken by their American 
counterparts. From the British Council’s absence before 1955 and its smaller-scale return, 
the USIS was now the dominant Western exponent of cultural diplomacy in Iran.  
 
The USIA, USIS and the Containment of Communism in Iran 
 
Despite regarding their cultural diplomacy programme in Iran as being in its formative stage, 
USIA officials in Washington were convinced that the USIS had made considerable 
progress. The agency had played a substantial role in easing Iran’s transition from its ‘feudal 
and Islamic roots’ into the ‘modern world.’ Through the USIS’ initiatives, USIA figures 
maintained that they had helped ‘foster an understanding of American and Western 
objectives.’ In spite of the high levels of Soviet propaganda, and compared to its position 
  255 
several years previously, Iran had made a ‘remarkable comeback.’ Their activities in the 
country were supported by the regime’s willingness to engage with the US. Eager to receive 
American military and economic aid, as well as become the US’ key regional ally, the Iranian 
government were only too happy to assist the USIS with their activities.3 Officials from the 
American Embassy in Tehran concurred. In a telegram to the State Department, they argued 
that Iran’s increasingly pro-Western stance in the Cold War was down to the US engaging 
the Iranian public. Thanks to the USIS’ collaborative efforts with Radio Tehran, the country’s 
people were now more sceptical towards Tudeh propaganda, aware of its close links with 
the Soviet Union.4  
Arguably one of the USIS’ biggest successes was its work with Radio Tehran and its 
provincial satellite stations. According to a memo sent to Washington, each station by the 
late 1950s was carrying 136 hours of content produced or authorised by the agency per 
month on average.5 Complementing this was the increasing closeness and collusion 
between USIS and DPB officials. One such collaborative project was the show Fahrnabaz, a 
children’s programme set in Antiquity about an Iranian hero fighting the invading 
Macedonian forces led by Alexander the Great. In writing and producing Fahrnabaz, USIS 
and DPB figures aimed to promote Iranian national identity and independence, deterring the 
country’s youth from advocating Communist ideals.6 The USIS, though, had even greater 
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influence after the DPB’s 1959 restructuring of Iranian radio. Instead of focusing its efforts on 
Radio Tehran, the government department opted to give more prominence to provincial 
stations. These satellite broadcasters were no longer just in the larger cities of Esfahan, 
Mashhad and Shiraz, with stations increasingly established in smaller settlements such as 
Rasht, Resiah and Kerman. Compared to previously, the DPB provided greater autonomy to 
these satellite broadcasters to provide more specialised regional news programming. Per 
the Iranian government department’s recommendation, USIS-funded-or-produced shows 
complemented this local content. As well as programmes like Fahrnabaz, the American 
agency peddled programming that aimed to foster unfavourable views towards the Soviet 
Union and praised the Shah’s regime.7 
The DPB clearly enjoyed working with the USIS. In a letter from its head of 
department, Nosratollah Moinian, to the American agency’s Tehran office, the DPB chief 
praised the actions of his USIS counterparts. He claimed that the American organisation had 
‘directed the Iranian public towards a better life, furthering their desire for cooperation and 
progress.’8 Such views were supported by the observations made by the USIA’s inspection 
team. They noted how the DPB was relying extensively on USIS material to such an extent 
that it was difficult to distinguish between US and Iranian-produced content.9 Yet despite the 
USIA and Moinian’s praise, the USIS found it difficult to judge the impact of their initiatives. 
The Shah had outlawed the monitoring of all audio-visual content in Iran out of fear that this 
information could be used to influence and endanger his regime. As such, there was no 
effective, independent means for the USIS to gauge listener views or the popularity of its 
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programming. The agency, accordingly, turned to listener letters as a key performance 
indicator, despite the fact that correspondents’ views might not be representative of the 
wider listener base. The USIS’ attempts at accessing these, however, were blighted by the 
DPB. Despite repeated requests, the American agency was not permitted access to listener 
letters, with no explanation given for this policy. USIS officials were instead provided with 
selected letters and DPB assurances that correspondence praised USIS radio shows.10 One 
such example was a note congratulating producers on broadcasting Khosh-Ghadam Family. 
Broadcast bi-weekly, this was a comedy devised and produced with considerable USIS input 
and one, which the DPB claimed, received more fan mail than any other show. The letter in 
question stated that all of the writer’s family sit down to listen and that the programme acts 
as a template on how to live life.11 
The only survey the USIS was allowed to undertake regarding radio programming in 
Iran was a limited one on listening habits. This, though, was constrained by the fact that the 
agency was only permitted to ask visitors to the USIS libraries or Iran-America Society 
offices to participate. Out of 420 respondents – all literate, urban and middle class - 88% 
claimed that they only listen to Radio Tehran. Excluding respondents from the nation’s 
capital, this figure rose to 97%. Likewise, 67% claimed that they relied on Radio Tehran for 
news, with roughly a third of respondents stating that they relied on print journalism. More 
concerning for the USIS, though, was that only 28% claimed they regularly listened to the 
American agency’s programmes on Radio Tehran, compared to 83% who listen to DPB 
content. While a gulf here was to be expected – the USIS’ programming was much more 
highbrow – figures from the American agency were concerned that this gap was too high. 
Compounding these concerns was the survey’s focus on middle-class literate men who 
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attended USIS centres. Members of this societal group tended to be more pro-US anyway. 
Taken on a larger scale – with the incorporation of, among others, women and the working 
classes – it was more than likely that the USIS’ programming on Iranian radio was not 
particularly popular with society at large.12 
Outside of Iranian radio, however, the USIS found it difficult to promote the broader 
American foreign policy goal of containing Communism. In their 1959 inspection report, 
USIA figures had noted the absence of other initiatives to combat the threat of Soviet-
inspired Communism in Iran. Besides working with DPB, the showing of newsreels in Iranian 
cinemas nationwide was the only continuing operation undertaken by the USIS in Iran in this 
field. These promoted American progress, criticised Soviet policies and praised the Shah’s 
attempts at modernising Iran.13 Inspectors accordingly questioned the lack of policies to 
counter Communism in Iran that did not involve the Iranian government in some way. They 
bemoaned the lack of, among other things, a sustained, coordinated book translation 
programme, as well as a scarcity of mobile units touring the country with anti-Soviet 
materials and exhibits. Such initiatives had been cornerstones of America’s cultural 
diplomacy programme in 1952, the year of the last inspection. During this period, it had been 
the US Embassy, not the USIS, which had devised and presided over these initiatives. USIA 
inspectors dismissed the USIS’ claims that they did not have the budget to pursue these or 
similar policies. Instead, they deemed the agency’s officials in Iran unenthused by these 
initiatives or doubtful of their effectiveness.14  
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Despite USIA pressure to implement other longstanding initiatives to counter 
Communism in Iran, the USIS feared that such policies would antagonise Iranian 
government officials. Protesting to the USIA office in Washington, they argued that they 
could only implement such initiatives through collaborating with the Iranian government. On 
occasions when the USIS sought to work independently, they had been met with 
government opposition and accusations that they sought to undermine the regime. Such 
paranoia was a consequence of the August 1953 US-backed coup. As the Americans had 
worked clandestinely with the British to topple Mohammad Mossagdeh’s regime, current 
Iranian government officials, while largely pro-US, feared the same could happen to them.15 
Attempts to try and promote the Eisenhower Doctrine in Iran, for example, failed due to this 
paranoia. In January 1957, the then US President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, made a speech to 
Congress outlining the US’ approach to the Middle East. With the decline in Britain and 
France’s standing in the region in the wake of the Suez Crisis, combined with the Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s increasing prominence, Eisenhower was convinced that 
the US should take a bolder stance towards Middle Eastern proceedings. He feared that, 
with Britain’s and France’s shrinking regional presence after the 1956 Suez Crisis, Nasser’s 
pan-Arab ideals would spread across the Middle East. While maintaining Cold War 
neutrality, governments like Egypt’s that was ruled by an Arab nationalist would willingly 
accept considerable Soviet aid. In his speech, the US President pledged to provide 
American economic assistance and military support towards any governmental regime in the 
region that faced Communist or nationalist threats.16 
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The USIS in Iran were keen to promote the content of Eisenhower’s ideas, both to 
the government and the public. Due to the Shah’s vehement opposition to Communism, as 
well as the monarch’s growing ties with the US, the American agency was eager to publicise 
US support and assistance available to the country. Newsreels were produced and 
distributed to cinemas that promoted this message, while pamphlets were also published.17 
The Iranian government, however, halted the campaign. According to Qolam Abas Aram, 
the Director of Political Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Eisenhower Doctrine 
infringed upon the territorial sovereignty of Iran and its neighbours. Aram regarded the 
pledge as a means by which for the US to peddle American imperialism in the country. In a 
January 1957 meeting with USIS officials, he forbade the American agency from promoting 
the speech in Iran, despite their protestations that they only sought to contain Communism 
in the country.18 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, moreover, halted the USIS’ distribution of ‘freedom 
fighter’ posters that sought to tap into the global outcry over the Hungarian Uprising. 
Between October and November 1956, there was a domestic popular uprising against the 
Soviet-puppet government ruling the country. The USSR responded by sending in the army, 
crushing the revolt. The Soviet Union’s actions were condemned internationally and the 
USIS hoped to exploit this in Iran. The American agency’s officials invented characters 
involved in the uprising, giving them typical Hungarian names. They placed pictures and 
descriptions of these freedom fighters, most notably the ‘everyday hero’ Peter Szanto, in 
                                               
Yaqub, Containing Arab nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill, 
2004). 
17 USIS (Tehran) to the USIA (Washington), 12 January 1957, NAII, USIA papers, Iran, Telegram 
Messages (1952-1961). 
18 USIS (Tehran) to the USIA (Washington), 12 January 1957, NAII, USIA papers, Iran, Telegram 
Messages (1952-1961). 
  261 
window displays of bookstores across Tehran.19 On the premise that it would damage Iran’s 
relations with the Soviets and the Hungarians, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered the 
removal and disposal of all these displays. Despite USIS protestations, the Ministry informed 
the American agency that they could only pursue such anti-Communist initiatives in the 
confines of their own centre and library.20 
Iranian paranoia towards the USIS’ activities in Iran worsened after the February 
1958 arrest of Valiollah Qarani, the commander of the Iranian army’s intelligence staff. The 
military official had been detained for allegedly conspiring with the US to destabilise the 
Shah’s regime. On 22 January 1958, Qarani and his subordinates approached US Embassy 
officials in Tehran, as well as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his deputy William 
Rountree, who had stopped over in Iran during a tour of the Middle East. Qarani had called 
on the US to persuade the Shah to relax his authoritarian rule and encourage the Iranian 
parliament to undertake necessary socio-economic reforms that the monarch was refusing 
to implement. While vehemently pro-monarchist, Qarani was opposed to the cronyism and 
corruption blighting the Iranian government, deeming the modernisation of Iran the best way 
to combat this. He had passed information to CIA previously about the Shah’s rule, so as to 
encourage US to rein him in. On this occasion, though, Qarani had approached members of 
the American government in person with recommendations bolder than those he had 
proposed before.21 The Eisenhower administration was unsure about how to approach this 
development. As the Shah was sensitive to criticism anyway, they knew they could not 
approach him directly about this. White House officials also feared, irritated with what he 
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perceived as American pressure, that the Iranian monarch would adopt Cold War neutrality 
and accept Soviet aid. Overthrowing the Shah was not a feasible option since there was no 
credible Western alternative.22 
Regarding Qarani as a threat, SAVAK, the Iranian secret police and intelligence 
service, had been monitoring him. They arrested the military figure on 27 February 1958. 
Immediately after his incarceration, the Iranian press and parliament publicly accused the 
US of conspiring with Qarani. Aware that American officials shared his views, the affair 
made Iran’s government increasingly paranoid towards the United States. Indeed, as the 
1950s had progressed, figures within the Eisenhower administration and the State 
Department had objected to the Shah’s increasingly personalised regime. Their expectations 
of reform in Iran had not been achieved and they were appalled at the high levels of 
incompetence and corruption. White House officials had also become increasingly aware 
that many middle-class Iranians, an expanding demographic, were increasingly outspoken 
towards the Shah’s oppressive rule. Fear that his position could be placed in jeopardy meant 
the Iranian monarch had banned political opposition. Aware that the Tudeh could exploit this 
middle-class discontent and destabilise the country, the Eisenhower administration had 
lobbied the Shah to relax his authoritarian stance and impose reforms more rapidly. These 
calls, on the grounds it would destabilise the status quo enjoyed by the upper classes who 
supported the Shah, had gone unheeded.23 
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Despite having grown weary of the Shah’s approach to government, the USIS had 
distanced itself from the Qarani Affair for two reasons. First, the Iranian monarch’s constant 
changing of prime ministers irked officials from the American agency. Between 1953 and 
1960, the Shah had appointed and dismissed Fazlollah Zahedi, Hossein Ala and the former 
Chancellor of the University of Tehran, Manoucher Eqbal. As the USIS maintained in a June 
1955 report to their USIA superiors, the Iranian people had grown weary of the Shah’s 
shuffling of prime ministers. Such indecision and instability had therefore made it difficult for 
the USIS to try and foster favourable impressions of the regime’s competence to the Iranian 
people.24 Second, the USIA had previously reprimanded the agency for being too closely 
tied to the Iranian government. As surmised in its 1959 inspection report, senior figures in 
Washington had been opposed to the idea that the USIS should protect and bolster the 
regime, commenting frequently on this in telegrams to Tehran.25 The report had concluded 
that the Iranian government were ‘embarrassingly cooperative’, noting how the USIS were 
able to freely engage with government, military and business figures. Yet, they urged the 
USIS to find a middle ground between collaborating with the government and working 
independently. In other words, ‘engage with the regime, not maintain its power.’ Failure to do 
so could lead to an increasing number of Iranians disaffected with the Shah’s regime 
becoming increasingly opposed to the USIS’ presence in Iran, regarding the agency as a 
tool of the monarch.26 
In spite of having nothing to do with Qarani, his arrest and the fallout surrounding the 
incident damaged USIS relations with Iranian government officials at all levels, impeding 
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their activities. In Tabriz and the wider Azerbaijan province, for example, local government 
paranoia towards the agency’s activities increased immeasurably. In the period before, 
during and after the Qarani Affair, USIS officials in the region had been in the process of 
campaigning to appease the local Kurdish population. With the assistance of their 
counterparts in Tehran, they had produced an 18-minute film entitled Khaneh. The short was 
about a heroic fictional local Kurdish chief in a bid to foster regional and ethnic pride. The 
film’s release deliberately coincided with the Iranian military’s announcement that they were 
planning to build part of their northeastern defence line against the Soviets through Kurdish 
settlements. The movie, along with a series of posters promoting it, had been distributed in 
villages on or in the vicinity of this proposed defence line.27 However, the Governor General 
of Tabriz, Ibrahim Zand, objecting to the posters and the film, had banned them. Citing the 
Qarani affair when confronted about this by USIS officials, he claimed that both materials 
aimed to foster unrest in the local Kurdish population, culminating in protests that served to 
destabilise and remove the local government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran had 
also got involved, arguing that the US was deliberately promoting interests of a third country, 
Kurdistan, in Iran to break up the nation and weaken the Shah’s rule, something they had 
sought to do previously by cooperating with Qarani.28 
 
The USIA, USIS and the Promotion of the American Way of Life in Iran 
 
Beyond gauging government and media views on their activities, USIS officials in Iran did 
little to discover the reception of their initiatives among the general public. The agency’s 
officials possessed a largely homogenised view of Iran. They assumed that, if Iranian 
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political elites and their journalist counterparts - linked because of the former’s control over 
the media - liked USIS initiatives, the Iranian public would, too. There was no understanding 
of the various ethnic and societal groups living within Iran’s borders, their differing views on 
America, as well as their various motives and aspirations. Due to their superior living 
standards and access to education, those higher up the social order, in particular political 
elites and urban middle classes, held largely favourable views towards America anyway. 
They could afford consumer products and electrical items, an emerging, burgeoning market 
in 1950s Iran and elsewhere, and possessed a greater awareness and appreciation of 
cultures beyond their borders.  
As they were preaching to the converted, USIS policies to promote the American way 
of life in Iran were certainly received well by Iranians at an elite level. Indeed, Robert 
Payne’s determination to strengthen US-Iranian friendship in his role as the USIS’ PAO 
caught the attention of sections of the country’s media. The 28 June 1956 edition of the 
Francophile newspaper Farman, for example, wrote a piece profiling Payne and his work 
with the USIS. The article claimed that since Payne’s appointment in Iran… all sections of 
the USIS have been expanded.’ This had greatly contributed to ever-improving US-Iran 
relations, bringing the country into the free world.29 The Iranian government, likewise, 
frequently praised the ‘great part’ the USIS played in promoting America in Iran. Officials in 
particular commended the work of the Iran-America Society in teaching the English 
language, as well as their attempts to inform and promote the United States through their 
lessons, talks and lectures.30 
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The Embassy and the USIA, on the other hand, were increasingly concerned with the 
USIS’ increasing autonomy from America’s other diplomatic activities in Iran. The former 
accused Payne of freezing them out of initiatives. The Embassy’s frustration with this 
seeming disconnect from the USIS was exacerbated by the agency’s February 1957 move 
to new quarters on Tehran’s outskirts, a considerable distance from the Embassy’s city 
centre offices. Refuting these assertions to his USIA superiors in Washington, who the 
Embassy had complained to, Payne argued that the USIS needed greater autonomy to 
expand and thrive. Failure to permit this, he claimed, would result in many Iranians tying the 
USIS’ initiatives with interventionist American foreign policy.31 Both bodies, equally, were 
alarmed with Payne’s concentration of power in his role as PAO for Iran. The incumbent, as 
well as his predecessor Edward Wells, did not delegate enough tasks and responsibilities to 
their 23-strong staff, with both figures taking on too much work. Most of Payne and Wells’ 
subordinates were instead limited to their primary functions. The PAOs were disparaging of 
their staff’s capabilities, deeming their work sub-standard.32 
Despite these concerns, the USIA largely praised the USIS’ promotion of the 
American way of life in Iran, in particular their work to expand the exchange programme. 
Iranians with exposure to or experience with the scheme, USIA inspectors noted, had a 
‘favourable positive attitude’ towards it. More than that, though, the programme had 
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‘heightened US-Iran mutual understanding and enabled the shaping of Iranian society along 
American lines.’33 During Payne’s tenure as the USIS’ PAO for Iran, the exchange 
programme had expanded on an unprecedented scale. It was a one-way scheme in 1953, 
with only two American lecturers visiting Iran for six months and no visits from students or 
teachers. By the end of the decade this had increased to, on average, 10 lecturers and 6 
teachers visiting from the US for the whole academic year and 24 teachers and 19 students 
going from Iran to America for the same amount of time.34 USIA inspectors were also 
impressed with the returnee programme, established in 1957, to help Iranians returning from 
the US to utilise what they had learnt from their travels to better Iranian society. They were 
convinced it had the potential to be ‘exceedingly effective’, encouraging and fostering 
societal change in Iran long-term.35 The potential of these initiatives to further US-Iran 
mutual understanding compelled the State Department and the USIA to reinstate the 
Fulbright programme. This had been defunct since the height of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis 
in 1952. The initial scheme involved selecting key Iranian education figures to go to the US. 
While there, they would commence eight weeks of work studying contemporary pedagogical 
approaches, followed by a two-day evaluation.36 
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While the USIA largely praised the exchange programme in Iran, its inspectors 
recognised that the scheme possessed considerable flaws. Most US and Iranian grantees, 
they noted, were from the arts and humanities, with only a handful from a science and 
engineering background. They called on the USIS to redress this balance, fearing that a 
failure to do so would convey the impression to the Iranian people that the United States had 
a poor STEM tradition.37 More pressingly, the USIA’s inspectors were concerned with the 
number of US grantees who did not understand Farsi. This issue was not just confined to 
individuals on the exchange programme. The problem also afflicted 99% of Americans going 
to Iran and was endemic among the USIS’ staff. Aside from David Nalle, the PAO for 
Mashhad, no other official was able to speak the language. As illustrated by the plight of 
George Quinby, a drama lecturer grantee between 1956 and 1957, such deficiencies 
blighted US cultural initiatives. Due to his inability to speak Farsi, Quinby required a 
translator in his lectures and small group seminars. With two voices speaking at one time, 
students complained that classes were chaotic and confusing. Despite being aware of these 
and similar issues since the mid-1950s, the USIS had overlooked this problem. They had not 
placed grantees or their staff on courses, nor had they imposed a comprehension of Farsi as 
a prerequisite for working in Iran.38 
Likewise, many Iranians who had visited the US via this scheme did not share the 
American agency’s conviction that it was a success in its current guise. According to a 
January 1956 survey, 39% of the 284 respondents claimed that they needed longer in Iran 
to prepare for their American sojourn and wished they were invited to American homes more 
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often than they were. While the respondents near unanimously believed they learned and 
developed as people, half of those surveyed did not think their newfound experiences were 
valued or utilised effectively on their return to Iran. They had experienced no change in 
salary, any career progression, and their superiors never sought their advice.39 Iranian 
dissatisfaction with the USIS’ exchange programme was not just confined to grantees, 
either. Students of US lecturers on secondment in Iran often commented that their teachers 
lacked the appropriate equipment to do their jobs properly. In Quinby’s case, the drama 
grantee lacked the apparatus to run sessions on lighting, producing and directing. The 
failure here was commented on by 60% of respondents to a survey Quinby compiled and 
distributed to his students at the end of his time in Iran. It contributed to only 40% of 
Quinby’s students claiming that they now had a better understanding of America, US theatre 
and that what they had learnt would help bolster Iranian theatrical scene.40 
 Similar limitations were apparent with the USIS’ public relations work with the Plan 
Organisation. In aiming to promote Iran’s socio-economic development, Herbert Linneman, 
on secondment from the USIS, bemoaned how the Plan Organisation’s Information 
Department operated. He complained that members of its staff were unaware of the 
intricacies of public relations, possessing a flawed conception of how the profession 
operated. One such example was the department’s emphasis on providing stories to Kayhan 
and Ettelat, the two biggest newspapers in Iran, to the detriment of other media outlets. 
Ignoring Linneman’s protestations, the Plan Organisation refused to send information on 
projects to other, ‘less important’ publications, despite their combined readership 
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outnumbering that of Kayhan and Ettelat.41 More vexing for Linneman, though, was the 
Information Department staff’s refusal to undertake tasks given to them by their superiors, as 
well as their misguided conception of public relations. Instead of seeking to establish links 
with media figures, they offered cash bribes in return for favourable stories, to embellish 
articles or to shelve negative news. In spite of Linneman arguing that such a policy was 
immoral and expensive long-term, he was unable to halt this practice.42  
Linneman, moreover, was frustrated at his inability to curb the influence and actions 
of Abolhassan Ebtehaj, the Plan Organisation’s Director. The American official was primarily 
concerned that Ebtehaj possessed vision but demonstrated a disregard for planning, 
logistics and how to translate these visions into tangible achievements. Linneman had 
already noted from inspecting the Plan Organisation’s socio-economic development projects 
that no research or preparation had gone into them. The ensuing mistakes and delays were 
a public relations nightmare, especially as these had not been clearly communicated to the 
press or public at large.43 One such failure that stemmed from Ebtehaj’s failings was the 
‘fiasco’ surrounding the August 1958 re-opening of Tehran Mehrabad International Airport. 
An air force base since 1938, the Plan Organisation had rebuilt it so the facility could cater 
for commercial airliners and their passengers. The Information Department, under 
Linneman’s supervision, had devised a brochure for the grand re-opening commemorating 
this event. On the day prior to its commencement, though, Ebtehaj shelved the booklet, 
claiming he did not like the language in the English edition. There was, as a result, no 
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brochure to give to the guests on the night.44 Another incident that angered Linneman 
regarding Ebtehaj was when Hal Lehrman, a journalist for the New York Times Magazine, 
interviewed the Plan Organisation’s Director. Sitting in on the discussion, Linneman saw that 
Ebtehaj lacked any detailed knowledge of his department's activities, responding to 
questions abruptly and in a monosyllabic tone. In a conversation with Linneman in the 
interview’s aftermath, Lehrman claimed that talking to Ebtehaj was ‘a frustrating experience’ 
and that he would no longer be writing a piece on the Plan Organisation.45 
Linneman’s irritation with Ebtehaj and the Plan Organisation’s Information 
Department, though, was short-lived. From the late 1950s, the Shah took less interest in 
seeking to foster Iran’s socio-economic development through the Plan Organisation’s 
projects. Rather than delegating this task to a government department, the Iranian monarch 
sought greater personal involvement in planning and implementing these types of projects. 
Compounding this were the simmering tensions between the Shah and Ebtehaj. The latter 
was opposed to the Shah’s autocratic, personal style of rule, convinced governmental power 
should be diluted. He also did not get along with the Shah’s acolytes, notably his Minister of 
Interior Asadollah Alam and the former University of Tehran Chancellor Manoucher Eqbal. In 
protest at the cronyism and corruption evident in the ruling regime, Ebtehaj resigned his Plan 
Organisation directorship in February 1959. With the loss of such a charismatic, pro-
American figurehead, combined with the Shah’s increasing ambivalence towards it, the 
scale and scope of the Plan Organisation’s activities decreased dramatically. It was now 
merely supplying funds for government projects, not undertaking any of its volition. Ebtehaj’s 
replacement, Khosrow Hedayat, was simply a ‘yes man’ to higher authorities, presiding over 
a shell organisation and lacking his predecessor’s initiative and vitality. With no more 
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schemes being devised and launched, USIS figures reckoned that there was no longer any 
need to involve themselves in promoting socio-economic development projects in Iran.46 
The USIS’ management and supervision of the Iran-America Society, in comparison, 
was much more longstanding. It carried on through to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, with the 
organisation disbanding in the immediate aftermath of the November 1979 storming of the 
US Embassy in Tehran.47 The Iran-America Society’s functions and initiatives were certainly 
received well by Iranian government elites. Hekmat Shirazi, a veteran diplomat and politician 
who served as the Shah’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and later Ambassador to India, held the 
Iran-America Society in high esteem. At a February 1959 event held by the philanthropic 
Rockefeller Foundation, Shirazi informed the then US Ambassador to Iran Edward Wailes 
that the society was ‘a fine instrument.’48 The Minister of Foreign Affairs’ views were backed 
by the Iran-America Society’s exponential growth. By the end of the decade, 3,267 families 
were members and 5,910 students were enrolled on its English language courses, up from 
1,900 in 1952.49 The expansion beyond Tehran into Esfahan and Shiraz, as well as the 
1959 opening of a student centre in Iran’s capital, help explain the society’s burgeoning 
membership. Catering for Iranians between 18 and 21 years old, the latter had 350 
members and 1,600 regular users by the end of its first year. The Iran-America Society’s 
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student centre was the only overseas organisation of its kind permitted by Iranian 
government in Iran. It had a library, showed films and provided recreational facilities for 
young Iranian adults.50 
Gauging the views of Iran-America Society users towards the organisation’s 
activities, however, is much more difficult. While between 1953 and 1960 the USIS launched 
several surveys to assess the reception of Iran-America Society activities among its 
membership, all but one of these appraisals had to be shelved. Most of its English language 
students, as well as many who attended concerts, lectures and exhibitions, did not bother to 
fill out the surveys, despite pressure from staff to do so.51 USIS figures attributed this to what 
they deemed a collective lack of community spirit and the individualist nature of Iranian 
society. As historically they viewed most people in Iran to have lived tribal and nomadic 
lifestyles, the American agency’s officials presumed that many of its citizens would be 
focused on themselves. This supposedly selfish Iranian way of living was in direct contrast to 
the more ‘communitarian lifestyles’ of Europe and North America. Had such surveys been 
devised and undertaken in similar clubs in Western nations, USIS officials presumed that a 
collective urge towards societal improvement, combined with a more ‘altruistic culture’, 
would result in a greater number of respondents.52 It was only a March 1959 questionnaire 
that achieved a quorum of 46 respondents. Half of these judged the Iran-America Society’s 
English language teaching as valuable and enjoyable, with no respondents disagreeing with 
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this statement. One third claimed that they had learnt more about America thanks to the 
organisation’s activities, with 37% describing the United States as a peace-loving nation.53 
Tensions between the wishes of the Iran-America Society’s staff and the broader 
membership were not just confined to surveys. They were much broader, causing serious 
issues in the inaugural year of the Iran-America Society opening their centre in Esfahan. As 
explained in the office’s first annual report in December 1958, the Iranian members treated 
the society as a ‘closed club.’ Most were middle or upper-class males who all knew or were 
acquainted with one another and were keen to keep membership of the club between 
themselves. The local branch, consequently, had not flourished in the way that USIS figures 
in Tehran envisaged when they approved for it to be established.54 Impacting on this ‘closed 
club’ further were budgetary restraints. To go beyond just providing English language 
teaching, Iran-America Society branches in cities such as Esfahan and Shiraz required more 
money.55 This would enable these cities to be able to attract speakers and acts to present 
and perform respectively, as well as provide them with the means to employ more staff. 
Personnel shortages meant that both branches, in their formative years, were forced to rely 
on volunteers from the small pool of Americans who lived in the vicinity of either city. As well 
as there not being that many of them, many of these expatriates or visitors to Iran were 
unwilling or unable to help the Iran-America Society with its activities.56 
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The Iran-America Society’s budget issues worsened as the 1950s progressed. While 
the USIS provided the organisation with $20,000 p/year, the society required $28,000 extra 
to break even. Most of this extra finance was for the student centre in Tehran. Starting off as 
a $10,000 p/annum project, high demand for its facilities meant that it needed at least 
$24,500 a year to function effectively. Such additional funds were difficult to obtain. To 
resolve this issue, figures within the Iran-America Society opted to reduce the number of 
schemes and extra-curricular activities. They made the ‘difficult decision’ to stick solely to 
English language teaching.57 An April 1959 fair at the Iran-America Society’s Tehran branch 
did little to alleviate this issue. Attracting 100,000 Iranians, with all visitors encouraged to 
donate, the monies raised were not enough to cover the costs of attracting performers, or of 
buying new furniture and equipment.58  
The organisation was not alone in facing budgetary troubles. Throughout the 1950s, 
the USIS’ operations in Iran were undermined by financial shortfalls, despite the agency’s 
officials in Iran making repeated requests to the USIA for more money. Writing to C. 
Huntingdon Damon, the USIS’ Assistant Director for the Near East, in August 1954, Nalle 
complained that he did not have enough money to hire staff to support his activities in 
Mashhad. He argued that this rendered him ‘virtually useless.’ Nalle was instead forced to 
rely on consul officials to help, unpaid, in their own free time.59 Payne, similarly, protested to 
the USIA on numerous occasions about this. He asserted that, as per the American 
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agency’s demands, he was expanding the programme in Iran, but could not do so effectively 
with inadequate staffing. Despite possessing a number of ideas, Payne maintained that he 
could not put them into action unless personnel levels were ‘beefed up.’ There was not 
enough staff in the new provincial branches for these offices to be effective, an adequate 
level of administrative personnel to avert bureaucratic inefficiencies and no cultural officer to 
specialise in the exchange programme.60 The USIA’s response to these complaints was 
curt, ordering the PAO to make the most of the resources available to him. The agency’s 
inspectors also recommended that these financial shortfalls could be alleviated through 
further specialising its initiatives. Instead of seeking to engage with the broader urban middle 
classes, the USIS should look to connect with a particular group within this social stratum, 
such as government officials or business figures.61 
Such budgetary troubles worsened from Burnett Anderson’s December 1957 
appointment as PAO for Iran. A close ally of Damon, Anderson also possessed extensive 
media experience. Between 1943 and 1947 he was a journalist for the Minneapolis Star-
Tribune, reporting on state and federal politics. His next role took him to Stockholm, where 
he became the Scandinavian correspondent for Look magazine. Published bi-weekly as a 
competitor to Life magazine, it placed more of an emphasis on images rather than articles.62 
Travelling through the region, Anderson became increasingly aware of the Soviet Union’s 
supposed threat to northern Europe, particularly Finland. It was this that compelled him to 
join the governmental ranks. In 1951, Anderson was appointed the press officer for the 
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Marshall Plan Organisation in West Germany, holding this role until 1954. From then he was 
brought into the USIA’s Washington office, appointed Deputy Director for Press and 
Publications. A desire to see the world, though, resulted in Anderson pushing Damon to 
appoint him as PAO for Iran.63 
From his initial posting to Tehran, Anderson was aware that the USIS branch was 
spending more than it could afford. In a telegram to William Handley, the agency’s PAO for 
Turkey, Anderson conceded that ‘things were tough financially’ and that ‘major surgery was 
required.’ The chiefs of the USIS’ operations in Tehran and Ankara were close, having 
worked together in the State Department. As Handley had a greater number of years in post, 
Anderson often turned to him for advice.64 From Anderson’s appointment, the USIS’ 
budgetary situation had worsened. In the November 1958 midterm elections, the Democratic 
Party made considerable congressional gains, taking 48 seats from the Republicans in the 
House of Representatives and 13 in the Senate. The former’s takeover of both houses 
meant that there was greater scrutiny on how the USIA spent its money. Many of these 
Democrats, representing seats in northern states, were opposed to considerable 
government-sanctioned cultural activities in Asia and Africa. They were instead convinced 
the USIA should do more to promote the US in the Americas.65 Moreover, the USIA’s new 
Director, George Allen, was sceptical of the need to promote the American way of life in Iran. 
Having previously served as US Ambassador to Iran during the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis, he 
was more concerned with containing the spread of Communism. Allen was accordingly 
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unimpressed with the work done by Payne, Anderson’s predecessor, to promote the 
American way of life in the country, deeming this unnecessary. By making Iranians see the 
pitfalls of Soviet-inspired Communism, he was convinced that they would be more attracted 
towards American norms, values and ideas anyway. Allen therefore ordered Anderson to 
find ways to cut USIS Iran’s budget and staffing levels.66 
Anderson subsequently sought to reduce the scale and number of the American 
agency’s activities in Iran. Prior to undertaking this task, the PAO expressed some 
reservations. Conceding to Handley that the USIS Iran’s activities were expensive, ‘its 
initiatives were still extensive and impressive.’ Anderson already deemed the budget surplus 
to requirements and was at a loss as to how the USIS would cope after this further 
reduction.67 Anderson’s initial forays into cost cutting focused on making piecemeal 
reductions to staffing levels in the USIS’ Tehran office. The agency’s publications officer 
Maynard Fourt, for instance, was urged to follow his interest in Chinese culture by taking a 
position at the agency’s Hong Kong Office. Likewise, George Louden, the exhibits officer, 
was promoted and sent to South Vietnam. Both figures were not replaced and their roles 
were morphed into one job. Their successor was a junior figure, on a significantly lower pay 
grade, called Henry Stephen. Having only served in the USIS’ office in the Congo, Anderson 
was not happy at being given someone of Stephen’s limited experience. The PAO for Iran 
did concede though that this new arrangement saved a lot of money, easing budgetary 
pressure.68 
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Anderson’s other attempts to cut costs in a similar vein, however, were ill fated. To 
remain within his shrinking budget, as well as to meet the USIA inspectors’ requests that he 
dilutes his own power, Anderson asked permission to appoint an Assistant PAO. The 
incumbent in this new position would liaise with the Iranian government and preside over the 
exchange programme. They would also cover for the USIS’ chief officer in Iran when they 
were away or unavailable. In so doing, the Assistant PAO would do a job currently being 
undertaken by 8 people.69 Anderson wanted to appoint Phil Dorman to this role. Since 
joining the USIA in 1953, he had experienced a number of overseas roles, impressing his 
superiors everywhere he went. Dorman would later become the USIA’s Chief Officer for 
Zambia and the Sudan.70 
Despite the amount of money this arrangement would save, the USIA was resistant 
to the idea of appointing an Assistant PAO for Iran. William Handley, in particular, protested 
against this, with senior agency figures in Washington supporting his claims. Handley did not 
think it was fair that the USIS’ office in Iran would be able to employ an Assistant PAO, while 
his centre in Turkey would not be allowed to have one.71 Moreover, he deemed the dilution 
of Anderson’s position unnecessary, warning that it could set a dangerous precedent. 
Despite Iran’s importance to US foreign policy goals, the situation in the country was not 
complicated enough to warrant an Assistant PAO. USIS offices in nations of India’s size – or 
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even those on the Cold War’s frontline such as West Germany – did not employ someone in 
this role. The centre in Iran was certainly organisationally chaotic with a ‘top-heavy’ power 
structure that needed alleviating. But the dilution of the PAO’s role would not resolve this, 
leading to future clashes between Anderson and Dorman over what was in either person’s 
remit.72 Handley instead recommended to his contemporary in Iran that he revise the 
bureaucratic structure and staffing. Rather than the PAO overseeing branches and 
departments, Anderson should devise both a cultural and an information section. An officer, 
appointed internally, would preside over each section, providing these branches with greater 
autonomy and reducing Anderson’s workload.73 
In April 1960, Anderson was offered a place at the prestigious US Army War College 
in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. As the institution prepared its students for taking on senior 
governmental and military roles, the USIA urged Anderson to accept the War College’s 
offer.74 Anderson’s replacement was Linneman. After leaving his secondment with the Plan 
Organisation, he had stayed in Iran at the USIS’ Tehran office, working to produce and 
distribute anti-Communist propaganda for the agency’s library in Iran’s capital.75 Linneman 
continued Anderson’s cost cutting endeavours. His first austerity measures were to cease 
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the showing of USIS newsreels in Iranian cinemas and halting the publication of the 
agricultural magazine Land and People. The weekly Farsi language journal Akbar Hafte 
(weekly news) was also turned into a bi-monthly publication. Linneman’s emphasis on 
reducing the scale of the USIS’ publications initiatives in Iran was due to the USIA’s 
reduction in the amount of paper allocated to the American agency in Tehran. If they had 
wished to publish pamphlets, newspapers and periodicals on the same scale, the USIS 
would have needed to spend an extra $50,000 on paper. Alongside this expense, USIS 
officials knew they had other priorities. Budget shortfalls meant that savings needed to be 
made so as to continue the USIS’ work with Radio Tehran, an initiative their USIA superiors 
in Washington heartily approved of. Linneman needed to keep them on side. With the 
Eisenhower administration leaving office, he was unsure as to how the new President, John 
F. Kennedy, would approach Iran, let alone overseas US cultural diplomacy.76 
 
The Foreign Office and the Containment of Communism in Iran 
 
As the 1950s drew to a close, the UK Foreign Office’s IRD and SAVAK, the Iranian secret 
service, worked even more closely together than before. The initial success of the book 
translation programme, which had resulted in a Farsi translation of Doctor Zhivago, proved 
hugely popular with the Iranian public, compelled the British and Iranian agencies to work 
together in other fields. As a sign of these solidified ties, the IRD seconded Donald 
Makinson, an operative in the Foreign Office department, to the British Embassy in Tehran. 
The IRD had two reasons for deploying him to Iran. First, as a fluent Farsi speaker, 
Makinson was able to translate and edit anti-Communist literature sent by the IRD in London 
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to make it appropriate for distribution in Iran.77 Dubbed ‘Transmission X’, officials in London 
had been producing generic news content for Middle Eastern audiences that negatively 
depicted the Soviet Union. This would be transmitted to the Regional Information Office in 
Beirut, who would translate this content and distribute it across the region. ‘Transmission X’ 
items, however, were ‘unsuitable for Iranian consumption.’ Budgetary constraints meant that 
its content catered more for the Arab world. Reports, for instance, would highlight the 
alleged links between Nasser, the UAR and the USSR.78 Makinson, then, was not only 
required to translate ‘Transmission X’ items into Farsi, but to also make these pieces 
relevant, newsworthy items for Iranians. Second – and more importantly to the IRD – was 
Makinson’s close rapport with SAVAK’s Deputy Director, Hassan Pakravan. Since SAVAK’s 
1957 conception, both figures had frequently corresponded with one another regarding the 
production and dissemination of propaganda. This relationship with a prominent Iranian elite 
took on even greater importance to IRD officials in 1961. Suspecting the then Director, 
Teymur Bakhtiar, of divulging Iranian state secrets to the then US President John F. 
Kennedy, the Shah dismissed Bakhtiar as SAVAK’s Director, replacing him with Pakravan.79  
Within months of Makinson’s February 1962 secondment in Iran, the IRD and 
SAVAK were instrumental in establishing a writers’ panel in Tehran. Composed of 
prominent, influential journalists, editors and columnists from Iran’s three largest newspaper 
publications – The Tehran Times, Kayhan and Ettelat - the panel met monthly. SAVAK 
officials would provide these journalists with stories and information that extolled the virtues 
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of the Shah’s regime. Figures who attended these monthly meetings would receive ‘snappy 
and informative’ 10-12 page booklets that would provide suggestions for possible stories, as 
well as potential angles to take on these reports.80 Loosely based on ‘Transmission X’ 
content, typical news reports that stemmed from the booklets at these monthly writers’ panel 
meetings were unsurprisingly critical of the USSR. Between November and December 1964, 
for example, articles appeared in the Farsi and English editions of The Tehran Times and 
Kayhan. In Iran, newspapers would be published in the former language in the morning, 
while editions in the latter edition would be published in the afternoon or evening. These 
articles warned readers of the Soviet Union’s dissemination of pro-Communist propaganda 
across Iran and the wider Middle East. In particular, both newspapers’ readerships were 
urged to watch out for Farsi translations of Russian books and films.81  
Moreover, Makinson was instrumental in persuading Pakravan to send SAVAK 
officials to Britain to attend training sessions on the production and dissemination of 
propaganda. Makinson argued that this was the most effective way of ensuring that middle 
and high-ranking SAVAK figures would be adept at producing propaganda with little IRD 
input in the long run.82 In May 1963, selected officials from the agency were flown over to the 
UK to commence a two-week training course. Figures were initially given a tour of both IRD 
offices and BBC Monitoring in Caversham to illustrate how a counter-subversion office 
should function and be structured. IRD officials proceeded to teach the Iranians how to 
construct and publish effective propaganda. Sessions were given on the importance of 
persuasive techniques, the importance of translating Western novels and the distribution of 
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books, leaflets and other literature through third parties.83 Clearly, the IRD were attempting 
to underline to SAVAK the importance of distancing themselves from counter-subversive 
propaganda. To IRD officials, close government association with anti-Communist 
propaganda would render the material ineffective. By appearing independent, news articles, 
books, pamphlets and films would seem more authentic to the general public. At the same 
time, SAVAK endeavoured to cement the support of Iran’s military figures behind the Shah 
and anti-Communist efforts. They sought to reduce complacency towards the USSR, 
encouraging the armed forces to be mindful of attempted clandestine Soviet incursions in 
Iran. With the IRD’s help, officials from the Iranian agency produced a series of films for 
army figures. One such production was entitled Interests of Protective Security. Premiering 
at a May 1964 military convention in Tehran, the film detailed a fictional Soviet espionage 
operation in a secret government department that was foiled by figures in Iran’s army.84  
Beyond solidifying individual ties, the IRD and SAVAK also sought to establish links 
with Iranian broadcasters. Officials from the department, confident that they were now in a 
position to compete with their US counterparts, worked extensively with the government-run 
Radio Iran. Formerly called Radio Tehran, the station now had two channels. The first 
broadcast nationwide in Farsi from Tehran. The other was more localised, transmitting Arab 
language programmes in the oil rich region of Khuzestan. Concern at the high level of Radio 
Moscow broadcasts aimed at this area of southwest Iran compelled IRD and SAVAK officials 
to prioritise assisting broadcasts from the latter.85 According to figures from both 
departments, the material Radio Iran were using in this region to counter Communist 
propaganda was insufficient and of a low quality. IRD and SAVAK officials recommended to 
Radio Iran’s producers that they dedicate a daily segment to criticising the Soviet Union. 
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Selecting the morning radio show - when the number of listeners was typically at its peak - 
Radio Iran sought to provide a ‘factual account’ of the USSR’s actions. Daily segments 
would underline how both Russian and Soviet officials were determined to meddle in Iranian 
affairs. Broadcasts would point to the proceedings outlined above, as well as other past 
events, to suggest that expanding into Iran was a key foreign policy goal of the USSR and 
Imperial Russia.86  
The fostering of an IRD-SAVAK two-way relationship, however, meant that officials 
from the Iranian agency were able to influence the actions of their British counterparts. 
SAVAK frequently asked the IRD to place positive stories about Iran in the European and 
American press. The agency was ‘particularly bitter’ about ‘unfriendly comments’ regarding 
the Iranian government’s flouting of human rights in Western left-of-centre, liberal leaning 
newspapers and magazines. Convinced these articles were damaging the perception of Iran 
overseas, SAVAK feared that the Soviet Union and its allies could use this information to 
destabilise the Shah’s regime. The IRD deemed it imperative that this concern was 
addressed. In relaying the content and nature of his meetings with Pakravan to the London 
office, Makinson claimed that the SAVAK Director suspected the IRD of supplying media 
outlets with negative information about Iran.87 To maintain the fledgling relationship between 
the agencies, the Foreign Office department used their ties with the Anglo-American media 
to supply friendly journalists with positive stories about Iran. Articles from the Financial 
Times, for example, paid significant attention to the ‘White Revolution’, a programme 
initiated by the Shah to modernise his country’s economy and infrastructure.88 With content 
supplied from the IRD, reports underlined the commercial and financial potential of investing 
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in Iran in this period. Claiming that the Iranians were ‘undergoing an Industrial Revolution of 
their own’, articles urged readers to stay ahead of financial trends by investing in Iran now. 
Similarly, pieces that the IRD contributed to in other newspapers highlighted the Middle 
Eastern country’s attractiveness as a tourist destination. Articles would play on Iran’s past as 
the centre of the Persian Empire, suggesting that it was culturally and politically on a par 
with Ancient Rome and Athens. Articles would cite the numerous historical sites dotted 
around Iran from this period and their accessibility to tourists.89  
More crucially, though, SAVAK was instrumental in persuading the IRD to assist 
them with the countering of Arab nationalist propaganda. The desire to remain neutral in the 
Cold War proposed by Nasser and the Baathist governments in Iraq and Syria particularly 
concerned Pakravan. Having lived through the Mossagdeh government of 1951-53, the 
SAVAK Director realised that such ideas resonated with the Iranian people. Should they 
spread to Iran, a public backlash could constrain Iran’s attempts to engage with the US, UK 
and other Western powers.90 Attempts by the Iranian agency to request assistance in this 
field through the CENTO Counter Subversion Office (CSO) had proved futile. The 
organisation’s terms of reference stipulated that it could only help in the fight against Soviet 
inspired Communist propaganda.91 Maintaining that Arab nationalism and third force 
neutralism were ‘more significant threats than Communism’, Pakravan used his meetings 
with Makinson to stress the need to be ‘hard headed’ against Egypt. Failing to combat the 
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propaganda peddled by Arab nationalist regimes, he argued, would lead to Nasser forcing 
the British out of the Middle East.92  
SAVAK’s request for IRD assistance to combat Arab nationalist propaganda placed 
the Foreign Office department in an awkward position. As this request did not pertain to anti-
Communist propaganda, it went beyond what the agency was established to do. More 
broadly, key to British foreign policy in the Middle East during this period was the need to 
ensure geopolitical stability in the region. Foreign Office officials were convinced that 
assisting SAVAK in this way would heighten tensions between Arab nationalist states and 
the pro-Western nations such as Iran and Jordan.93 Furthermore, Anglo-Egyptian relations in 
the 1960s had considerably improved from their 1956 nadir. Since the Suez Crisis, the 
British approach to Nasser had been to limit the Egyptian President’s influence in the Middle 
East and to avoid directly confronting him. Such tactics had resulted in Britain militarily 
intervening in Jordan and Kuwait in 1958 and 1961 respectively. In both cases, British 
policymakers feared that internal Arab nationalist forces, funded by Nasser, were 
threatening the pro-Western Jordanian and Kuwaiti ruling regimes.94 
Despite the Foreign Office’s reluctance to endanger Anglo-Egyptian relations, the 
IRD acquiesced to SAVAK’s requests. Makinson and officials in London feared that a failure 
to consent to the Iranian agency’s demands would result in a dilution of IRD-SAVAK 
collaboration. Pakravan would not be persuaded to adopt a more consensual approach 
towards Egypt. Dismissing Makinson’s argument that appeasing Nasser would be beneficial 
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to Anglo-Iranian interests, he threatened to request assistance from other Western powers.95 
While recommending that the IRD assist SAVAK in the production of anti-Arab nationalist 
material, the Foreign Office urged the department to keep their distance. To avoid 
heightening Anglo-Egyptian tensions, officials in Whitehall ordered Makinson to ‘ensure 
deniability.’ They instead called for the IRD official to ‘consider and recommend’ measures 
for SAVAK to pursue.96 In his meetings with Pakravan, Makinson was successful in helping 
to shape the Iranian agency’s new approach to counter-subversion. Exploiting the SAVAK 
Director’s scepticism of Communism as an ideology, Makinson persuaded Pakravan that 
Arab nationalism was closely entwined with this left-wing thinking.97 Through the writers’ 
panel, SAVAK provided Iranian journalists with stories suggesting that Nasser was a closet 
Communist. Reports, for instance, would discuss his nationalisation of Egyptian industries 
and how the President’s meddling in the markets was constraining the earning potential of 
his subjects.98 The IRD, moreover, provided SAVAK with BBC technicians to help the Iranian 
agency jam radio transmissions from Arab nationalist broadcasters. Officials from the Iranian 
agency were convinced that these ideals were filtering into Iran through the Nasser backed 
Radio Baghdad and Voice of Arabs. As well as technical assistance, officials from the BBC 
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provided SAVAK with the latest equipment to sporadically block short wave transmissions 
from Arab nationalist countries.99  
The two-way nature of IRD-SAVAK collaboration masked the issues blighting the 
propaganda material produced and disseminated. Many of the books both agencies selected 
for translation and publication in Iran were not commercially viable. Their lack of mainstream 
appeal meant that most Iranians – in particular the literate middle classes – did not read or 
purchase this literature. In a 1963 review of IRD work in Iran, officials in London referred to 
the books made available to Iranians through collaboration with SAVAK as ‘turgid.’ 
Expressing a lack of surprise that these novels and monographs were failing to sell, they 
called for the translation and publication of literature of a ‘lighter vein.’ IRD officials claimed 
that it was only through the promotion of these popular Western works – which instead of 
criticising Communism promoted British values – that the policy of book translation and 
publication would yield any success.100 IRD-SAVAK collaborative efforts were also 
constrained by staff and budgetary shortages. Writing to the Foreign Office department’s 
Whitehall office, Makinson claimed that these issues meant that there was a ‘very distinct 
limit… to what we can absorb and utilise effectively.’101 Instead of producing news content 
relevant to the Iranian public a lack of personnel meant that Makinson was instead forced to 
translate Transmission X material designed for Arab nations. 102 Likewise, staff shortages 
meant that the booklets handed out to Iranian journalists in the writers’ panel meetings were 
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often not of the required standard. Many of the articles produced from information supplied 
from these meetings were poorly written and uninspiring, doing little to harden the views of 
readers towards Soviet-style Communism.103 Not only was there a shortage in the quantity 
and quality of propaganda produced, but also many potential projects, while discussed in 
depth, were never pursued. Despite possessing the monetary means, attempts to establish 
an IRD and SAVAK-backed publishing house in Tehran were unsuccessful due to a lack of 
personnel with expertise in this industry.104  
More broadly, IRD-SAVAK collaborative efforts were undermined by the United 
States. US State Department officials were not wholly supportive of the IRD and SAVAK 
working together. In their own dealings with the Iranian agency – who had requested 
American intelligence and surveillance assistance – State Department figures discouraged 
SAVAK from sustained collaboration with the IRD. Arguing that the propaganda produced 
was provocative, they claimed that these projects would antagonise Arab nationalist regimes 
in the Middle East, attracting them more towards the Soviets. Iran, they claimed, would be 
more isolated, left with fewer regional allies. Having assisted the IRD in its counter-
subversive projects in other regions, the State Department’s opposition towards IRD-SAVAK 
collaboration surprised and disappointed British officials. In a May 1963 letter to the US 
Embassy in Tehran, Makinson accused the then Ambassador, Julius Holmes, of pursuing 
‘the worst of all courses.’ The IRD official proceeded to claim that the American’s ‘lukewarm 
approach’ to IRD-SAVAK collaboration indicated that the US appeared to favour allowing the 
Iranian agency to die on its feet.’ This, Makinson claimed, would result in the UK ‘taking the 
blame for this failure’, reducing Britain’s standing in Iran in the process.105 
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Such an agency-led approach meant that IRD-SAVAK collaboration was short-lived. 
In 1965, Makinson was promoted to a more senior position in the Foreign Office in London, 
with no other IRD official willing or able to succeed him. In 1966, the Shah appointed 
Pakravan as his Minister of Information. His successor, Nematollah Nassiri, was suspicious 
of IRD motives in Iran, convinced the department was seeking to meddle in Iranian affairs.106 
From his appointment, Nassiri sent his deputy, General Ali Sobhani, to discuss issues with 
IRD figures. According to members of the Foreign Office department, the SAVAK official 
‘deliberately caused problems’ in these meetings. Refusing to minute these discussions, he 
would veto any IRD suggestions, filibustering during deliberations to ensure nothing would 
get decided or achieved. During a December 1966 meeting in Beirut, he also declared to 
officials from the Foreign Office department that SAVAK would no longer help fund these 
collaborative efforts. The Iranian agency expected the British to pay for all future projects, 
something it was unwilling and unable to do. After 1966, therefore, IRD-SAVAK bilateral 
collaboration dramatically reduced. In the next two years, IRD officials gradually phased out 
their collaborative projects with the Iranian agency.107  
 
The Foreign Office, the British Council and UK Cultural Diplomacy in Iran 
 
According to the British Council in Iran’s annual reports, the institution had made ‘a major 
contribution’ to Anglo-Iranian relations, engaging Iran’s middle classes in ways that the 
Embassy would never be able to do. The February 1955 reopening of its Tehran office had 
been received well by Iranians. Unlike in the early 1950s, when it had to depart Iran when 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis escalated, the British Council were now unaffected by political 
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proceedings in Iran and the wider region.108 The institution’s officials deemed its ties with the 
Iranian Ministry of Education as the ‘most important feature of their work in Iran.’ The 
seminars for secondary school teachers organised and run in collaboration with this 
government department had changed how the English language was being taught in the 
country. Through a greater emphasis on spelling, grammar and punctuation, the English 
skills of Iranian students nationwide had considerably improved. Supplementing this was the 
work undertaken by British Council centres in Esfahan, Shiraz and Tabriz. On top of the 
summer seminars for Iranian teachers, these branches were also offering English language 
courses to students. British Council officials claimed that the sessions they put on were 
‘good adverts for the UK system’, providing solid examples of how schools and lessons 
should be run.109 
British Council officials were also ‘immensely impressed’ with the impact of their 
television programme English by Television. While aware of the ‘great difficulties’ its staff 
members work under, senior figures in London praised the quality of the scripts. They were 
even so magnanimous to claim that their fears that this endeavour would be disastrous had 
‘proved quite groundless.’ What pleased these individuals the most, though, was that there 
was no similar initiative to English by Television that the Americans were undertaking. It 
meant that the UK institution was ahead of its US counterparts in this field.110 Similarly, 
Derek Traversi, the head of the British Council’s operations in Iran, was delighted with the 
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praiseworthy letters sent in by English by Television’s viewers. One correspondent judged it 
to be a ‘superior programme’; another declared that it had ‘helped the Iranian people so 
much with English.’ There was even one secondary school pupil that claimed that the Iranian 
people ‘learn English more from this than from books or classroom lessons.’111 
In a similar vein to how the Americans gauged the impact of their own cultural 
initiatives, the British Council also relied on letters from Iranian people. Again, this was not 
the most accurate way of garnering reception, with correspondents’ views not being 
representative of the public at large. Just like with the USIS and the DPB, the channel TVI, 
which broadcast English by Television bi-weekly, did not allow foreign organisations to 
monitor its broadcasts. It accordingly made it ‘difficult to assess viewer reaction accurately’, 
with the British Council forced to rely on TVI’s uncorroborated claims that 5-7 million viewers 
regularly tuned in. The UK organisation’s officials presumed though that, as the broadcaster 
relies on advertisements for revenue, it was not in their interests to broadcast unpopular 
programmes. From discussions with TVI officials, the agency suspected that there was a 
considerable amount of group viewing, particularly among teachers and secondary school 
students, of English by Television. As televisions were luxury items in Iran in this period, the 
British Council had been under the impression that only the wealthy and educated, as well 
as students in schools, would be able to watch.112 
In the absence of accurate viewer perspectives on English by Television, British 
Council officials relied on their own intuition when evaluating the programme. Inspectors 
from the London office claimed in November 1959 that English by Television was good for 
bolstering the prestige of Britain in Iran. As English was superseding French as the country’s 
second language, the programme was ‘a valuable medium from which to exploit this.’ The 
first half of the show was well devised and presented. The parts where formal lessons in 
grammar, sentence structure and vocabulary took place can be used as a model if a similar 
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initiative were implemented in another country. The second part of the programme, however, 
which aimed to promote British culture, history or geography, required considerable 
improvement. Such showcases ‘varied in quality and were in need of fuller direction and 
supervision.’ They suffered from poor camera work and no rehearsals, something that was 
illustrated in the final product. The inspectors blamed this issue on English by Television’s 
‘shoestring budget.’ Giving the programme more money would improve the second half of 
the show for two reasons. First it would enable extra staff to be recruited. English by 
Television suffered from a shortage of scriptwriters and backstage personnel. Several extras 
employed on a casual basis aside, there were currently three people involved, all taking a 
part in producing, directing and starring in English by Television. Second, more money 
would enable more equipment to be sourced. All the second half of the show needed were a 
greater number of scriptwriters and appropriate apparatus such as telecoders and autocues. 
These additions would make English by Television programmes appear much more 
professional, reducing the number of mistakes and blunders.113 
Charles Wilmot, Derek Traversi’s successor as head of the British Council in Iran, 
was eager to meet the inspectors’ recommendations. To professionalise English by 
Television’s production and resolve its budgetary issues, he requested for more films, 
photos and auto prompts from London, as well as extra staff.114 Wilmot arrived in Tehran in 
May 1959, when Traversi went back to UK higher education. Formerly the British Council 
representative for Australia, he had been behind unsuccessful attempts to get Australians to 
establish their own institution to promote their nation’s culture overseas. Wilmot attributed 
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his failure here to the lack of political will and appetite for such an agency in Australia.115 
Taking over from Traversi in May 1959, Wilmot asserted in a memo to the British Council’s 
Education Division that English by Television was ‘an absorbing experiment.’ Despite its low 
budget, first-year teething problems and inexperienced staff, the programme should be 
regarded as a success. The enterprise would only get stronger provided it could be more 
professionalised. The current reliance on volunteers and a small, under-paid team would not 
work long term. The British Council needed to regard English by Television as an endeavour 
in its own right, formally appointing someone to oversee this. The role would require 
someone to write, direct and act, as well as liaise, with the head office in London.116 
The British Council in London, however, was resistant to Wilmot’s requests, deeming 
them ‘out of proportion to the relative importance of this activity.’ While they were happy with 
English by Television, they did not envisage it as key to broader UK cultural diplomacy in 
Iran. Replying to Wilmot, the British Council claimed that they could not justify the money 
and time Wilmot demanded for this. They were also convinced that such initiatives should be 
in the BBC’s remit, as they produced similar programmes for East Asian and South 
American audiences. As the broadcaster had already informed the British Council, they were 
much more adept and efficient at producing these shows. The agency in Iran should instead 
focus on its strength, English language teaching.117 The tensions between Wilmot and his 
superiors in London surrounding this issue came to a head in 1961 when TVI took control of 
English by Television away from the British Council. As the broadcaster developed, its 
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producers became bolder, more eager to have a greater editorial say over profitable 
programmes. They began steering script content and invested in studios and facilities. Due 
to the British Council’s relative lack of investment in the programme compared to TVI, the 
UK agency’s staff confined themselves to writing the scripts.118 
English by Television was not alone in suffering from a lack of staff and resources. 
Monetary, personnel and equipment shortages were issues blighting British cultural 
diplomacy in Iran as a whole. These problems were frequently mentioned in the British 
Council’s annual reviews. Every April since its 1955 return, the organisation’s officials in Iran 
were required to compile a progress report. In each evaluation, Traversi – and latterly 
Wilmot – complained about staff and money shortages. The latter point proved particularly 
damaging to the British Council in Iran, with demand for its English language teaching 
outstripping the supply of teachers and classroom spaces. It was as a result of this that, 
despite English language teaching being its primary function, the British Council’s 
contribution ‘was a mere drop in the ocean.’119  
Budgetary issues, moreover, meant that the British Council could not expand beyond 
English language teaching and promote the UK’s culture in Iran. Lack of funding meant that 
the agency’s officials were unable to attract exhibits, concerts and lectures, something 
branches in other countries were able to do more freely. The British Council in Iran was 
accordingly forced to operate within a ‘small part of their remit’ here. Outside of instructing 
Iranian students and teachers in the English language, the agency just showed technical 
films to aspiring engineers. Such programmes were technical and instructional, doing little to 
promote Britain’s culture and way of life to viewers. Compounding this predicament for the 
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British Council was the demand among Iranians for British-style initiatives in this field. Since 
reopening in 1956, the UK agency’s library had been organising film showings of movies and 
documentaries on topics such as British art, history and music. During these events, the 
centre’s cinema room had been ‘uncomfortably full’, with the library experiencing a 
significantly above average footfall.120 
British Council officials in Iran were consequently frustrated that they were not in a 
position to compete or match the better-funded initiatives of the USIS. With the absence of 
substantial UK cultural diplomacy programmes in Iran after August 1953 and before 
February 1955, the US had become the dominant Western influence in this field. Despite 
complaining about financial shortages themselves, the American agency’s initiatives were 
much more comprehensive. Not only had they had a significant impact on shaping Iran’s 
education system, but also, they had a stranglehold on Iran’s state-run radio stations. 
Equally, the Iran-America Society, whose functions were similar to the British Council, 
possessed a far superior building, had the resources to teach more students than the UK 
agency, and could attract musicians and lecturers. The organisation, as such, was not only 
able to reach students and teachers, but educators, government officials and middle-class 
professionals, too. Such policies had resulted in the US becoming the dominant Western 
culture in Iran, at a time when the country was becoming a key political and economic ally to 
the United States. Both of these roles had been enjoyed by Britain since the eighteenth 
century, yet America had taken the UK’s place.121 
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The Foreign Office and the British Council’s annoyance at this turn of events were 
compounded by the USIS’ attempts to ensure that UK cultural diplomacy in Iran did not 
supersede its American equivalent. To dissuade Iranian people and institutions from working 
with the British, American officials played on popular perceptions of the UK in Iran. Due to 
Britain’s historic meddling in Iranian affairs, most of its people were suspicious of British 
motives and interactions. This notion of ‘perfidious Albion’ had manifested itself in the Iranian 
popular consciousness, with many blaming the UK whenever an unfortunate incident or 
event befell their country.122 The USIS invested significantly in Abadan Technical College, 
an institution in the oil-rich Khuzestan region where Britain had historically exploited its 
resources and people. The USIS had also established a journalism and public relations 
course in the University of Tehran that demonstrated the tactics employed by the Foreign 
Office when it had meddled in Iranian affairs.123 Both initiatives had clearly been successful. 
Despite the British Council’s overtures, Iranian universities were unwilling to work with the 
institution, fearing that the UK agency sought to meddle and destabilise its operations. The 
University of Tehran, in particular, refused to respond to the British Council’s requests for 
meetings, citing communication failures when pressed.124 Even the May 1959 signing of the 
Anglo-Iranian Cultural Convention did little to improve Anglo-Iranian relations in this field. 
Despite pledging in writing to collaborate with one another through cultural exchanges, there 
                                               
122 Review of press in Baghdad Pact countries, 14 November 1956, TNA, FO 371/121766; Survey of 
the BBC Persian Service’s output in Iran, 17 December 1963, Caversham, Reading, BBC Written 
Archives Centre, E/3/182/1. 
123 Joint USIA-State Department message, 25 August 1956, NAII, US State Department papers, Iran, 
US Education in Iran (1955-1960); American Embassy (Tehran) to State Department, 29 August 
1957, NAII, US State Department papers, Iran, US Education in Iran (1955-1960). 
124 British Council Representative in Iran’s annual report, 1958-59, 9 May 1959, TNA, BW 49/17; 
David West (Foreign Office, Eastern Department) to the Foreign Office, 1 April 1959, TNA, FO 
924/1251. 
  299 
were no extra initiatives devised or suggested. As figures in the Foreign Office’s Eastern 
Department predicted, the Iranians had no interest in acting on the pledges stated in the 
treaty. They had simply pushed for the agreement with Britain and other nations in the 
developed world as a means to formalise relations with these countries.125 
Budget and personnel shortages – as well as the prevalent ‘perfidious Albion’ view 
among Iranian people – resulted in the British Council acting as a ‘junior partner’ to the 
USIS. By the end of the 1950s, both Foreign Office and British Council officials had come to 
accept this subservient role. They were resigned to the USIS’ undermining of British cultural 
diplomacy, citing it as typical American behaviour. With regards to broader Anglo-American 
foreign policy towards Iran, figures from both departments conceded that US officials in Iran 
were treating their counterparts from the UK Embassy much better than they were during the 
1951-53 Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis. To wrestle control of the industry away from the British – as 
well as to usurp Britain as the dominant Western power in the country – US officials had 
initially supported Mossagdeh’s attempts to nationalise the cultivation and exporting of 
Iranian oil.126 Now, though, the Americans had sought to ‘smooth over’ the UK’s return to 
Iran, no one more so than the then US Ambassador, Loy Henderson. He, in particular, had 
helped break down popular and elite Iranian suspicion towards the British government and 
its initiatives, underlining how the UK now wanted a different type of relationship with Iran. 
The country no longer desired to ‘imperially meddle’ in Iranian affairs or sought to be the 
dominant political and economic foreign power. While this negative perception was going to 
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take time to completely alter, the British Ambassador to Iran, Roger Stevens, maintained 
that the US had helped the UK Embassy make significant progress here.127 
Despite this, the Foreign Office and the UK Embassy in Tehran were aware that their 
American counterparts were unwilling to ‘yield their priority to the UK in any sphere.’ From 
experiencing the USIS’ reaction to British cultural diplomacy in Iran, they realised that 
attempts to foster greater Anglo-Iranian mutual understanding would be hindered by the US. 
As they would deem these initiatives a challenge to their interests and programmes in Iran, 
the Americans would seek to challenge and undermine the British Council’s activities where 
possible. As the UK agency’s attempts to establish ties with the University of Tehran 
illustrated, the American Embassy and the USIS were adept at promoting popular anti-
British feeling among Iranians when they felt threatened by Britain.128 Foreign Office and UK 
Embassy officials, consequently, settled for the role that the Americans wanted them to play 
in Iran, that of the ‘junior partner.’ They argued that, despite the ‘lack of full reciprocity’ and 
the fact that ‘we have to do all the running’, it was the only way British assessments of the 
Iranian situation could be taken into account in the shaping of American policy on Iran.129 
Even though the UK was now content to play a ‘junior’ role in Iran to the US, it was 
still one of the main exponents of soft power in the country, second only to America. As this 
chapter demonstrates, the implementation of cultural and anti-Soviet propaganda policies 
was a pivotal aspect of 1950s Anglo-American foreign policy in Iran. Three key themes, 
moreover, can be ascertained from this section. First, that both US and UK officials 
perceived their programmes and policies as being successful, despite their failure and 
                                               
127 Roger Stevens (British Ambassador, Iran) to Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Secretary), 7 December 1956, 
TNA, FO 371/120724. 
128 David West (Foreign Office, Eastern Department) to the Foreign Office, 1 January 1957, TNA, FO 
371/120724. 
129 Roger Jackling (UK Embassy, Washington) to Frederick Brown (Foreign Office, Eastern 
Department), 31 December 1958, TNA, FO 371/140817. 
  301 
inability to accurately assess their reception among the Iranian public. Second, was the 
Shah’s resistance towards American and British soft power initiatives that promoted US and 
UK culture rather than tackled the supposed Communist threat. Despite being a key 
Western ally in the region, the Iranian monarch still feared that American and British 
policymakers sought to replace him, deeming US and UK cultural policies as a means to do 
this. The Shah and his acolytes, therefore, sought to limit and constrain these initiatives at 
every turn. The third and final key theme is that both American and British soft power 
policies were beset by staffing issues and limited budgets. In the cases of the USIS and the 
British Council, both agencies did not have the required personnel or the financial 
capabilities to fully implement their policies and programmes, leading to these initiatives not 
being as effective as initially envisaged. These points, among others, will be explored more 
depth in the following concluding section.  
  302 
Conclusion 
 
‘As the time passed in Tehran, I felt more and more bearish about the ability of USIS to do 
much with anyone who was not already converted and proposed that there be a significant 
reduction in the USIS operation.’1 
 
The above quote is taken from an interview of Jack Shellenberger, a United States 
Information Agency (USIA) officer in Iran between February 1977 and July 1979. While in 
this role, Shellenberger presided over the reduction of the agency’s staff and activities in the 
country. As this thesis demonstrates, the USIA, through the USIS, established itself in Iran 
between 1953 and 1960. Following this, the agency carried on its activities for the next 17 
years, promoting American norms, values and ideas, while also seeking to dissuade Iranians 
from supporting Communist ideas. Increasing popular opposition, however, towards the 
regime of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, compelled Shellenberger to minimise the 
USIA’s involvement in Iran. Many Iranians, crucially, had allegedly come to regard the US 
government and the American agency as being too closely entwined with the Iranian 
monarch. Presidential administrations from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Gerald Ford had 
authorised the provision of extensive military and economic support to the Shah. The USIS, 
at the same time, had been implementing policies that sought to protect and foster popular 
support for the ruling regime. Shellenberger, then, sought to dissociate the agency from the 
                                               
1 Jack Shellenberger interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt, 21 April 1990, Arlington, Virginia, The 
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 
https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Shellenberger,%20Jack.toc.pdf (accessed 1 May 2019). 
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American government and the Shah, minimising the USIS’ presence in Iran before public 
opposition and protests towards the Iranian government escalated.2 
Fearful that cutting back the USIS’ provision in Iran would hinder America’s cultural 
ties with the country, US State Department officials resisted Shellenberger’s 
recommendations. Events in the country, though, rendered their protestations redundant. In 
February 1978, left-wing and religious activists began demonstrating against the Shah in 
major Iranian cities. As the year unfolded, an increasing number of citizens joined these 
protests, culminating in national unrest. By September 1978, the Iranian monarch declared 
martial law and ordered the military to open fire on protestors in Tehran. In response to the 
64 demonstrators that lost their lives, as well as increasing public antagonism towards the 
Shah’s rule, activists declared a general strike. By January 1979, the Iranian monarch’s 
position was untenable, forcing him to leave Iran. Throughout this period of instability in the 
country, the USIS was unable to function effectively. The agency’s inability to implement its 
cultural and propaganda initiatives did not change in the wake of the Shah’s departure. With 
the April 1979 founding of the Islamic Republic, USIS officials were confident that they could 
resume their activities. Yet the Iranian public’s increasing antagonism towards the US, 
fuelled by the new Iranian government’s depiction of America as the ‘Great Satan’, limited 
the effectiveness and reach of USIS initiatives. By November 1979, though, the agency’s 
presence in Iran came to an abrupt end. The storming of the US Embassy in Tehran and the 
                                               
2 Jack Shellenberger interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt, 21 April 1990, Arlington, Virginia, The 
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 
https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Shellenberger,%20Jack.toc.pdf (accessed 1 May 2019); Theodore 
Boyd interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 29 November 2005, Arlington, Virginia, The Association 
for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 
https://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Boyd,%20Theodore%20A.toc.pdf (accessed 1 May 2019). 
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taking of 52 hostages, several of whom were USIS officials, compelled USIA figures in 
Washington to discontinue their attempts to culturally engage with Iran.3 
The UK’s soft power initiatives in Iran came to a close at the same time as their 
American equivalent. In October 1978, the British Council withdrew from all major Iranian 
cities aside from Tehran in response to the growing protests against the Shah. Just one year 
later, and after witnessing the storming of the US Embassy, the UK agency left Iran’s 
capital.4 Unlike the USIS, the British Council was invited to return, reopening its Tehran 
office in January 2001. In February 2009, however, it was again forced to vacate its 
premises. The Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, suspected the organisation’s 
English language teaching activities of encouraging domestic opposition towards the ruling 
Islamic regime.5 Proceedings here, and with the USIS, illustrate the importance of soft power 
policies to US and UK diplomacy in Iran during the Shah’s reign and beyond. From the 
August 1953 coup that toppled Prime Minister Mohammad Mossagdeh to the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution, seeking to engage with Iranians on a cultural level was certainly a pivotal aspect 
of American and British foreign policy in the country. The foundations of this diplomatic 
approach stemmed from the propaganda and cultural initiatives considered, devised and 
implemented between 1953 and 1960.  
                                               
3 Stephen Reinhardt (Director of the International Communication Agency) to Zbigniew Brzezinski 
(President James E. Carter’s Assistant for National Security Affairs), 14 November 1979, Oxford, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Public Diplomacy, Volume XXX. 
4 British Council (Iran) to the Foreign Office (London), 28 October 1978, Kew, Richmond, The 
National Archives, BW 49/27. 
5 ‘British Council in Iran “Illegal”, BBC News, 5 February 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world 
/middleeast/7872525.stm (accessed 1 May 2019); Julian Borger, ‘British Council Suspends 
Operations in Iran After Local Staff “Intimidated”’, The Guardian, 5 February 2009, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/05/british-council-iran (accessed 1 May 2019). 
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The concluding chapter of this thesis evaluates American and British soft power in 
Iran during this period. This PhD set out to answer the following five questions. First, what 
were American and British policymakers’ motives for seeking to improve diplomatic relations 
with Iran via soft power initiatives? Second, how did the UK Foreign Office and the US State 
Department use cultural and propaganda initiatives to achieve their diplomatic goals in Iran? 
Third, what was the nature of the policies implemented by the British Council and the United 
States Information Service? How successful were the UK and US here? Fourth, what 
consequences did Anglo-American cultural diplomacy in Iran between 1953 and 1960 have 
on the UK-US ‘special relationship’ in the Middle East? Fifth, what implications did it have on 
the wider Cold War? 
In answering these research questions, this thesis contends that cultural diplomacy 
and propaganda initiatives formed a key part of the US and UK’s foreign policy approach 
towards Iran. The analysis also argues that this was an area in which American and British 
diplomats and officials sought to compete with one another to be the dominant Western 
power in the country. The US government, through the State Department-backed USIS, 
prevailed over their UK counterparts here. Soft power policies formed part of much broader 
American political and economic efforts to strengthen diplomatic ties with Iran and its Shah. 
Despite the USIS’ attempts to undermine the UK Foreign Office and the British Council’s 
operations, the latter was able to create a niche for itself in Iran through the teaching of the 
English language. The initiatives in this field by both countries, though, were undermined by 
the high financial cost, inadequate staffing and the Iranian government’s paranoia. While 
happy to work with the US and UK to contain Communism in Iran, they feared that policies 
promoting American and British norms, values and ideas sought to destabilise the Shah’s 
government.  
To US State Department and UK Foreign Office figures, strengthening and 
developing diplomatic ties with Iran were a high priority post-1945. A vital oil source that 
neighboured the Soviet Union, the country straddled numerous countries and regions. 
American and British officials feared that the USSR would exploit Iran’s geographic position. 
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Once the Soviets had helped replace the Shah with a Communist government, they could 
then use the country as a platform to make inroads into the Persian Gulf, Indian 
Subcontinent and Arab world. After August 1953, however, Iran became even more 
geopolitically vital to American and British foreign policy interests. The 1951-53 Anglo-
Iranian Oil Crisis demonstrated that the Iranian monarch’s grip on power was precarious. 
The recently deposed Nationalist Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossagdeh, had proved 
popular among the Iranian people, as did the left-wing ideals espoused by the underground 
Soviet-backed Tudeh Party. These Nationalist and Communist arguments had increasingly 
resonated with Iran’s educated middle classes, a burgeoning societal group in 1950s Iran 
both in terms of size and prominence. At the same time, many Iranian people increasingly 
held unfavourable views towards the US and UK. To prevent the nationalisation of Iran’s oil 
industry, the American Central Intelligence Agency and the British Secret Intelligence 
Service had helped instigate a coup in August 1953 against Mossagdeh. The United States’ 
involvement here persuaded many Iranians that America aspired to imperially meddle in 
Iran’s affairs, in a similar way that Britain had for nearly two centuries. Since the 1790s, the 
British government had intermittently intervened in Iranian politics. UK Foreign Office figures 
had imposed treaties, seized assets and helped replace rulers who were not conducive to 
their interests. 
The US State Department and the UK Foreign Office had different motives for 
implementing soft power policies in Iran. For the former, initiatives in this field formed part of 
a much broader effort to strengthen ties with the country and its people after 1953. Initiatives 
in this field complemented considerable American political, economic and military support, 
and were a pivotal aspect of US foreign policy towards the country. The USIA, through its 
constituent USIS office in Tehran, were the main conduit, devising and implementing 
programmes and initiatives. The US State Department, as well as senior Eisenhower 
administration officials, concerned themselves with the policies to contain Communism in 
Iran. They both feared that the Tudeh’s clandestine activities, in conjunction with Radio 
Moscow’s Farsi broadcasts, were undermining the Shah’s regime. They were also under the 
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impression that these agents of Soviet policy were engaging and encouraging Arab 
nationalist governments, especially Egypt, to adopt similar tactics. White House and State 
Department figures, therefore, used National Security Council meetings to make the 
combating of Soviet subversive activities a mainstay of the USIS’ activities in Iran.  
Initiatives promoting American values and culture in Iran, likewise, were advocated 
by US Embassy officials in Tehran. While the supposed Soviet threat to the country 
concerned them, they placed greater emphasis on the need to counter increasing popular 
anti-Americanism in Iran. The coining and placing of the phrase ‘Yankee go home’ into the 
popular Iranian vernacular particularly concerned Embassy officials. They feared that, if left 
unchecked, this would undermine US-led political, economic and military initiatives. For 
USIS figures, these cultural diplomacy policies had initially been a low priority, with the 
fostering of a US-style library culture the only tangible policy. This changed with the January 
1955 appointment of Robert Payne as the chief USIS officer in Iran. Unlike his predecessor, 
Edward Wells, Payne was convinced that the promotion of the American way of life was the 
only effective way to ensure that Iran remains pro-Western. Having witnessed first-hand the 
rise of President Gamel Abdel Nasser in Egypt, he feared that Iran would go the same way 
unless the USIS concentrated its efforts on cultural diplomacy. 
UK Foreign Office officials shared their American counterparts’ concern with the 
apparent emerging subversive Communist threat in Iran. British diplomats and officials were 
also more determined to ensure the safe supply of Iranian oil. Propaganda initiatives and 
cultural diplomacy, with the latter undertaken through the British Council, were a means for 
the UK to retain its presence in the country. Iran had previously been regarded as being an 
integral part of the UK’s informal empire. With the United States’ growing political, economic 
and cultural involvement with Iran and its Shah, though, this was no longer the case. The UK 
government’s attempts to rely on soft power to strengthen Anglo-Iranian relations focused on 
engaging with political elites and prominent individuals. Foreign Office figures presumed this 
would lead to a ‘trickle-down effect’, with these officials, in turn, shaping the views of 
ordinary Iranians towards Communism and Britain. Cultural and propaganda initiatives, then, 
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were employed as a means to compete with the US in Iran. Unable to match or afford the 
American government’s military and economic support to the Shah, soft power policies could 
be used to fill the gaps left by the US. With regards to the British Council’s English language 
teaching provision, officials could play on Britain’s supposed prestige of its education 
system, persuading and attracting Iranians towards the UK as a result. 
The US and UK’s respective rationales accordingly shaped the types and nature of 
the propaganda and cultural policies both countries implemented. In seeking to counter 
Soviet subversive activities, American and British officials exploited the Iranian government’s 
willingness to receive assistance and support. The USIS initially supplied anti-Communist 
articles to the Iranian press, proceeding to work with Department of Press and Broadcasting 
(DPB) to shape Radio Tehran’s programming and its reach outside the Iranian capital. As 
well as the Deputy Prime Minister, Nasser Zolfghari, officials from the American agency 
established close links with Nosratollah Moinian, the DPB’s head. Their overall aim was to 
make the government department, which ran Radio Tehran, an anti-Communist bulwark in 
its own right. The UK Foreign Office adopted a similar approach. Their Information Research 
Department (IRD) worked with SAVAK, the Iranian secret and intelligence service. In 
particular, they worked extensively with Teymur Bakhtiar and Hassan Pakravan, SAVAK’s 
Director and Deputy-Director respectively, to produce and disseminate anti-Communist 
propaganda. 
USIS officials, moreover, worked with certain educational institutions to promote the 
American way of life. The US agency relied on these political elites and organisations as a 
platform from which to spread the norms, values and ideas of the United States. The USIS 
collaborated extensively with the University of Tehran. They helped establish a wide-
reaching staff and student exchange programme between the Iranian institution and 
American universities, as well as seeking to improve the University of Tehran’s arts and 
humanities provision. USIS officials also strove to foster a culture of extra-curricular activities 
among Iran’s youths. Through encouraging after-school activities, they hoped to promote the 
idea that the US’ education system, unlike its British or Soviet counterparts, produced more 
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mature, well-balanced individuals. As well as organising youth-activity seminars, USIS 
officials also encouraged Iran’s Education Ministry to provide courses for Iran’s 
schoolteachers on running extra-curricular programmes. Beyond its work in the fields of 
youth activities and higher education, the USIS attempted to promote Iran’s socio-economic 
modernisation. In so doing, they hoped to underline to the Iranian people the US’ role in their 
country’s rejuvenation, fostering positive perceptions of America in the process. Much of the 
American agency’s work here focused on promoting the projects of the Iranian government-
backed Plan Organisation. Having been charged by the Shah with improving Iran’s 
infrastructure, none of its initiatives had proved successful. Most of its schemes, both in rural 
and urban areas, were incomplete and were facing long delays. The increasing public 
backlash towards these developments induced USIS officials to promote the Plan 
Organisation’s activities and work with its senior management to modernise its practices and 
bureaucracy. 
Despite its smaller budget, staffing and resources, the British Council sought to 
compete with the USIS in Iran. It focused much of its energy on English language teaching, 
something British Council officials were confident they could deliver to a higher standard 
than their American counterparts. Before undertaking this approach, the British Council had 
to reopen its offices in Tehran and other major Iranian cities, having been forced to depart in 
1952 during the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis. From their 1955 return, the UK agency focused 
most of their efforts on the teaching of the English language, offering advanced courses to 
educated elites and government officials. To attract these individuals, the British Council 
played on the popular perception that the UK education system was more rigourous than its 
American equivalent. Having reasserted itself, the agency’s senior figures in Iran, most 
notably its chief of operations, Derek Traversi, sought to shape the broader teaching of 
English in the country. Offering pedagogical courses to Iranian teachers of the language, the 
British Council also worked with the Iranian broadcaster Television Iran in the production 
and broadcast of English by Television. The delivery of this programme on terrestrial Iranian 
television was novel, the first time the British Council had used the medium to promote 
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Britain’s values and ideas in any of their overseas posts. As well as audio-visual lessons on 
spelling, grammar and punctuation, the programme informed viewers of British culture, 
norms, ideas and geography. 
Even before the British Council’s February 1955 return to the country, American 
figures had worked with their UK counterparts to achieve shared goals. Notably, officials 
from both countries were keen to promote a united front to both the Soviet Union and the 
Iranian government. US and UK Embassy figures, as well as their respective State 
Department and Foreign Office superiors, feared that a failure to do so would lead to either 
power seeking to ‘divide and rule’ America and Britain. Joint US-UK propaganda, for 
example, stressed how both countries worked together to establish the Baghdad Pact. Radio 
broadcasts and literature distributed across Iran highlighted how both countries envisioned 
the organisation as a vehicle for ensuring geopolitical stability across the region. At the same 
time, US and UK officials worked together to subvert the Communist threat in Iran. USIS 
figures supplied the British-based Farsi-language BBC Persian Service radio station with 
unfavourable stories regarding the Soviet Union, with staff from both embassies 
collaborating to produce anti-Communist press releases.  
Yet, when it came to the promotion of their respective cultures and way of life in Iran, 
USIS officials sought to undermine Britain’s efforts in this field. Senior figures within the 
American agency suspected the British Council of seeking to usurp the USIS as the 
dominant exponent of Western values in Iran. Its officials, accordingly, aimed to sabotage 
the UK institution’s ventures into Iranian education. To negate the impact of the British 
Council’s delivery of English language courses to proficient speakers, the USIS expanded 
their provision and support of Iranian technical and vocational education. They approved the 
opening of a new technical college in Abadan, a city in the oil-rich Khuzestan province that 
the British government had historically been heavily involved in. Officials from the American 
agency hoped to demonstrate to the college’s students and the city’s inhabitants the US’ 
greater interest in their personal and economic development. When the British government-
backed Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) had been the region’s main employer, the 
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organisation had taken little interest in developing the area. USIS figures, moreover, also 
sought to remind Iranians of the negative popular perceptions of Britain in the country. 
Encouraging the British Council to establish a journalism course at the University of Tehran, 
the USIS quickly distanced themselves from the initiative. They aimed to illustrate to the 
Iranian government and people how the subversive nature of this course’s content indicated 
that Britain still sought to meddle in the country’s affairs from afar. 
US State Department and UK Foreign Office officials were convinced that their soft 
power polices had helped make some progress towards their wider goals. Soviet and Tudeh 
activities, while not totally quashed, had been constrained. An increasing number of middle-
class Iranians, likewise, had become increasingly enamoured with American and British 
cultures, norms and values. Senior USIA figures, in their report on the USIS’ activities in 
Iran, had even proclaimed that the agency’s initiatives had undoubtedly helped improve 
elite-level relations between the US and Shah’s government. The extent to which, though, 
the USIS and the British Council had shaped popular perceptions of the Soviet Union and 
Communism, let alone US and UK culture, is unclear and would be a fruitful area for further 
research. Neither agency, crucially, were willing or able to accurately monitor the reception 
of their endeavours or initiatives. This can be attributed in part to the Iranian government 
outlawing the monitoring of views and broadcasts in Iran by external powers. Equally 
pressing, though, was that the USIS and the British Council assumed that the views of the 
Shah’s regime and the country’s people were synonymous. As the Iranian monarch and his 
acolytes had approved the US and UK’s cultural and propaganda initiatives, USIS and 
British Council figures presumed that the Iranian people were equally enthused. Severely 
undermining these US-UK cultural and propaganda initiatives, however, was both countries’ 
shortage of staff and resources. The activities of the USIS and the British Council were 
particularly blighted by these finance and personnel issues. The former was forced to make 
budget cuts by the end of the 1950s due to austerity measures imposed by the USIA and the 
State Department. The latter was unable to spend the money required to match and 
compete with the USIS’ initiatives in Iran.  
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Indeed, the analysis of US and UK soft power in this dissertation highlights certain 
tensions, as well as the competitive element, within the Anglo-American ‘special 
relationship.’ Both countries, while collaborating in many fields, had similar aims but different 
regional priorities in the Middle East. The British government, lacking their own domestic 
supplies of the resource, were desperate to ensure the safe supply of oil from the region. 
Their American counterparts, in contrast, were more concerned with halting the spread of 
Communism. Exacerbating Anglo-US tensions were both countries’ contrasting fortunes of 
the world stage. Britain, post-1945, was a fading international force, relinquishing many of its 
overseas colonies and reducing its global commitments. The US, in comparison, had 
emerged from the Second World War as a political and economic superpower, making and 
shaping the world order. Its diplomats and officials were now taking a greater interest in the 
struggle against Communism in regions such as the Middle East. This thesis highlights how 
these developments caused friction with the Anglo-American ‘special relationship.’ Iran, 
historically, had constituted part of Britain’s ‘informal empire’, with the UK Foreign Office 
dictating political proceedings from afar. Its wider decline, though, reduced its capabilities to 
maintain this influence, culminating in the British government’s loss of control over Iran’s 
petroleum industry in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis’ aftermath. Exploiting Britain’s diminished 
standing in the country, the US had taken its place as the dominant Western power after 
1953, something the UK Foreign Office were determined to reverse. Their reliance on soft 
power policies to achieve this, however, failed, due to their comparative lack of resources 
and the USIS’ surreptitious sabotaging of their activities. By the end of the 1950s, the British 
government were resigned to playing the role of ‘junior partner’ to the US in Iran.  
More broadly, this dissertation suggests that the implementation of American and 
British soft power initiatives in Iran between 1953 and 1960 had implications for the wider 
Cold War. Indeed, the analysis here makes four key contributions to the study of US-UK 
foreign policy in this period. First, it views Anglo-American relations with Iran through the 
prism of soft power. This is an original take on the topic. Previous research has emphasised 
economic and military interactions between the UK, US and Iran. This dissertation 
  313 
supplements the considerable body of literature already produced on the cultural Cold War. 
Many of these histories have considered the use and employment of soft power by the two 
main superpowers to reassert their position on the world stage. Second, it explores the role 
of individuals in the making and shaping of foreign policy initiatives in the Cold War era. The 
soft power policies of both countries in Iran were formulated and delivered by figures within 
the US and UK embassies in Tehran, or by USIS and British Council officials. The USIS’ 
Robert Payne, for instance, was integral to ensuring that the American agency sought to 
promote the American way of life to Iranian people. Similarly, the British Council’s chief of 
operations in Iran, Derek Traversi, was key to the British Council’s return to Tehran, its 
expansion into other Iranian cities and the televisual broadcast of English by Television. The 
role played by individuals within the Shah’s regime cannot be ignored here, either. As 
Deputy Prime Minister, Zolfghari helped encourage the US State Department and UK 
Foreign Office to work with the Iranian government to combat Soviet subversive activities. 
His subordinates, Moinian and Bakhtiar, also worked with the Americans and British 
respectively to contain the spread of Communism in Iran.  
Third, the dissertation illustrates that there was more to American and British 
diplomacy in the Cold War than the containment of Communism. While the need to combat 
supposed Soviet expansion was a key foreign policy concern, equally important to US and 
UK officials was the promotion of their respective cultures overseas. In seeking to expand 
and maintain their prominent positions on the world stage, American and British governing 
elites strove to persuade and attract foreign publics to their respective norms, values and 
ideas. Fourth, and linked to the third point, this PhD demonstrates not just Iran’s importance 
to Anglo-American foreign policy goals, but also soft power’s key role in cementing 
diplomatic ties with the country in the 1950s and beyond. Cultural and propaganda policies, 
clearly, were not just employed as a solution to short-term issues. Rather, they were 
implemented by US and UK officials in the 1950s as part of a broader attempt to cement 
diplomatic ties with a country that was, and remains, geopolitically vital to American and 
British foreign policy goals.
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